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Abstract 
This thesis has two purposes. The first is to offer a critique of existing accounts of 
knowledge in contemporary capitalism. On the one hand, knowledge-based models 
of new growth theory are criticised for privileging some aspects of knowledge whilst 
endogenising it on the basis of a neoclassical framing; many restrictions are placed 
upon knowledge, in general, and its utilisation and diffusion, in particular. On the 
other hand, the bold argument of cognitive capitalism theory, that contemporary 
capitalism is undergoing a transition to a new stage of capitalism and therefore 
Marx’s value theory has lost its validity, is shown to be based on flawed 
understandings of value theory. Externalities play essential roles in both new growth 
theory and cognitive capitalism theory, each being a theory of use value, although 
there is no place for externalities as such in Marx’s value theory. Especially, for 
cognitive capitalism theory, unpaid life activities are seen to contribute significantly 
to production, with surplus being appropriated by capital as rent, which can and 
should be re-appropriated as basic income. The latter is, however, understood in 
cognitive capitalism theory as factor remuneration derived from the production of 
surplus products and, in this respect, it has an affinity with neoclassical economics 
despite its purported commitment to Marx’s method. 
The second purpose is to incorporate the role of knowledge into Marx’s value theory 
in a consistent and coherent manner. Criticising the two contending approaches in 
the South Korean controversy on the value and price of information commodities, 
this thesis puts forward an alternative based on a structural distinction between 
knowledge and commodities. It is demonstrated that knowledge affects the 
determination of the productivity and complexity of (collective) commodity-
producing labour within and across sectors, respectively, and therefore takes part in 
the determination of the value of commodities. This social process of virtual 
multiplication of labour is a relatively abstract formulation of the role of knowledge 
in contemporary capitalism, but it also provides a logical foundation upon which 
more concrete and complex, and constructive, theories of knowledge can be built.  
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1. Introduction1 
1.1. Overview 
Discourses and theories of knowledge and the knowledge economy have been 
flourishing. Beniger (1986) provides a list of 76 terms which were introduced 
between 1950 and 1984 to conceptualise (putatively fundamental) technological and 
societal changes. More well-known terms such as post-Fordism, the creative 
economy (UNCTAD & UNDP, 2008 and 2010; Howkins, 2001) and cognitive 
capitalism were introduced in the late 1990s and early 2000s,2 and there is yet no 
sign that the pace is slowing down, with the sharing economy, Wikinomics, the gig 
economy and the flat white economy being recent additions. Despite the diversity 
and creativity in terms of naming and empirical details, the key elements and 
characteristics of the knowledge economy and the like are remarkably similar and 
relatively simple. First, much emphasis is placed upon the critical role of knowledge, 
information, flexibility and creativity and their (good or bad) impacts on the 
economy and the society as a whole. Second, knowledge, information and creativity 
are considered as exhibiting key characteristics of a public good, bringing to the fore 
the role of intellectual property rights and government in fostering innovation and 
maximising the growth potential of the economy. Third, whilst many try to 
incorporate both continuity and discontinuity of capitalism in the new era (David & 
Foray, 2002), most lean toward the latter.3 For example, Stiglitz (1999, p. 37) says 
(somewhat self-contradictorily): 
To be sure, we still face the economics of scarcity. But just as the importance 
of land in production changed dramatically as the economy moved from 
agriculture to industry, so too does the movement to a knowledge economy 
necessitate a rethinking of economic fundamentals. 
Fourth, however, the definition of a term like the knowledge economy is at best 
ambiguous. The reality that it attempts to capture is considered as continually 
                                                
1 Parts of early drafts of this thesis were published in Jeon (2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2012, 
2013) and Fine, Gimm and Jeon (2010). From the co-authored piece, only my own material 
is used. 
2 For a genealogy of the knowledge economy, see Kenway, Bullen, Fahey, and Robb (2006, 
Chapter 1). 
3 For early critical literature surveys, see May (2002), Webster (2002) and Kumar (1995). 
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evolving and thus hard to pin down (UNCTAD & UNDP, 2010).  
In sum, although framed within the context of a grand historical narrative, the 
knowledge economy and the like are underdeveloped theoretically and, subject to 
various often idiosyncratic detail, do not go further than positing that the economy 
is increasingly organised around the production, diffusion, exchange and 
consumption of knowledge. As Huws (1999, pp. 29-30) puts it in one aspect, “these 
are not academic inquiries into the nature of the universe; they are practical 
manuals for managers and policy-makers”. Similarly, the notion of the knowledge 
economy is “so rhetorical rather than analytically useful” (Smith, 2002, p. 4). 
In this respect, having played only a limited role in theories of contemporary 
capitalism until relatively recently, knowledge was thrust suddenly, but largely 
inappropriately, onto the analytical stage. For Mirowski (2011), such a hastened 
elevation of knowledge to a more prominent level in economic theories and 
discourses is ascribed to the rise of interest in information within the natural 
sciences (and its rapid propagation to the social sciences) and the promotion of the 
idea that the market not only allocates material goods but also processes and 
distributes knowledge and information in optimal ways (Hayek, 1945). At the same 
time, the scale and scope of the (material) technological developments since World 
War II have been certainly remarkable. This includes the rapid development of 
micro-electronics technologies and the widespread diffusion of information and 
communication technologies. Bio- and nano- and alternative energy technologies 
are emerging as new frontiers. Not only has all this changed the everyday life of 
ordinary people, but the economy, especially its industrial structure, has been 
reshaped significantly. Productivity for existing products has soared and the pace of 
the creation of new products has been accelerated, raising the question of 
measurement of intangibles in GDP and financial reporting (Gordon, 2000 and 
2010; Corrado, Haltiwanger & Sichel, 2005; Corrado & Hulten, 2010; Lev, 2001). In 
addition, with the development of a stronger intellectual property rights regime, the 
separation between knowledge production (R&D) and commodity production 
(manufacturing) has deepened, giving rise to the emergence of a group of companies 
specialised in IP (intellectual property) and manufacturing, respectively. Whilst it 
does not necessarily follow from these that our time is different (Standage, 1998),4 it 
                                                
4 “Today we are repeatedly told that we are in the midst of a communications revolution. But 
the electric telegraph was, in many ways, far more disconcerting for the inhabitants of the 
time than today’s advances are for us. If any generation has the right to claim that it bore the 
 
8 
is true that there has been a significant change in the way knowledge is produced, 
traded and consumed, raising empirical and analytical questions. It is against the 
background of all of these material, ideological and academic developments that the 
knowledge economy should be located, be it a theory, a discourse or a policy 
initiative.  
The main purpose of this thesis is, then, to situate knowledge in Marxist political 
economy, in general, and value theory, in particular. The method for doing so is to 
revisit Marx’s value theory selectively with attempts to explain and incorporate the 
role of knowledge at various levels of analysis. This can be done within two 
extremes. On the one hand, at the most simple and abstract level, knowledge is a 
precondition for commodity production in the sense that one should first have a 
design and necessary skills to be able to produce something. On the other hand, 
whether the growing significance of knowledge constitutes a new stage of capitalism 
or even a new mode of production can be explored. Importantly, the progression 
from one to the other should be step-by-step following Marx’s method, and 
especially the latter should not be taken up until the roles of knowledge and their 
variegated forms in contemporary capitalism are identified and clarified. 
This by no means suggests that the role of knowledge is absent in Marx’s works. 
Although there is no chapter in his Capital which specifically deals with knowledge, 
he provides detailed and rich accounts of machinery and large-scale industry in 
Capital, in the Grundrisse and in the 1861-63 manuscript. In these, his theory of 
knowledge, especially of science and technology, is intertwined with, and cannot be 
easily separated from, his analysis of the structures, processes and underlying 
tendencies of capitalism. For example, Marx’s theory of competition presumes that 
there are productivity differences between competing capitals within a sector. 
Whilst knowledge production or R&D as such is not mentioned, it is implicit in his 
analysis of competition that each individual capitalist ceaselessly attempts to 
increase the productivity of labour by way of the production and use of knowledge. 
In addition, the tendency of the organic composition of capital (OCC) to rise is 
inconceivable without assuming that a part of the total social labour is devoted to 
the production of knowledge. More fundamentally, for Marx, from very early on, it is 
a systemic character of capitalism that the productive powers of society develop on 
                                                                                                                                     
full bewildering, world-shrinking brunt of such a revolution, it is not us — it is our 
nineteenth-century forebears” (Standage, 1998, p. 213). 
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an unprecedented scale and at an incomparable speed: “The bourgeoisie cannot 
exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby 
the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society” (CW6, p. 
487). 
However, knowledge production as a structural element in capitalism is not 
recognised explicitly and Marxist scholars have not paid much attention to the role 
of knowledge, with labour process theory (LPT) being the most prominent 
exception. In some cases, based on the presumption that there is no role of 
knowledge in Marx’s value theory, either the need to incorporate knowledge into 
value theory is discarded or the validity of value theory for contemporary capitalism 
is denied. 
Therefore, there are a number of compelling reasons to develop a theory of 
knowledge in contemporary capitalism based on Marx’s value theory. First, the 
excesses of grand specifications of contemporary capitalism centred on knowledge, 
information and creativity simply need to be corrected and the focus should be 
shifted to identifying and clarifying the roles of knowledge in capitalism. Second, the 
best way of repudiating the claim that value theory has lost its validity is to 
demonstrate that knowledge can be incorporated into value theory in a consistent 
and coherent manner without altering or abandoning any of the core elements of 
value theory. Third, given the relative underdevelopment of economic theories of 
knowledge in mainstream economics, it provides an opportunity to challenge the 
orthodoxy, especially its inadequacy for theorising knowledge and information 
(Mirowski, 2009). 
For this purpose, Marx’s distinction between value and use value, or the dual nature 
of the commodity, is of great importance. Simply put, whilst an increase in the level 
of social knowledge necessarily involves an expansion of use value production in 
quantity, quality and diversity, it does not directly affect value production (a growth 
in productivity may lead to an increase, decrease or no change in total value 
produced). Without such a distinction, mainstream economics can analyse 
knowledge and its contribution to production only in use value terms and 
technological development can only be conceived as leading to output growth and 
productivity growth in price terms, with productivity determined ex post (the ratio 
of output to a weighted sum of inputs). Hence, the productivity paradox that the 
rapid development and wide adoption of computers and information technologies 
have yet to boost total factor productivity sufficiently can never be resolved 
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satisfactorily unless the economy grows at a much faster rate than usual for a 
sustained period.5 By contrast, such a conundrum does not exist in value theory as 
productivity (defined in use value terms) and total value produced are completely 
decoupled. 
The remainder of this section is devoted to providing an overview of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 is concerned with reviewing the development of the new growth theory 
and Romer’s 1990 model in particular, which is often considered as the theoretical 
foundation of theories of the knowledge economy (OECD, 1996; World Bank, 2007; 
Kenway et al., 2006). The focus is, then, placed upon assessing how knowledge is 
modelled and incorporated into endogenous growth models as the sole engine of 
growth (in the presence of intellectual property rights). They are, above all, an 
extension of Solow’s neoclassical growth theory in the sense that the primary goal of 
modelling is to generate a long-term sustained growth path consisting of 
equilibrium points. Technically, this means that increasing returns at the aggregate 
level (growth) should be theorised as the outcome of non-increasing returns at the 
individual level (equilibrium), shifting the focus of growth theory from comparing 
equilibrium paths for the economy and different policy options to explaining and 
reconstructing growth on the basis of a set of growth-generating factors. Whereas 
Solow only identified the existence of an unobservable factor that bridges non-
increasing returns with increasing returns and left it unexplained, each endogenous 
growth model attempts to, and is compelled to, provide a theory of the engine of 
growth, be it knowledge, information, creativity, education or any combination of 
these. It is certainly a daunting task, because such factor(s) of production should 
exhibit both non-increasing returns and increasing returns at the same time.6 Whilst 
knowledge is simply and unduly assumed to do so in Romer’s 1986 model — with 
the corresponding contradiction resolved magically by positive externalities of 
knowledge — in his more sophisticated 1990 model, the contradiction is projected to 
the economy by dividing it largely into two sectors, namely the intermediate and 
final goods sectors and the knowledge sector representing and being responsible for 
                                                
5 For the productivity paradox literature, see Gordon (2000), Triplett (1999), Brynjolfsson 
(1993), Brynjolfsson and Yang (1996) and Brynjolfsson and Saunders (2010). 
6 It is a striking if unobserved feature of such models that externalities (around knowledge) 
are never internalised despite being attached to the long run. It is as if other branches of the 
mainstream, not least those associated with, and derived from, Coase simply do not exist. 
This is all indicative of the extent to which the mainstream is itself driven by the technical 
assumptions necessary to obtain desired results as opposed to consistency and realism. 
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equilibrium and growth, respectively. Although it is a neat solution from a technical 
point of view and does generate a long-term sustained growth as expected, the 
presumption that knowledge production and commodity production are completely 
separated from each other and therefore a firm can produce either knowledge or 
commodity but not both is simply wrong. More generally, although many 
compromises are imposed upon the modelling of knowledge and the economy to fit 
them into the neoclassical framework, incorporation of knowledge into neoclassical 
growth theory remains less than successful. Knowledge-based endogenous growth 
models are inferior to micro-level theories of innovation and technological change, 
and so such models do not add much to the neoclassical understanding of growth. 
By contrast, Chapter 3 demonstrates that knowledge can be incorporated into 
(Marxist) value theory in a consistent and coherent manner without abandoning any 
of the core elements of value theory or imposing simplifying assumptions on 
knowledge. First, an important structural distinction between knowledge and 
commodities is drawn at the most abstract and simple level of analysis; knowledge is 
indispensable for commodity production, but it is not a commodity. It follows 
that knowledge does not have value and nor does it transfer value to the 
final products during the production process. This abstract and fundamental 
distinction is reproduced at more concrete and complex levels of analysis, logically 
and historically. Second, this understanding of the nature of knowledge is different 
from two contending approaches put forward in the controversy on the value and 
price of information commodities among South Korean value theorists. The 
‘monopoly price approach’ argues that knowledge (the source code of software) does 
not contribute to the value of commodities (installation packages of software) at all 
and the ‘cost approach’ considers knowledge as a means of production, transferring 
value to the final products in a piecemeal fashion. These two approaches are 
criticised and a new approach is proposed. In short, it is shown that knowledge takes 
part in the determination of the productivity and complexity of commodity-
producing labour within and across sectors, respectively. If an individual capital’s 
knowledge is more advanced than the sectoral average (within a sector) and/or if the 
sector is a knowledge-intensive one (or the sectoral average knowledge is more 
advanced than the economy-wide social average), commodity-producing labour of 
this capital acts as multiplied labour because it is more productive than the sectoral 
average labour and/or more complex than the economy-wide average labour. In 
short, knowledge can virtually multiply commodity-producing labour and individual 
capitals with advanced knowledge can realise surplus profit as long as the 
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competitive advantage is maintained. 
Chapter 4 is devoted to critically reviewing the key features of cognitive capitalism 
theory and the interpretations of value theory underpinning its rejection of the 
validity of value theory for contemporary capitalism. Instead of getting involved in 
the debate over whether we live in a new stage of capitalism, our critique focuses on 
demonstrating that the rejection of value theory in cognitive capitalism theory is 
based on serious misinterpretations of value theory. First, based on a naturalistic 
and physiological interpretation of abstract labour as pure expenditure of human 
energy, the proponents of cognitive capitalism theory ignore the role of knowledge 
in the determination of value (as in the monopoly price approach). Second, then, the 
separation between conception (knowledge production) and execution (commodity 
production) is seen as the condition of value production since, for them, only the 
latter is measurable by labour time and value is all about the imposition of measure. 
According to this understanding of value theory, the applicability of value is limited 
and attached to a specific form of the division of labour. And value is necessarily 
degraded into a technical category from a social category expressing the social 
relations between producers. Third, on the basis of the (casual) observation that 
cognitive labour is replacing simple and repetitive manual labour as the hegemonic 
form of labour in contemporary capitalism, it is argued that the form of the division 
of labour underpinning value production is collapsing and therefore new theories of 
value are required. Although no such theory has been developed as yet, with 
measurability as such being denied, any theory of value in cognitive capitalism can 
only be a theory of use value, in which Marx’s distinction between value and use 
value would no longer be valid. 
Chapter 5 is concerned with intellectual property rights and rent theory. Instead of 
situating intellectual property rights at more concrete and complex levels of 
analysis, the three interpretations of value theory criticised in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4 provide relatively crude and simple conclusions on the role of intellectual 
property rights. First, for the monopoly price approach, intellectual property rights 
are equated with monopoly pricing. Knowledge is understood as being freely 
available by nature and, therefore, if there were no intellectual property rights, the 
price of commodities produced in knowledge-intensive sectors would be much lower 
(zero in case of information commodities). From this point of view, knowledge 
becomes scarce only because of intellectual property rights, giving rights holders the 
power to extract surplus profit which they are not entitled to otherwise. However, 
intellectual property rights are not specific to knowledge-intensive sectors only and, 
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therefore, to be consistent with the approach, we should conclude that monopoly 
pricing is preponderant across the economy (and, historically, not only in the 
contemporary period); where there are intellectual property rights, there must be 
monopoly pricing. This unfortunately leads to the (implicit) rejection of the validity 
of value theory for contemporary capitalism despite the strong adherence and 
commitment of the proponents of this approach to value theory.  
Second, in the cost approach, intellectual property rights are seen to transform 
surplus profit into rent. It is argued that Marx’s theory of ground rent applies to 
anything that is non-replicable and can be the source of surplus profit if its use is 
monopolised. In other words, some surplus profits become rents because they 
satisfy certain conditions. Consequently, rent becomes a special form of surplus 
profit, a classificatory concept, and Marx’s rent theory is degraded into a static 
distribution theory, with property rights playing no role in determining value 
production, in general, and capital investments, in particular. By contrast, for Marx, 
ground rent is an economic category that expresses a historically specific form of 
landed property and its consequences for the development of large-scale agriculture. 
His theory of ground rent is, then, an application of his value theory to agriculture in 
the presence of a historically specific form of landed property. His emphasis is 
placed upon showing that the capitalist form of landed property obstructs the 
development of modern agriculture in a number of ways, which are expressed in 
different forms of ground rent (differential rent II and absolute rent). Whilst his 
analysis of ground rent is certainly useful for developing a theory of knowledge in 
contemporary capitalism, transplanting it to different industries organised around 
different (intellectual) property systems should be avoided. 
Third, rent is suggested as the central category in cognitive capitalism theory. As a 
use value theory, it is interested in showing that knowledge plays much more 
important roles than in previous stage of capitalism whilst increasingly being 
produced outside both workplace and the capital-labour relation, which is then seen 
as exacerbating the measurability problem and making it difficult to identify who 
has contributed to production and how much. Regardless of these practical 
problems, it is also argued that capitalists do not play any meaningful role in the 
production process but they can continue to appropriate a portion of total output 
only by way of intellectual property rights. As a corollary, they no longer earn profit 
because they do not contribute to production but only appropriate rent by 
monopolising important factors of production, not least knowledge. From this point 
of view, then, intellectual property rights should be eradicated and the portion of 
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total output that is being currently appropriated by capitalists as rent should be re-
appropriated by the members of society as basic income. Leaving aside the problem 
of measuring the contribution of workers and non-workers to the production of the 
‘common’ (given its immeasurability), the idea that basic income can be justified 
because we are being paid less than our collective contributions ties the fate of basic 
income to that of cognitive capitalism theory and therefore can turn out to be 
detrimental to the cause of basic income. 
In Chapter 6, we attempt to develop a constructive theory of knowledge on the basis 
of the virtual multiplication approach put forward in Chapter 3 and in light of the 
deficiencies and flaws of the theories criticised in earlier chapters. In doing this, the 
following principles are applied. First, we develop a value theory of knowledge, not a 
use value theory. This is simply because knowledge production in capitalism is 
driven primarily by value production and the drive for accumulation. As a result of 
knowledge production, the production of use value expands significantly in quantity, 
quality and diversity, but only as a by-product. This by no means suggests that the 
relations between knowledge and use value should be ignored, but any attempt to 
build a use value theory of knowledge cannot bypass known theoretical conundrums 
related to productivity such as the productivity paradox and Baumol’s cost disease 
(Baumol, 2012). Second, as we develop a more complex and concrete theory of 
knowledge, for example, by bringing intellectual property rights into the analysis, so 
too the distinction between knowledge and commodities necessarily takes more 
complex and concrete forms. It is not only that these forms are the logical unfolding 
of the distinction, but they can and should be wedded to an analysis of the 
historically specific forms of knowledge production in contemporary capitalism. 
Third, given that intellectual property rights have different effects in different 
industries, there can be no general theory of intellectual property rights, not to 
mention a general rent theory. Rather, the focus should be placed upon analysing 
the interplay of intellectual property rights with industry-specific dynamics and its 
consequences. These principles underpin our brief analysis of the digital music 
industry, the semiconductor industry and outsourcing, respectively. In all three 
examples, intellectual property rights allow for specialisation and play important 
roles in shaping and transforming the value chain dynamics. However, in case of the 
recorded music industry, with the rapid and widespread adoption of digital 
technologies and the continuing introduction of new business models, especially the 
subscription streaming model, record labels (intellectual property rights holders) 
are increasingly trying to exploit and develop new business opportunities to 
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generate new and stable royalty revenue streams, sometimes obstructing capital 
investments aimed at increasing the user base and launching innovative products 
and services. In the semiconductor industry, the distinction between knowledge and 
commodities appears as the division of innovative labour between (fabless and 
chipless) companies specialised in chip design and foundries specialised in 
manufacturing. Intellectual property rights are not only the basis of the deepening 
of specialisation in the industry but also can be seen as largely fostering innovation, 
with the industry as a whole relying on chipless companies (which license chip 
designs) such as ARM and Imagination Technologies for basic and fundamental 
industry-wide R&D. In this respect, whilst chipless companies earn licensing fees 
and royalties, these have nothing to do with exploiting advances made by others. 
Outsourcing of manufacturing deals with the other side of specialisation and also 
relies on intellectual property rights. In this case, however, contract manufacturing 
companies earn neither licensing fees nor royalties, but are paid for their contract 
manufacturing services. Then, whilst licensing fees and royalties indeed arise from 
intellectual property rights, the latter is not necessarily economically realised 
through the former. In addition, outsourcing, by definition, does not involve any 
direct labour on the purchaser side. The contract manufacturing company (e.g. 
Foxconn) provides contract manufacturing services produced by workers employed 
by the company. And the final product of the purchaser (e.g. Apple’s iPad) is 
produced by combining manufacturing services with other means of production. 
Foxconn workers contribute to the value of iPads only indirectly by way of 
producing manufacturing services. This suggests that information commodities 
whose production requires next to no direct labour is in fact not an exception. 
1.2. Method and the dual nature of the commodity 
Against this background, this section examines the dual nature of the commodity 
and its development and concretisation in the first volume of Capital. This is 
important for the following reasons. First, as mentioned earlier, in theorising 
knowledge on the basis of value theory, the distinction between value and use value 
is of great importance. Significantly, the dual nature is not simply two opposing 
aspects of a commodity, but it permeates the understanding of capitalism across all 
levels of abstraction, with the commodity being its most simple and abstract form. 
Then, tracing the development of the dual nature should be an essential part of 
complex and concrete analyses of knowledge. In other words, the logical and 
historical unfolding of the distinction between knowledge production and 
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commodity production should be theorised as the result of, and in the context of, the 
logical and historical development of the dual nature of the commodity, progressing 
from the simple and abstract to the complex and concrete.7 Second, and more 
specifically, especially with the introduction of the large-scale industry based on 
machinery, the opposition between value and use value develops into real 
contradiction and struggle, in which knowledge plays a crucial role in establishing 
the dominance of value over use value (in the social labour process), such that 
human beings are degraded from being the subject of labour to human material for 
both the operation of machinery (in the labour process) and exploitation (in the 
valorisation process). With knowledge playing mediating roles in the development 
of the dual nature of the commodity, the dialectical relations between knowledge 
and commodity need to be recognised and analysed.  
Whilst this section is concerned with laying out the methodological principles of this 
thesis, it is a contribution to the study of Marx’s method and, to that extent, can be 
read independently of the other parts of the thesis. 
The dual nature of the commodity 
Marx opens Capital with the commodity. This is not an arbitrary choice; he does so 
because the commodity, to him, is the elementary form of the social wealth or the 
“economic cell-form” (CI, p. 90) of the bourgeois society. The analysis of the 
commodity “deal[s] with minutiae, but so similarly does microscopic anatomy”. For 
Marx, the bourgeois society or the capitalist mode of production is an organic whole, 
of which the commodity form is the seed or gene with the capacity of underpinning 
the adult organism. 
                                                
7 Jessop and Sum (2006, pp. 303-304) distinguish the movement from the abstract to the 
concrete from that from the simple to the complex. The former is “the increasing 
concretisation of a given phenomenon (for example, from commodities in general to labour 
power as a fictitious commodity to the wage relation, on to the determination of the nominal 
wage to the real wage, and so on)”. The latter is about “introducing further dimensions of a 
given phenomenon (for example, state, capitalist state, patriarchal capitalist state, 
multicultural patriarchal capitalist state, and so on)”. In his defence of the regulation 
approach on the basis of critical realism, Jessop (2001, p. 99) also argues that Marx tended 
to ignore the movement from the simple to the complex, although he considers that it is 
implicit in his method: “Although Marx himself did not explicate this distinction between 
types of theoretical movement, it is certainly implicit in his well-known statement that one 
should aim to reproduce the ‘real-concrete’ as a ‘concrete-in-thought’, i.e., as the concrete 
synthesis of multiple determinations and relations”. 
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Starting his presentation from commodity, not from the “concept of value” (CW24, 
p. 544), Marx immediately draws attention to the dual nature of commodity, being 
both a use value and a value. Use value and value are interdependent: a commodity 
is a value only if it is a use value and it can be consumed only after it is exchanged. 
At the same time they are mutually exclusive or in opposition with each other: 
commodities, as use-values, are distinguished from each other in quality, but as 
values, only in quantity; value abstracts from use value and contains nothing related 
to use value; use value explains consumption and value exchange. Significantly, for 
Marx, the dual nature is the essential characteristic of commodities: “Iron, linen, 
corn, etc. are only commodities because they have a dual nature, because they are at 
the same time objects of utility and bearers of value” (CI, p. 138).8 
By the same token, labour has a dual nature; commodity-producing labour is at once 
concrete labour and abstract labour. As is the case with the commodity, labour is 
considered only in terms of quality in its relation with use value and only of quantity 
                                                
8 Marx “was the first to point out and examine critically this twofold nature of the labour” 
and “this point is crucial to an understanding of political economy” (CI, p. 132). He 
mentioned in a letter to Engels right after the publication of the first volume of Capital, 
dated August 24, 1867, that “the two-fold character of labour [emphasis removed]” (CW42, 
p. 407) is one of the two best points of the book, which is “fundamental to all understanding 
of the FACTS”. In another letter to Engels dated January 8, 1868, he again pointed out that 
the dual nature of labour is one of “the three fundamentally new elements of” the first 
volume of Capital:  
The economists, without exception, have missed the simple fact that, if the commodity 
has the double character of use value and exchange value, then the labour represented in 
the commodity must also have a double character; thus the bare analysis of labour sans 
phrase, as in Smith, Ricardo, etc., is bound to come up against the inexplicable 
everywhere. This is, in fact, the whole secret of the critical conception. (p. 514) 
The discovery and refinement of the notion of the dual nature of the commodity had a long 
gestation period. The basic idea of the dual nature appears in his early works. For example, 
in On the Jewish Question written in 1844, Marx says: 
Where the political state has attained its true development, man—not only in thought, in 
consciousness, but in reality, in life—leads a twofold life [emphasis added], a heavenly 
and an earthly life: life in the political community, in which he considers himself a 
communal being, and life in civil society, in which he acts as a private individual, 
regards other men as a means, degrades himself into a means, and becomes the 
plaything of alien powers. (CW3, p. 154) 
In addition, in German Ideology written in 1845, he says: 
The production of life, both of one’s own in labour and of fresh life in procreation, now 
appears as a twofold relation [emphasis added]: on the one hand as a natural, on the 
other as a social relation—social in the sense that it denotes the co-operation of several 
individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what end. (CW5, p. 
43) 
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in its relation with value. For this reason, concrete labour is concerned with how 
labour is performed and what it produces, whereas in abstract labour how and what 
are abstracted away, leaving only how much labour has been expended, i.e. the 
duration of labour. More importantly, whereas abstract labour is the substance of 
value, concrete labour is only a factor of production. Whilst the final outcome of 
concrete labour is certainly a product of labour, labour alone is not sufficient to 
produce useful things. “As William Petty says, labour is the father of material 
wealth, the earth is its mother” (CI, p. 134). 
At this abstract level of analysis, put forward in the first two sections of Chapter 1 of 
Volume 1 of Capital, a commodity is viewed only as an isolated thing with a dual 
nature, but with no particular relation with other commodities whatsoever. 9 
However, commodities as values are “expressions of an identical social substance, 
human labour” (p. 138) and therefore “purely social” (p. 139), presupposing “the 
social relation between commodity and commodity”. At the same time, it is a 
contradiction that the value of a commodity is expressed in its use value, so it must 
be expressed in the relations with other commodities. With the level of abstraction 
becoming more concrete to encompass the value relations and value expressions, 
the dual nature of the commodity also takes a more concrete and complex form. 
The expression of value 
In the simplest value relation between two commodities A and B which contains 
“the whole mystery of the form of value”, the value of a commodity A is expressed in 
the other commodity B.10 With the value of commodity A acquiring a form of 
                                                
9 The dual nature of the commodity does not derive from the specific material characteristics 
of products of labour, but presupposes a historically specific society in which commodities 
are mass produced and exchanged in the market: “The product of labour is an object of 
utility in all states of society; but it is only a historically specific epoch of development which 
presents the labour expended in the production of a useful article as an ‘objective’ property 
of that article, i.e. as its value. It is only then that the product of labour becomes transformed 
into a commodity” (CI, pp. 153-154). 
10 Lapavitsas (2005) considers the simple form of value as a simple and accidental form of 
exchange, not of value, with “one trader taking the initiative and requesting exchange with 
the other” (p. 103). For him: 
The successive ‘forms of value’ are treated as stages in the development of exchange 
value, which is also the process through which money emerges in commodity exchange 
… the development of the form of value is not a summing up of the historical process of 
money’s emergence but represents the logical unfolding of relations among commodity 
owners as they interact in exchange [emphasis added]”. (p. 102) 
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expression independent of its material form, the dual nature of the commodity is 
externalised. In this expression of value, the material form of commodity A has 
nothing to do with its value whereas that of commodity B functions purely as the 
body of value. In other words, “the natural form of commodity A figures only as the 
aspect of use value, while the natural form of B figures only as the form of value, or 
aspect of value” (CI, p. 153). These two commodities “are two inseparable moments, 
which belong to and mutually condition each other” (pp. 139-140). At the same time, 
they are also mutually exclusive, given that a commodity can be either in the relative 
form or in the equivalent form, but not in both concurrently. The mutual 
dependence and exclusivity between the two commodities in the expression of value 
is an externalised and developed form of the mutual dependence and exclusivity 
between value and use value: 
The internal opposition between use value and value, hidden within the 
commodity, is therefore represented on the surface by an external opposition, 
i.e. by a relation between two commodities such that the one commodity, 
whose own value is supposed to be expressed, counts directly only as a use 
value, whereas the other commodity, in which that value is to be expressed, 
counts directly only as exchange value. Hence the simple form of value of a 
commodity is the simple form of appearance of the opposition between use 
value and value which is contained within the commodity. (p. 153) 
The differentiation of commodities into commodities and money 
Marx’s analysis then moves forward to the process of exchange, in Chapter 2 of 
Volume 1 of Capital. For each party taking part in an exchange, it is both an 
individual process obtaining a use value and a social process realising the value of 
his commodity. From the viewpoint of the former, a commodity owner wants a 
particular use value that can satisfy his particular need. In case of the latter, 
however, the same owner expects the exchange to have nothing to do with the use 
value of his commodity as he considers it only as a value: “Every other commodity 
counts as the particular equivalent of his own commodity. Hence his own 
commodity is the universal equivalent for all the others” (p. 180). Whereas there are 
two distinct roles in the expression of value, the relative form of value and the 
equivalent form, commodities, and their owners, enter into an exchange as equals. 
It is therefore not acceptable to respect the need of one party for the acquisition of a 
                                                                                                                                     
By contrast, in Chapter 1 of the first volume of Capital, Marx analyses the expression of value 
and the form of value only, not exchange.  
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particular use value whilst ignoring the same need of the other party. Consequently, 
exchange cannot occur unless by chance and the relations between the two 
commodities fail to go beyond the expression of value in thought. 
According to Marx, to break the impasse, people already “acted before thinking” (CI, 
p. 180), by bringing their commodities into a relation with a particular commodity. 
As the result of this social action, “money necessarily crystallises out of the process 
of exchange” (p. 181),11 differentiating commodities into commodities and money, 
with the latter being the general equivalent in which all commodities express their 
values. This also establishes an all-round, if indirect, relation among all 
commodities, namely “the world of commodities” (p. 129). A commodity remains as 
both a use value and a value within the world of commodities, hence the dual nature 
is preserved, but the value side of the commodity attains the independent and 
external form of existence in money. The commodity, in its material form, is now 
considered only as a use value and, conversely, the material form of the money 
commodity only as pure value crystal.12 Marx sums up the process of externalisation 
dialectically, and as if value drives the transition as the self-acting subject,13 as 
                                                
11 “Money does not originate by convention, any more than the State does. It arises from 
exchange, grows naturally out of exchange, is a product of exchange [emphasis added]” 
(CW28, p. 102). 
12 In the Grundrisse, Marx often equates value with money as if money is a property of 
commodity: for example, “The exchange value of the commodity is its immanent monetary 
attribute” (CW28, p. 84); “In so far as money no longer exists as a quality of commodities, as 
their general attribute, but is individualised alongside them, it becomes itself a particular 
commodity among the other commodities (subject to the determination of demand and 
supply; can be divided into particular types of money, etc.)” (p. 88); “All commodities are 
transitory money” (p. 87); “All commodities are merely perishable money … the commodity 
is only local money” (p. 164). Similarly, “money is an essential aspect of the commodity” 
(CW32, p. 132).  
13 The externalisation of the dual nature of the commodity is both the precondition for, and 
the result of, the internal opposition between value and use value. As we have seen earlier, 
the dual nature presupposes the historical condition that commodity production and 
exchange are generalised in the economy, which requires the everyday use of money more 
than anything else. At the same time, the differentiation of commodities into commodities 
and money and the development of the all-round relation among all commodities are the 
result of the externalisation of the dual nature. According to Marx (CW28, p. 208), in “every 
organic system”, “everything posited is … also a premiss”. 
On the difference between precondition/result and cause/effect, Ollman (2003, p. 121) 
writes:  
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follows:  
The need to give an external expression [emphasis added] to this opposition 
[between use value and value] for the purposes of commercial intercourse 
produces the drive [emphasis added] towards an independent form of value, 
which finds neither rest nor peace until an independent form has been 
achieved by the differentiation of commodities into commodities and money. 
(CI, p. 181) 
                                                                                                                                     
The complex interaction by which the cause is itself shaped and made adequate to its 
task by the effect, now functioning in its turn as a cause, is easily lost or distorted, even 
where—as in Marx’s case—causes and effects are viewed as internally related. If Marx 
still uses the formulation ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ (or ‘condition,’ ‘determine,’ and ‘produce’ in 
the sense of ‘cause’), this is usually a shorthand and first approximation for bringing out 
for purposes of exposition some special feature in a conclusion whose essential 
connections have been uncovered by studying them as preconditions and results. 
He continues:  
Unable to follow Marx’s practice in making abstractions, lacking a conception of internal 
relations and a workable grasp of the often conflicting demands of inquiry and 
exposition, most of Marx’s readers have forced his words on precondition and result into 
a causal framework. The components of capitalism get divided into causes (or 
conditions, generally understood as weak or broad causes) and effects, with the result 
that the former, separated from their real causes, are made to appear historical, possibly 
natural, as something that cannot be changed or even seriously questioned. 
Given this distinction, whereas knowledge is the cause and economic growth the effect in 
new growth theory, knowledge is the precondition and accumulation the result in value 
theory, see Section 2.5. In addition, in the following quotes from Marx, “arise from” should 
be understood as linking preconditions with results, not causes with effects: “The properties 
of a thing do not arise from [emphasis added] its relations to other things, they are, on the 
contrary, merely activated by such relations” (CI, p. 149); “The form of value, that is, the 
expression of the value of a commodity, arises from [emphasis added] the nature of 
commodity-value, as opposed to value and its magnitude arising from their mode of 
expression as exchange-value” (p. 152).  
In a similar vein, Leopold (2007, pp. 48-49) argues that Marx takes a two-stage approach in 
reconstructing and reinterpreting Hegel’s philosophy: 
These two stages — which he characterises as the ‘transformation of the empirical into 
the speculative and the speculative into the empirical’ — are said to form the systole and 
diastole of Hegel’s speculative method. … Marx … portrays this two-stage process at the 
heart of absolute idealism in terms of a distinctive and recurring pattern of ‘inversion’. 
Initially, concepts which are themselves derived from the finite empirical world are 
characterised as elements of an a priori categorical framework. Subsequently, that 
(purportedly) a priori categorical framework is characterised as actualising itself in the 
essential features of the finite world. In this way, the empirical world — from which the 
categorical framework is in fact derived — becomes transformed into (or, more 
accurately, is redescribed as) the manifestation of that conceptual system. Marx 
describes the subject of the ‘inversion’ here in a variety of ways. At one point, he 
summarises speculative construction as a process in which ‘the fact which serves as a 
starting point [that is, empirical reality] is not seen as such but as a mystical result’. The 
same twofold process is characterised in terms of a series of parallel reversals whereby 
‘the condition is posited as the conditioned, the determinator as the determined, the 
producer as the product’. 
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The contradiction inherent in the dual nature of the commodity, that an act of 
exchange cannot be both the social process of value realisation and the individual 
process of use value acquisition to both parties, is “both realised and resolved” (CI, 
p. 198) by the selection of a particular commodity as money. It is resolved because 
with money, value realisation (sale) and use value acquisition (purchase) are 
separated from each other, and it is realised or actualised because the internal 
opposition between value and use value is externalised. Importantly, the new 
external opposition between money and commodities gives rise to the two functions 
of money — measure and instrument of circulation, respectively. First, the mutual 
exclusivity between the social process (value realisation) and the individual process 
(use value acquisition) takes the form of the essential difference between money, the 
general equivalent, and (particular) commodities. It is the basis of the function of 
money as measure in the sense that a measure should first be separated out from 
what is to be measured by it. Second, the mutual dependence between the two 
processes — the unity of the two processes — is expressed by the circulation of 
commodities, the constant repetition of sale and purchase. The function of money as 
instrument of circulation, then, arises from this unity. 14  In short, whilst the 
(external) separation between the two processes, between money and commodities 
and between sale and purchase seemingly abolishes the contradiction, the internal 
bond between the two opposing sides ensures that they do not become completely 
independent of each other. Rather, the internal mutual dependence asserts itself 
through the external (seeming) independence between the opposing moments of 
circulation.15 
This has a few implications. First, despite sale and purchase forming an internal 
                                                
14 In this respect, the two functions of money also derives from the dual nature of the 
commodity (CW 28, p. 123): 
Money has a dual determination: (1) as the measure or element in which the commodity 
is realised as exchange value, and (2) as means of exchange, instrument of circulation; 
and these two determinations have effects in quite different directions. Money only 
circulates commodities which have already been notionally transformed into money, not 
only in the mind of the individual but in the imagination of society (directly, of the 
parties involved in the process of purchase and sale). The notional transformation into 
money and the real one are not governed by the same laws at all. The relationship 
between them must be investigated. 
15 For Say who denies the existence of overproduction on the grounds that a sale is always a 
purchase and vice-versa, not only is there no distinction between the external independence 
and the internal dependence between sale and purchase, but there is no place of 
contradiction in exchange. For Marx’s critique of Say, see Marx (CW32, pp. 131-134). 
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unity, the circulation of commodities mediated by money, alternating endlessly 
between sale and purchase, can be either halted or delayed for many reasons, 
inflicting cracks on the unity: “As soon as money is an external thing alongside the 
commodity, the exchangeability of the commodity for money is immediately linked 
to external conditions, which may or may not be present. It is subject to external 
circumstances” (CW28, p. 85). Second, however, the external independence 
between sale and purchase is the mode of existence of the internal dependence, and 
thus cannot break away from its control: “If the assertion of their external 
independence proceeds to a certain critical point, their unity violently makes itself 
felt by producing — a crisis” (CI, p. 209). In the same vein, Marx argues that the 
separation between sale and purchase “appears in the crisis” and is the “elementary 
form of the crisis” (CW32, p. 133).16 Third, whilst the circulation of commodities is 
regulated by the dual necessity of value realisation and use value distribution, the 
inner logic of circulation exists only in and through the seeming independence 
between sale and purchase and the corresponding instability at the surface level.17 
Whatever triggers it and whichever form it takes, the instability of circulation, even 
to the extent that it leads to a crisis, is a form of appearance of its inner logic.18 
These points are of great significance to more concrete and complex analyses, not 
                                                
16 Similarly, Marx (CW32, pp. 139-40) says: 
The difficulty of converting the commodity into money, of selling it, only arises from the 
fact that the commodity must be turned into money but the money need not be 
immediately turned into commodity, and therefore sale and purchase can be separated. 
We have said that this form contains the possibility of crisis, that is to say, the possibility 
that elements which are correlated, which are inseparable, are separated and 
consequently are forcibly reunited, their coherence is violently asserted against their 
mutual independence. Crisis is nothing but the forcible assertion of the unity of phases 
of the production process which have become independent of each other. 
17 “Exchange does not alter the inner conditions … but it projects them outwards, gives them 
a form independent of one another, and thus lets their inner unity exist only as an inner 
necessity which is therefore given violent external expression in crises” (CW28, p. 376). 
18 “As the exchange value of a commodity has a dual form of existence, as a specific 
commodity and as money, so the act of exchange consists of two mutually independent acts: 
exchange of the commodity for money, exchange of the money for a commodity, buying and 
selling. Since these have now acquired a form of existence distinct from one another in space 
and time and indifferent to one another, their immediate identity ceases to exist. They may 
correspond or not; they may coincide or not; disparities may occur between them. True, they 
will always seek to get into balance, but the earlier direct equality has now been replaced by 
the continual movement towards equalisation, which of course presupposes continual 
inequality. It is possible that consonance between them may now be fully attained only by 
passing through the most extreme dissonances [emphasis added]” (CW28, pp. 85-86). 
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least to crisis theory. For now, however, suffice it to say that money is not the final 
outcome of the development of the dual nature of the commodity. As more historical 
as well as conceptual elements are brought into the analysis, the dual nature of the 
commodity develops into more concrete and complex forms. We cannot fully trace 
each and every step of concretisation that the dual nature goes through, but the 
following examples show how deeply the dual nature of the commodity is embedded 
in Marx’s analysis, not least in his analysis of the concept of capital. 
The dual nature of capital 
First, the concept of capital is built on the dual nature of the commodity. Whereas 
money is the outcome of the externalisation of the dual nature, capital derives from 
the imposition of the dual nature on human being’s capacity to labour, that is, its 
commodification into labour power.19 Valorisation (and thus capital) arise neither 
from labour power as value alone nor from labour power as use value alone, but 
from labour power as the unity of value and use value: from its value, the labour 
time required to reproduce labour power which should be exceeded for valorisation 
to succeed; and from its use value, the power to create value. As Marx puts it, 
valorisation “must have its origin both in circulation [value] and not in circulation 
[use value]” (CI, p. 268). It needs both circulation, governed by exchange between 
value equivalents, and its absence, where exchange gives way to consumption (of 
labour power as use value).  
Second, with the commodification of the human capacity to labour, the dual nature 
of labour is reconstructed into a subject-object duality. Labour — the effect of the 
consumption of labour power — is, on the one hand, concrete labour, subjective and 
purposeful human activity, however dire the conditions of labour are. It is “the 
living, form-giving fire” (CW28, p. 286) as Marx famously puts it, transforming the 
means of production into products of labour during the labour process. At the same 
time, as abstract labour, far from being consciously performed, labour is extracted 
from labour power during the valorisation process, of which the means of 
                                                
19 “In the process of production … dead labour is replaced by living labour, something 
stagnant by something flowing, a constant by a variable. The result is the reproduction of v 
plus an increment of v. From the point of view of capitalist production, therefore, the whole 
process appears as the independent motion of what was originally constant value, but has 
now been transformed into labour power. Both the process and its result are ascribed to this 
independent motion of value” (CI, p. 322). 
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production are the subject, consuming the commodity labour power, the human raw 
materials, for valorisation: “Instead of being consumed by him [the worker] as 
material elements of his productive activity, they consume him as the ferment 
necessary to their own life-process” (CI, p. 425). Consequently, in the capitalist 
production process, “the unity of the labour process and the process of valorisation” 
(p. 304) and a developed form of the dual nature of the commodity, human beings 
are rendered also to have the dual nature, of being both the subject of labour and the 
object of valorisation.20 It is worth noting that this inversion of subject and object is 
reproduced in the transformation of surplus value into a form of profit (CIII, p. 136): 
Yet the way that surplus value is transformed into the form of profit, by way of 
the rate of profit, is only a further extension of that inversion of subject and 
object which already occurs in the course of the production process itself. 
Concepts with a dual nature 
Third, at a relatively abstract level of analysis of capital in which the labour process 
is assumed to be intact despite the introduction of the capitalist relations, Marx 
deploys pairs of concepts that embody the dual nature of labour. For example, value 
creation and value transfer have bearings on abstract labour and concrete labour, 
respectively: “By the simple addition of a certain quantity [emphasis added] of 
labour, new value is added, and by the quality [emphasis added] of this added 
labour, the original values of the means of production are preserved in the product. 
This twofold effect, resulting from the twofold character of labour, appears quite 
plainly in numerous phenomena” (CI, 309). In turn, value transfer and value 
creation, the two opposing aspects of the capitalist production process, are 
externalised in the opposition between constant capital and variable capital. 
Constant capital, the portion of capital whose value is preserved by being 
transferred to the final product, represents the concrete side of labour and variable 
capital the abstract side. Capital is the unity of constant capital (= use value) and 
variable capital (= value)21 and, in this respect, also exhibits a dual nature, which is 
                                                
20 At this stage, use value and value are only in opposition. Once it develops into a 
contradiction, the subject-object duality gives way to the struggle between living labour and 
dead labour. See the sub-section of this chapter titled ‘From opposition to contradiction’. 
21 According to Marx (CI, pp. 314-315), labour’s function of value transfer is a sort of positive 
externality to capital: 
The worker is unable to add new labour, to create new value, without at the same time 
preserving old values, because the labour he adds must be of a specific useful kind, and 
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an externalisation and a developed form of the dual nature of the commodity and 
labour: 
There now appears, as the result of this unity of the production and 
valorisation process [emphasis added], the product of the process, i.e. capital 
itself, as it emerges as the product of the process whose precondition it was — 
as a product which is value. (CW28, p. 329) 
Another example is the differentiation of constant capital into fixed constant capital 
and circulating constant capital. Concrete labour inflicts a partial loss of lifetime on 
a means of production, not least machinery, although this does not mean that there 
is necessarily any reduction in its use value. For use value under consideration here 
is indivisible. A machine is consumed over its lifetime, little by little due to wear and 
tear, but its usefulness does not diminish to the extent that it functions with the 
same quality and maintains the same throughput. It is useful only as a whole and 
thus enters the production process as a whole.22 It is only after it ceases to function 
or is replaced by a new, better machine that it loses its (social) use value (other than 
as potential in terms of changed or different circumstances such as second hand use 
elsewhere or a surge in demand with limits on capacity to deliver). Therefore, a 
means of production, especially a machine, is either a use value or a non-use-value 
— there is nothing in between. From a value point of view, on the contrary, at any 
moment, the machine is losing its lifetime little by little and is therefore also 
transferring its value to the final product little by little. Likewise, that different 
means of production have different lifetimes has economic significance in terms of 
value, not of use value,23 especially when technical change is considered, with the 
                                                                                                                                     
he cannot do work of a useful kind without employing products as the means of 
production of a new product, and thereby transferring their value to the new product. 
The property therefore which labour power in action, living labour, possesses of 
preserving value, at the same time that it adds it, is a gift of nature which costs the 
worker nothing, but is very advantageous to the capitalist since it preserves the existing 
value of his capital. 
22 Marx also examines an opposite example (CI, p. 313): 
A means of production may enter as a whole into the valorisation process, although it 
enters only piece by piece into the labour process. Suppose that in spinning cotton, the 
waste for every 115 lb. used amounts to 15 lb., which is converted, not into yarn, but into 
‘devil’s dust’. Now, although this amount of waste is normal and inevitable under average 
conditions of spinning, the value of the 15 lb. of cotton is just as surely transferred to the 
value of the yarn as is the value of the 100 lb. that form the substance of the yarn. 
23 As Marx explains, the role of a means of production in the labour process has nothing to 
do with that in the valorisation process. A means of production, albeit indispensable for use 
value production, may as well contribute very little to the value of final products: 
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means of production with longer lifetimes being more vulnerable to the risk of 
devaluation. This necessitates the introduction of the economic concepts reflecting a 
varying lifetime of means of production and its economic consequences, that is, 
fixed constant capital and circulating constant capital.24 
From opposition to contradiction 
One important characteristic of the dual nature of the commodity and its 
development under the capitalist relations is that the two sides in opposition get to 
engage with each other, developing opposition into contradiction. Either it is 
resolved by developing into a new form, or it intensifies the struggle between the 
two sides in contradiction until one prevails over the other, according to Thomas 
Weston (2012): “For Marx as for Hegel, the main difference between opposition and 
contradiction is negativity, the internal activity of a contradiction” (p. 13),25 although 
Marx does not use the distinction between opposition and contradiction consistently 
(pp. 14-15).26 From this point of view, whereas sale and purchase are in opposition 
when they are considered as the externalisation of the internal dependence between 
the two, they are in contradiction as soon as the circulation of commodities is 
disrupted and there appears a rupture between the two. Similarly, value and use 
                                                                                                                                     
If an instrument of production has no value to lose, i.e. if it is not the product of human 
labour, it transfers no value to the product. It helps to create use value without 
contributing to the formation of exchange-value. This is true of all those means of 
production supplied by nature without human assistance, such as land, wind, water, 
metals in the form of ore, and timber in virgin forests. (CI, p. 312)  
The same applies to knowledge although it is a product of human labour, see chapter 3 for 
more on this. 
24 In addition, due to gradual transfer of its value, the value of fixed constant capital 
“acquires a dual existence” (CII, p. 243): “A part of it remains tied to its use form or natural 
form, which pertains to the production process, while another part separates off from this 
form as money”. 
25 “Negativity is an abstraction of conflict, not of the absence of something. Both Marx and 
Hegel generally understand it in this way” (Weston, 2012, p. 13). 
26 “His revisions of Capital, Volume 1, for the second edition suggest, however, that he was 
then taking greater care in distinguishing opposition from contradiction” (Weston, 2012, p. 
15). He continues in the footnote (references to Marx’s works are removed): 
‘Widerspruch’ [contradiction] and its variants occur two dozen times in the first four 
chapters (and the Appendix to Chapter 1) of the first edition, the area of the text that has 
the highest concentration of dialectical terminology. For that edition, Marx deleted two 
occurrences of ‘contradiction’ and twice replaced ‘contradiction’ with ‘opposition’. The 
substantive change here was to drop the assertion that use value and exchange-value are 
in ‘immediate [unmittelbarer] contradiction’. 
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value are in opposition in the expression of value, but it develops into a 
contradiction when commodities are brought into market for exchange, which is 
resolved by the differentiation of commodities into money and commodities.27 
Significantly, the struggle between the two sides in contradiction, “contending 
agencies” (CIII, p. 357), is real as well as conceptual, leading to alterations in 
reality.28 As we have seen earlier, the capitalist production process is the unity of the 
labour process and the valorisation process. When the introduction of the capitalist 
relations does not interfere with the labour process, i.e. the “formal subsumption of 
labour under capital” (CI, p. 645), they are merely in opposition. With the 
introduction of machinery and large-scale industry, however, the opposition 
develops into a real contradiction in which the valorisation process is constantly on 
the offensive, driven by the insatiable desire for valorisation inherent in capital. 
Consequently, although labour in the stage of large-scale industry remains as both 
concrete and abstract, it turns out that labour is first and foremost abstract labour, 
with concrete labour being performed only for the purpose of extracting abstract 
labour and reconfigured to best suit the need for the extraction of abstract labour, 
i.e. the “real subsumption” of labour under capital. Not only are human beings 
degraded into the object of the labour process as well as the valorisation process, but 
the capitalist form of social production takes precedence over its content, i.e. 
satisfaction of social needs. Likewise, it is no longer use value but valorisation that is 
the immediate motive of production. Although use value remains useful for capital 
in the sense that it allows for valorisation, as long as valorisation can continue, it 
does not matter to capital whether or not it goes hand-in-hand with use value 
                                                
27 “The dual existence [of the commodity as a specific product and as money] in two distinct 
forms must lead to differentiation, and the differentiation to opposition and contradiction” 
(CW28, pp. 84-85). According to Weston (2012, p. 13), when referring to oppositions that 
have yet to develop into contradictions, Marx uses the word complementary. For example, 
“The possibility of a crisis … only arises from the fact that the differences in form—the 
phases—which it [metamorphosis] passes through in the course of its progress, are in the 
first place necessarily complementary [emphasis added]” (CW32, p. 138). Similarly, “If we 
say that the simple form of metamorphosis comprises the possibility of crisis, we only say 
that in this form itself lies the possibility of the rupture and separation of essentially 
complementary [emphasis added] phases” (p. 139). 
28 “As the contradiction undergoes the fullest possible development and nears resolution, 
this interference is increased to such an extent that the two sides cannot coexist any longer, 
and one must defeat the other, either by destroying it or by weakening it so completely that it 
can no longer interfere with the victorious side” (Weston, 2012, p. 24). 
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production, as is most clearly expressed in the circuit of interest-bearing capital (M-
M’). However, even in this extreme case, with interest being indeed a form of 
surplus value and ultimately requiring use value production by industrial capitalists, 
use value is not only the means of, but also the prerequisite for, valorisation and 
thus limits the expansion of value production. 
In this assault of the labour process by the valorisation process, and more generally, 
of use value by value, knowledge plays a critical role. Knowledge is a prerequisite for 
commodity production and, therefore, also has a dual nature: Knowledge is a factor 
determining the productivity and complexity of commodity-producing labour, or the 
value-producing capacity of labour, see Chapter 3 for more on this; Knowledge also 
determines the use value of a commodity, not only the functional and technical 
specifications but also the production technologies or technical relations between 
factors of production. New knowledge, then, in theory, affects both the valorisation 
process and the labour process; capitalists produce and deploy new knowledge to 
raise the value-creating capacity of labour and thereby realise extra surplus value or 
surplus profit, and in doing so, make alterations to the labour process, quantitatively 
and/or qualitatively.29 Marx analyses in detail three major qualitative changes in the 
labour process in Chapters 13-15 of the first volume of Capital, simple co-operation, 
manufacture and large-scale industry based on machinery, respectively. 
Significantly, through these successive transformations, “the knowledge, judgement 
and will” (CI, p. 482) are taken away from individual workers and objectified in the 
means of production, confronting the workers as the power outside workers’ control, 
with the mechanism of its operation being dictated by the capitalists.30 For Marx, 
this transformation culminates in large-scale industry based on machinery, in which 
workers are degraded into the object of not only the valorisation process but also the 
                                                
29 “Hitherto, in dealing with the production of surplus value in the above form, we have 
assumed that the mode of production is given and invariable. But when surplus value has to 
be produced by the conversion of necessary labour into surplus labour, it by no means 
suffices for capital to take over the labour process in its given or historically transmitted 
shape, and then simply to prolong its duration. The technical and social conditions of the 
process and consequently the mode of production itself must be revolutionised before the 
productivity of labour can be increased” (CI, pp. 431-432). 
30 “If capitalist direction is thus twofold in content, owing to the twofold nature of the 
process of production which has to be directed — on the one hand a social labour process for 
the creation of a product, and on the other hand capital's process of valorisation — in form it 
is purely despotic. As co-operation extends its scale, this despotism develops the forms that 
are peculiar to it” (CI, p. 450). 
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labour process, with “the employment of women and children”, “the prolongation of 
the working day” and “intensification of labour” being key side-effects (CI, Chapter 
15): 
Every kind of capitalist production, in so far as it is not only a labour process 
but also capital’s process of valorisation, has this in common, but it is not the 
worker who employs the conditions of his work, but rather the reverse, the 
conditions of work employ the worker. However, it is only with the coming of 
machinery that this inversion first acquires a technical and palpable reality 
[emphasis added]. (p. 548)31 
On the other hand, new knowledge constantly raises the productivity of labour, 
driving down the value of commodities and expanding the scale of production, with 
more and more use-values being produced per worker in a given period of time. In 
addition, new inventions and innovations allow for the commodification of new raw 
materials, parts, sub-assemblies, processes, etc., developing the social division of 
labour in diversity and in quality as well as in quantity.32 Although new value 
created in the economy for a given period of time (v + s), determined and limited by 
the number of workers employed by capital, may grow only gradually, the scale and 
scope of use value production, fuelled by the increasing development of the society’s 
                                                
31 According to Marx, the inversion of the relation between living and dead labour is clearly a 
development of the dual nature of the commodity. In Chapter 3 of the first volume of 
Capital, even before he introduces the concept of capital, he writes (CI, p. 209): 
There is an antithesis [Gegensatz], immanent in the commodity, between use value and 
value, between private labour which must simultaneously manifest itself as directly 
social labour, and a particular concrete kind of labour which simultaneously counts as 
merely abstract universal labour, between the conversion of things into persons and the 
conversion of persons into things [emphasis added]”. 
In a similar vein, he also writes, “The devaluation of the world of men is in direct proportion 
to the increasing value of the world of things” (CW3, p. 272). 
32 For Marx (CIII, pp. 356-357), an expansion of use value production, in turn, contributes to 
accumulation (if) indirectly: 
The development of labour productivity contributes to an increase in the existing capital 
value, since it increases the mass and diversity of use values in which the same exchange 
value is represented, and which form the material substratum, the objective elements of 
this capital, the substantial objects of which constant capital consists directly and 
variable capital at least indirectly. The same capital and the same labour produce more 
things that can be transformed into capital, quite apart from exchange value. These 
things can serve to absorb additional labour, and thus additional surplus labour also, and 
can in this way form additional capital. The mass of labour that capital can command 
does not depend on its value but rather on the mass of raw and ancillary materials, of 
machinery and elements of fixed capital, and of means of subsistence, out of which it is 
composed, whatever their value may be. Since the mass of labour applied thus grows, 
and the mass of surplus labour with it, the value of the capital reproduced and the 
surplus-value newly added to it grow as well. 
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knowledge and not subject to devaluation due to technical changes, grows much 
faster than those of value production. This raises an important question of whether 
the explosive growth of the mass of use-values can be absorbed by the market, or the 
society’s consumption power. 
Marx’s starting point 
Before concluding this section, it is worth elaborating some of the methodological 
points which have been implicit in our discussion so far. First, Marx’s starting point 
is the commodity, especially its dual nature, not the concept of value.33 His focus is 
on commodity as the unity of value and use value and the dual nature’s 
consequences at more concrete and complex levels of analysis; he is not concerned 
with deriving capital from commodity through money dialectically, as if capital is 
the culmination of the development of the value form.34 In his Notes on Wagner 
                                                
33 For Postone (1993, p. 139), Marx’s choice of commodity as the starting point of Capital 
reflects his movement from “a transhistorical starting point” to “a historically determinate 
one”. Postone rightly recognises the critical importance of the dual nature of the commodity 
in Marx’s analysis: 
The category ‘commodity,’ in Marx’s analysis, does not simply refer to an object, but to a 
historically specific, ‘objective’ form of social relations—a structuring and structured 
form of social practice that constitutes a radically new form of social interdependence. 
This form is characterised by a historically specific duality purportedly at the core of the 
social system: use value and value, concrete labour and abstract labour. Proceeding from 
the category of the commodity as this dualistic form, this nonidentical unity, Marx seeks 
to unfold from it the overarching structure, of capitalist society as a totality, the intrinsic 
logic of its historical development, as well as the elements of immediate social experience 
that veil the underlying structure of that society. That is, within the framework of Marx’s 
critique of political economy, the commodity is the essential category at the heart of 
capital; he unfolds it in order to illuminate the nature of capital and its intrinsic 
dynamic. … In my analysis of Capital, I shall show how this duality, according to Marx, 
becomes externalised and gives rise to a peculiar historical dialectic. 
For critiques of Postone’s interpretation of Marx’s method, especially of his characterisation 
of labour as being self-mediating, see McNally (2004) and Aufheben (2007). 
34 For value form theorists, the significance of commodity lies mainly in its being the 
simplest form of value; they apparently prefer starting from value (instead of commodity) 
and attempt to reconstruct Marx’s Capital accordingly. They are, however, keenly aware that 
the commodity is Marx’s unambiguous starting point. Hence, Arthur (2004a, pp. 24-30), 
endorsing Banaji (1979), instead argues that Capital has a “dual starting point” (p. 29):  
The commodity form of the product is the analytical starting point, from which we 
separate out value and use value, while this value forms the synthetic point of departure 
for developing more complex relationships in the course of seeking how to ground it as 
the pure universal essence of the commodity. (p. 30)  
Similarly, for Smith (1990, p. 80): “The ordering of the determinations of the value form 
itself commences with a form of simple unity, i.e. the simplest and most abstract structure 
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published in 1880, Marx (CW24, p. 534) says, “For me neither ‘value’ nor ‘exchange-
value’ are subjects, but the commodity”.35 Second, then, Marx’s choice of commodity 
as the starting point is precisely because it is the elementary form of the dual nature, 
which is in turn commodity’s differentia specifica, although Marx does not explicitly 
say so.36 Third, whilst dialectics plays an enormously important role in Marx’s 
analysis, and he often employs a presentational style in which value features as the 
self-acting subject of dialectical movement, his somewhat idealist exposition should 
not be taken literally, other than for purposes of presentation.37 Equally importantly, 
for Marx, changes and developments in reality are never the result of conceptual 
developments. It is the other way around; concepts and theories are the reflection of 
the changes and developments in reality, only reconstructing the object of study in 
thought retrospectively.38 This by no means denies theories the role of predicting the 
                                                                                                                                     
[commodity] within which the value form is manifested [emphasis added]”. His ordering 
starts from the commodity, not because it is Marx’s starting point but because it is the 
simplest form of value. Bidet (2007, p. 136) points out that Marx indeed considered starting 
from value, and quotes from a letter Marx wrote to Lassalle, dated 11 March 1858: “It [the 
first instalment] contains 1. Value, 2. Money, 3. Capital in General” (CW40, p. 287) although 
value, the first part, does not seem to be in place of commodity as the three parts, according 
to the letter, correspond to “the process of production of capital; process of its circulation; 
the unity of the two, or capital and profit; interest”, respectively, and hence “1. Value” and “2. 
Money” were supposed to cover much more than the first three chapters of the first volume 
of Capital. 
35 “I do not proceed from ‘concepts’, hence neither from the ‘concept of value’, and am 
therefore in no way concerned to ‘divide’ it. What I proceed from is the simplest social form 
in which the product of labour presents itself in contemporary society, and this is the 
‘commodity’” (CW24, p. 544). He couldn’t make it clearer that his starting point is the 
commodity. 
36 Harvey (2010) deals with the question of Marx’s starting point and rightly points out that 
Marx carefully made his decision. However, he gives no explanation as to why Marx chose 
the commodity: “The method of descent brought him to the concept of the commodity, but 
Marx makes no attempt to explain that choice, nor does he bother to argue for its legitimacy. 
He just starts with the commodity [emphasis added], and that is that” (p. 9). 
37 Arthur (2004b, p. 37) argues that “Marx does not derive money as a device to overcome 
the limitations of barter [emphasis removed]”; Marx’s focus is not on deriving money from 
commodity, but on explaining why commodity exchange is impossible without money, hence 
the necessity of money. However, Arthur goes further and wrongly states, “[Marx] derives 
money as the form necessary to constitute value objectively [emphasis added]”. See also 
Arthur (2005, pp. 112-113; 2014). 
38 In the Postface to the second edition of Volume 1 of Capital, Marx famously contrasts his 
dialectical method with Hegel’s (CI, p. 103):  
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course of future development, and they may prove to be very powerful in doing so. 
However, it is important not to confuse the order of explanation (i.e. the concrete 
and complex being explained on the basis of the abstract and simple) with the order 
of existence (i.e. the concrete empirical world being the product of abstract 
concepts). 
Concluding remarks 
It has been briefly demonstrated that the first three chapters of Volume 1 of Capital 
can be interpreted as the logical and historical unfolding of the dual nature of 
commodities, and Marx’s analysis of the capitalist forms of division of labour hinges 
on that dual nature. We have covered only a small part of the three volumes of 
Capital in this section, and the scope of our analysis is necessarily limited. But we 
may conclude that the dual nature is of great significance to understanding Capital 
(as Marx explicitly said) and applying value theory to issues of contemporary 
capitalism. In addition, as the development of the dual nature of the capitalist 
commodity production process — the unity of the labour process and the 
valorisation process — into the contradiction phase (through the widespread 
adoption of machinery-based production) shows, knowledge does not sit outside the 
unfolding of the dual nature, but often plays an important role in the dialectical 
movement of (capitalist) commodity production. 
That contemporary capitalism can be best understood by conceptualising it as the 
result of the logical and historical unfolding of the dual nature of the commodity is a 
guiding principle of this thesis. Although this point is not repeated in subsequent 
                                                                                                                                     
My dialectical method is, in its foundation, not only different from the Hegelian, but 
exactly opposite to it. For Hegel, the process of thinking, which he even transforms into 
an independent subject, under the name of ‘the Idea’, is the creator of the real world, and 
the real world is only the external appearance of the idea. With me the reverse is true: 
the ideal is nothing but the material world reflected in the mind of man, and translated 
into forms of thought.  
For Hegel scholars emphasising that Hegel’s Idea exists only in and through the empirical 
world, Marx’s labelling of Hegel as an idealist as opposed to a materialist is too simplistic an 
interpretation. Beiser (2005, p. 69) writes: 
According to Hegel’s absolute idealism … the whole dispute between materialism and 
idealism is misconceived [emphasis added]. The absolute idea is neither subjective nor 
objective because it is the form or structure that inheres equally in both. We cannot 
reduce the subject down to the object, as if it were only material, and neither can we 
reduce the object down to the subject, as if it were only ideal. Both the subjective and 
objective are equally real, and the opposition between them is apparent from our 
everyday experience. 
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chapters, it is implicit throughout this thesis, especially in the emphasis placed upon 
making careful distinctions between levels of abstraction (most obvious in the 
critique of theories failing to do so) and in the incorporation of historical and 
industry-specific elements into theory when analysing the roles of intellectual 
property rights. 
 
35 
2. New growth theory: Trapped between knowledge and 
growth 
2.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the development of new growth theory 
(NGT), focusing on how knowledge is conceived, how knowledge production is 
incorporated into theory (to generate increasing returns), and the consequences of 
this. Further, this chapter will examine critically the robustness and flexibility of 
neoclassical economics in the wake of an increasing focus on knowledge within 
economics, policy circles and across social sciences, not least the discourses on the 
knowledge economy39 in which knowledge is of fundamental importance, with the 
economy being considered increasingly organised around the production, exchange, 
dissemination and consumption of knowledge. NGT is the natural choice for this 
task given that most well-known knowledge-based models of NGT,40 not least the 
Romer 1990 model, attempt to reconstruct long-term economic growth, generally 
considered a main feature and strength of the capitalist economy, based solely on 
the growth of knowledge. It will be shown that too many restrictions are placed 
upon knowledge in order to bring knowledge into the analysis without abandoning 
any of the key neoclassical assumptions and, in spite of the compromised conception 
of knowledge, the link established between knowledge and growth is not strong 
enough. 
This chapter, however, does not provide a thorough literature survey, nor is it 
                                                
39 Romer says: 
My [Romer’s] work on growth can be traced back to an attempt to isolate the differences 
between the information or knowledge-based economy and what came before. My belief 
is that those differences are important for our understanding of growth. Those 
distinctions matter to people running firms and they should matter to policymakers. 
(Kurtzman, 1997, para. 9)  
Foray (2004, p. ix) expresses a similar view in the context of economics of knowledge: 
Just as industrial economics as a discipline was founded with the advent of 
industrialisation in around 1820, so the economics of knowledge developed as 
knowledge-based economies gradually came into being. 
40 NGT has evolved to encompass more factors than knowledge, including, but not limited to, 
regional aspects, political environments, education, etc. For example, Sala-i-Martin (1997) 
identifies 60 variables correlated to growth, see Fine (2000) for a critique. In this chapter, 
we use NGT in a narrower sense, as an umbrella term for growth models with endogenised 
knowledge in which knowledge functions as the sole source of growth in productivity. 
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concerned mainly with the critique of NGT. Rather, it primarily deals with 
modelling choices (and compromises) in a few prominent growth models in terms of 
incorporating or endogenising knowledge and attempts to understand the reasons 
for such choices and their implications. For the latter, it is important to lay bare the 
structural characteristics of the economy (implicitly and explicitly) assumed in these 
models. With this narrow focus in mind, the choice of growth models to review in 
this chapter is both selective and strategic. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 begins with the 
Solow model in detail to lay groundwork. This is because the basic structure of the 
Solow model is reproduced in later models, albeit in different forms. Section 3 then 
reviews the first generation of endogenous growth models, especially the Romer 
1986 model, which relies on positive externalities of R&D to allow for non-
increasing returns at the firm level with increasing returns at the aggregate level. 
Much attention is devoted in this section to assessing the adequacy of using 
externalities to characterise the mechanism of the production and dissemination of 
knowledge across the economy even if externalities are, to some extent, considered 
exceptional within mainstream economics other than to explain what is otherwise 
inexplicable. In section 4 the second generation of endogenous growth models based 
on monopolistic competition, especially the Romer 1990 model, is examined. Whilst 
knowledge is incorporated into theory in a more realistic manner, in these second 
generation models the modelling of knowledge fails to go beyond the heavy 
restrictions imposed by the neoclassical framework. As a result, the modelling of 
knowledge in NGT is shown to be unsatisfactory, and so too is that of the 
mechanism through which new knowledge generates growth. The final section 
situates such inadequacy of NGT in the context of Marx’s distinction between use 
value and value. As an economics of use value, neoclassical growth theory in general 
limits the economic role of knowledge to an economy-wide productivity booster and, 
thus, the endogenisation of knowledge leaves out other important functions of 
knowledge in the capitalist economy. 
2.2. The Solow model: Competition and growth as two 
independent aspects of the economy 
NGT and, more generally, neoclassical growth theory assign a crucial role to 
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knowledge — the engine of long-term growth,41 and it does so on the basis of 
neoclassical economics’ core theoretical framework, not least general equilibrium 
and (profit and utility) maximising agents, although in simplified forms. More 
specifically, neoclassical growth theory conceptualises knowledge as the source of 
increasing returns (in per capita terms) in the presence of non-increasing returns to 
scale with respect to conventional inputs. Whereas the latter ensures that the 
economy adjusts towards competitive equilibrium, knowledge carries forward the 
economy whose growth would otherwise continue to slow down (in per capita 
terms) despite continuing capital accumulation. 
Simple growth model 
This can be easily demonstrated. Suppose that the aggregate production function,  𝑌 = 𝐹(𝐿,𝐾), has two conventional inputs — labour (𝐿) and capital (𝐾) — and 
exhibits constant returns to scale.42 Then the production function can be rewritten 
in per capita terms, as 𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑘), where 𝑦 is per capita output, 𝑘 is capital per labour 
and 𝑓 𝑘 = 𝐹(1, 𝑘). Assuming diminishing marginal product of capital, 𝑦 grows as 
long as 𝑘 grows regardless of the reason, but at diminishing rates, with the growth 
rate of 𝑦 continually decreasing. 
Theoretically, such limitations imposed upon economic growth, stemming from 
purely technical relations between factors of production and output, can be offset by 
technical change. Continuing technical change or continuing knowledge growth 
increases the output level despite diminishing marginal product of capital in the 
case of Hicks neutral technical change, or keeps 𝑘! (= 𝐾/𝐴𝐿) from growing in the 
case of labour augmenting technical change where A is the aggregate knowledge 
stock. In other words, the continuing increase in the aggregate knowledge stock 
ensures that per capita output grows indefinitely whilst the economy remains in, or 
at least approaches, equilibrium. 
                                                
41  Prendergast (2010) argues that, before Adam Smith, economic theorists, especially 
Mandeville, considered economic growth or progress as the result of knowledge 
accumulation. It is Smith who shifted the focus of later economists towards capital 
accumulation as the source of economic growth. 
42 Constant returns to scale are only a simplifying assumption. Referring to his 1956 model, 
Solow (1994, p. 48) says, “Notice that I have not mentioned constant returns to scale. That is 
because the model can get along perfectly well without constant returns to scale. The 
occasional expression of belief to the contrary is just a misconception”. 
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Even this very simple formulation of growth reveals the peculiar structural 
characteristics of neoclassical growth theory. First, growth is only of secondary 
importance. The economy is designed to be always in or approaching equilibrium 
regardless of whether the economy grows or not; knowledge can only determine the 
equilibrium output level, but does not affect, in any way, the formation of 
competitive equilibrium. Second, by the same token, competitive equilibrium is 
independent of economic growth. Economic forces that drive the economy towards 
equilibrium do not generate growth and vice-versa; the economy can grow whilst 
not moving towards equilibrium and the economy can stay in equilibrium whilst not 
growing or even contracting. Obviously, this very simple model falls short of a 
proper growth model, not least because it does not necessarily generate long-term 
sustained growth. Rather, it opens many different paths for the economy, with the 
growth rate of the economy at a point of time being determined by the rate of capital 
accumulation (𝐾/𝐾), the growth rate of population (𝐿/𝐿) and the growth rate of 
knowledge (𝐴/𝐴). Given that the time paths of these variables and relations between 
them are not specified yet, that is, they are independent of each other, it is only a 
coincidence if the economy grows at relatively constant rates over a long period of 
time.  
Solow model with exogenous knowledge growth 
Solow’s famous model (Solow, 1956) generates a stable long-term economic growth 
path. This growth is a necessary outcome of introducing a constraining assumption 
that a fixed fraction of final output is saved and accumulated as capital in the 
presence of exponential knowledge growth (i.e. this drives up 𝑘! ). This, in 
combination with constant population growth (i.e. this drives down 𝑘! at the growth 
rate of population, which is exogenously given) and diminishing marginal 
productivity of capital, induces capital per unit of effective labour of the economy 
(𝑘!) to approach a point (𝑘!∗), an equilibrium point which 𝑘! will eventually reach 
regardless of the initial endowment, and in which it will stay once reached. At this 
steady-state point, by definition, 𝐴𝐿, effective labour, and 𝐾 grow at the same rate 
indefinitely, and so does 𝑌 due to constant returns to scale. Consequently, capital 
per labour 𝑘 (=𝐾/𝐿) grows exponentially at the same rate as 𝐴 and so does per capita 
output 𝑦. Once the economy has entered the steady state, 𝑦 grows only if 𝐴 grows, 
and its growth rate is determined solely by the growth rate of 𝐴. 
Whilst it is striking that relatively robust and stable outcomes are generated as the 
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result of two additional simple assumptions — constant saving rate and exponential 
knowledge growth — in conjunction with other neoclassical assumptions such as 
decreasing marginal productivity of capital, one can question the validity of these 
assumptions. For example, if the saving rate (or the rate of time preference in the 
case where intertemporal utility maximisation is considered) is not a fixed constant 
but changes over time, the economy is going to be in endless transition towards 
ever-changing equilibrium points; whilst the steady-state value of 𝑘!∗(𝑡) does exist at 
any point in time 𝑡, it constantly changes and ends up being a moving target. 
Although the saving rate does not affect the steady-state growth rate, which is a key 
policy implication of the Solow model, the economy is unlikely ever to reach a steady 
state. Further, even a small decrease in the saving rate can immediately result in 
economic contraction (in per capita terms).43  
The Solow model is an equilibrium model on two different levels. First, the economy 
is in or approaching equilibrium at any point in time. Any snapshot of the economy 
shows that all factors are employed and being paid their marginal products and all 
agents get optimal outcomes, with these working independently of the time path of 
the economy. This framework of the co-existence of competition and knowledge, of 
non-increasing returns and increasing returns is at the core of neoclassical growth 
theory and taken for granted in later endogenous growth models as well. In this 
respect, the Solow model is not an old, exogenous growth model to be replaced by 
new models, but rather the main framing of neoclassical growth theory on which 
many different variations can be written.  
Second, assuming that the growth rate of the knowledge stock is exogenously given 
as constant, the economy is always moving towards, or along, an equilibrium time 
path, i.e. a balanced growth path. Put differently, long-term sustained growth is 
shown to be a natural outcome of the economy as it is always driven towards an 
equilibrium path. Whilst this dynamic equilibrium is distinct from the more 
fundamental and prevalent static equilibrium in the sense that balanced growth 
                                                
43 However plausible this critique may be, criticising old growth theory (OGT) on the basis of 
its simplifying assumptions is not pertinent here when more fundamental simplifications 
have already been made, not least the use of the aggregate production function, the adoption 
of the one sector and single agent model, and perfect competition and full employment in all 
markets. There have been many critiques of neoclassical growth theory on this ground, with 
the Cambridge capital controversy being the most prominent, see Fine (1980a, Chapter 5), 
Fine (2006) and Harcourt (1972). These critiques are not to be repeated here as an all-round 
critique of NGT is not a main concern of this chapter as mentioned earlier. 
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paths are no more optimal than the other potential paths of the economy,44 it is a 
salient feature of the Solow model that the (capitalist) economy, by its own nature, 
not only allocates resources in a Pareto optimal way but is also predetermined to 
grow in a long-term, sustainable manner as long as the aggregate knowledge stock 
keeps growing exponentially; the economy featured in this model is inherently 
stable, efficient and ever-expanding.45 
Endogenisation of knowledge. Is it required? 
Not surprisingly, many have pointed out that the main conclusion of the Solow 
model — economic growth being solely determined by exogenous knowledge growth 
— is not satisfactory because this implies the economy grows for non-economic 
reasons, and hence raises the need for endogenising the changes in knowledge and 
the steady-state growth rate. Consequently, this has been the main driver of the 
development of neoclassical growth theory over the last three decades.46  
                                                
44 This is not the case in the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model in which the balanced growth 
path is an outcome of lifetime utility maximisation. It is therefore called an optimal growth 
model. 
45 Solow (2000, p. xii) admits that this is too good to be real: “The connection is a bit too 
pretty and too interesting and unleashes a standing temptation to sound like Dr. Pangloss, a 
very clever Dr. Pangloss”. 
46 By contrast, the endogenisation of population growth has drawn little interest: 
One of the enduring myths about capitalism that continues to be perpetuated in 
capitalism in mainstream economic textbooks and other pedagogic strategies is that 
labour supply is somehow exogenous to the economic system. The supply of labour is 
typically assumed, especially in standard growth theories, to be determined by the rate of 
population growth, which in turn is also seen as ‘outside’ the economic system rather 
than in interplay with it. (Ghosh, 2012, p. ix)  
According to Solow (2000, p. 98): 
My own 1956 paper did actually show, as an example, how one could allow for a possible 
dependence of population growth on the current standard of living. But that was 
intended as a sort of finger exercise … it seemed best to treat the rate of population 
growth as exogenous. 
For Marx, however, economically active population is an outcome of accumulation, and in 
this respect, is determined endogenously. As accumulation proceeds, more workers are 
employed as materials of exploitation. At the same time, due to technical changes, the 
number of workers required to valorise a given amount of capital decreases over time, 
producing a relative surplus population: 
Simultaneously with impulses towards a genuine increase in the working population, 
which stem from the increase in the portion of the total social product that functions as 
capital, we have those agencies that create a relative surplus population. (CIII, p. 357) 
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Interestingly, Solow considers endogenisation of knowledge as neither important 
nor necessary. In his Nobel lecture given in 1987 (it is worth mentioning that 
Romer’s first endogenous growth model was published in 1986) he calls for 
extending neoclassical growth theory to encompass “medium-run departures from 
equilibrium growth” (Solow, 2000, p. xxvi),47 but never mentions the need for 
endogenising knowledge or technical change. For him, it is not a matter of priority, 
with incorporating deviations from equilibrium paths being more important than 
developing an endogenous theory of technical change. Rather, Solow is dubious of 
the need and desirability as well as the feasibility of endogenising knowledge. This is 
primarily because technical change, in his view, is unlikely to be explained solely in 
economic terms, and therefore exogenous elements cannot be removed completely. 
Endogenising technical change is stretching neoclassical growth theory beyond its 
limits; once knowledge has been endogenised, the model may become more 
aesthetically pleasing, but probably less plausible. Equally importantly, for Solow, 
theorising something as an exogenous variable is different from leaving it 
unexplained. There is no presumption in theorising knowledge as an exogenous 
variable that knowledge grows exponentially at a constant rate indefinitely, nor that 
knowledge production is something like a black box, constructing systematic 
theories of which is not permitted. Rather, Solow’s interest lies in understanding 
“how the path of aggregate output adjusts to the rate of population growth and the 
rate of technological progress, whatever they happen to be and for however long 
they persist” (Solow, 2000, p. 98), not in developing theories of how these rates are 
determined.48 Despite his reservations, however, Solow (2007, p. 6) acknowledges 
that the endogenisation of the changes in knowledge is one of “the two most 
important innovations to come along in the past 50 years within the framework of 
neoclassical growth theory”. 
                                                
47 According to Solow (2000, p. xvii): 
Growth theory was invented to provide a systematic way to talk about and to compare 
equilibrium paths for the economy. In that task it succeeded reasonably well. In doing 
so, however, it failed to come to grips adequately with an equally important and 
interesting problem: the right way to deal with deviations from equilibrium growth.  
This position had been maintained at least for 10 years since the Nobel lecture (Solow, 1996, 
p. 219). 
[New idea] I had in mind [was] the integration of equilibrium growth theory with 
medium-run disequilibrium theory so that trends and fluctuations in employment and 
output could be handled in a unified way. 
48 “My main interest is the modelling of economic growth, not the modelling of research and 
development and the source of technological progress” (Solow, 1997, p. 19). 
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2.3. Externality-based endogenous growth models: Growth 
as exception? 
In the first generation of endogenous growth models, the notion of externalities 
plays a key role. In these models,49 the aggregate knowledge stock grows as a by-
product of choices made by profit-maximising firms. More specifically, an increase 
in conventional inputs by a firm leads not only to an individual output increase but 
also to an increase in the aggregate knowledge stock through knowledge spillover 
and, consequently, to an increase in the productivity of all competing firms; no firms 
are left behind. In more formal terms, the aggregate knowledge stock R is defined as 
a function of individual knowledge stocks. 
𝑅 = 𝑅!, 
where 𝑅! is firm 𝑖’s knowledge stock. Then the production function of individual 
firms, similar to that in the Solow model, is given as: 
𝑌! = 𝑅! ∙ 𝐹(𝑅! , 𝑥!), 
where 𝑥!  is a set of conventional inputs of firm 𝑖 and γ a constant.50 𝑅! in this model 
is similar to (physical) capital stock in the sense that it is produced by foregoing 
consumption, is accumulated and, more importantly, is a factor of production that 
has decreasing marginal productivity. This is so that a competitive equilibrium is 
guaranteed to exist, with all individual firms taking 𝑅! as constant. The aggregate 
production function has a slightly different form:  
𝑌 = 𝑅! ∙ 𝐹 𝑅, 𝑥 = 𝑅!!! ∙ 𝑥!!! 
The key difference from 𝑅!  is that 𝑅  is not taken as constant but determined 
endogenously as the result of individual profit maximising decisions. Consequently, 
the aggregate production function exhibits increasing returns to scale with respect 
to 𝑅 and 𝑥. Per capita output grows indefinitely despite non-increasing returns at 
the individual level as knowledge spillover results in increasing returns at the 
aggregate level. Significantly, investments into knowledge production or capital 
accumulation are not completely compensated, as individual firms do not consider 
                                                
49 See Arrow (1962), Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). 
50 𝑅! is the cumulative physical capital of firm 𝑖 in Arrow (1962), the knowledge stock in 
Romer (1986) and the human capital in Lucas (1988). 
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the external effects on the aggregate knowledge stock when making profit-
maximising decisions. 
The above is only a simplified description of the externality-based endogenous 
models, so it is worth mentioning some crucial aspects of, and developments 
around, these models briefly. First, the Romer 1986 model and the Lucas model 
were motivated equally by their dissatisfaction with the tendency towards 
convergence of growth rate across countries which they thought is implied in the 
Solow model. 51  The convergence controversy, however, turned out to be both 
flourishing in weight and somewhat futile in outcome.52 Second, the divergence 
between the social and private optimum in the context of intertemporal utility 
maximisation and potential policy options (to bridge the gap) are widely discussed. 
Third, additional constraining assumptions are introduced to generate sustained 
long-term growth in these models depending on whether factors of production that 
have externalities have increasing or decreasing marginal productivity: The growth 
rate of these factors is assumed to be bounded from above so that output does not 
explode to infinity in the former case (the Romer 1986 model); Zero population 
growth is ruled out as the production function exhibits decreasing returns with 
capital accumulation alone (with no population growth) in the latter case (the Arrow 
model). 
Nevertheless, the gist of these models is that positive externalities are indispensable 
for economic growth. In other words, as long as economic agents ensure that profit 
and utility are maximised, the economy will manage to reach not only competitive 
equilibrium but also a stable long-term growth path. This explanation is justified on 
                                                
51 “It is useful to ask whether there is anything in the data that should cause economists to 
choose a model with diminishing returns, falling rates of growth, and convergence across 
countries rather than an alternative without these features” (Romer, 1986, p. 1008). Lucas is 
more interested in economic development than in economic growth, which is about 
“accounting for the observed pattern, across countries, and across time [emphasis added], 
in levels and rates of growth of per capita income” (Lucas, 1988, p. 3) 
52 According to Romer (1994a, pp. 10-11): 
The differences between the different researchers concern the inferences about models 
that we should draw from these facts. As is usually the case in macroeconomics, many 
different inferences are consistent with the same regression statistics. … In the end, we 
have refined the set of alternatives somewhat, but seem to be left in about the same 
position where we started, with too many theories that are consistent with the same 
small number of facts.  
For a critique of the convergence controversy, see Fine (2000). 
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the grounds of common sense observation that knowledge spills over (the Romer 
1986 model), knowledge is acquired during the work process (the Arrow model) and 
the average level of skill affects the productivity of other factors of production (the 
Lucas model). These models, however, fall short of being systematic theories of 
knowledge growth (and thus economic growth) for the same reason; they leave 
unexplained the mechanism through which individual profit- and utility-
maximising decisions bring about the improvements in the aggregate knowledge 
stock, but take its existence and effects as exogenously given. 
The Romer 1986 model 
The Romer 1986 model deserves closer examination though, as it is based on a more 
plausible explanation that the aggregate knowledge stock grows due to investments 
into research by individual firms, rather than as a by-product of the accumulation of 
(physical or human) capital. This model draws a sharp distinction between private 
and social knowledge, and the differences between the two types of knowledge raise 
a number of issues. Significantly, private knowledge is considered a conventional 
rival input with decreasing marginal productivity. This contradicts the received view 
that knowledge, once acquired, can be used an unlimited number of times. In other 
words, assuming constant returns to scale, doubling of the output requires doubling 
of only conventional inputs because knowledge can be re-used as many times as 
necessary in the production process without incurring additional cost. This means 
that (private) knowledge should be treated in a different way from conventional 
inputs, but such need is simply ignored. Equally problematic is the fact that the 
aggregate knowledge stock is conceived as the total sum of individual knowledge 
stocks. Suppose that 𝑛 firms have produced essentially identical set of technologies 
(𝑅 ). Although the total sum of individual knowledge stocks — the aggregate 
knowledge stock according to the Romer 1986 model — increases by 𝑛𝑅, in this case, 
knowledge production is severely duplicated across the economy. Given that 
knowledge necessarily spills over in this model, it is more plausible that the 
aggregate knowledge stock increases only by 𝑅, see Olsson (2001) for a similar 
view.53 The other extreme, where each firm produces a completely unique set of 
                                                
53 “However, if the 𝑁 firms have at least one piece of knowledge in common, which seems to 
be reasonable given the assumed public good-character of 𝐴, then summing the knowledge 
stocks in the above manner means that the same piece of knowledge is accounted for 𝑁 
times, Hence, the measure 𝑇 [the total sum of individual knowledge stocks] overestimates 
what is known in society. This logical inconsistency, in part acknowledged by Romer (1994) 
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technologies, is simply too unlikely considering that all firms, by definition, produce 
the same product, have the same cost structure and have access to the same set of 
technologies. 
In short, the modelling of knowledge spillover in this model is both contradictory 
(private and social knowledge have different characteristics) and casual (no 
duplication in knowledge production across firms is assumed). Whilst the 
distinction between social and private knowledge partly reflects the fact that 
knowledge does spill over, with this unsatisfactory distinction, the Romer 1986 
model introduces two extreme (ideal) forms of knowledge: knowledge as a non-rival 
and non-excludable public good; and knowledge as a (rival and excludable) 
conventional input. Obviously, such dichotomisation of knowledge is adopted to 
guarantee the co-existence of increasing returns (economic growth) and non-
increasing returns (competitive equilibrium).54 
Externalities are both exceptional and indispensable in NGT 
Going back to positive externalities, the choice of externalities as the source of 
economic growth raises a more fundamental issue. One can question why something 
as essential to the (capitalist) economy as economic growth is explained on the basis 
of the lack of the market mechanism rather than its presence. It goes without saying 
that positive externalities are a convenient cost-free solution for generating 
increasing returns out of non-increasing returns. Suppose instead that a market for 
knowledge is created such that individual contributions to the aggregate knowledge 
stock are to be fully compensated, with positive externalities completely 
internalised. Then incumbents, as collective owners of the existing aggregate 
knowledge stock, may choose to block potential new entrants from using the 
knowledge stock and by doing so secure permanent competitive advantage. As a 
result, competitive equilibrium would cease to exist eventually, with only a few firms 
dominating the economy, which is an unacceptable result to neoclassical economics; 
                                                                                                                                     
[1994a], seems to have arisen from a failure to recognise the distinction between the 
knowing and the known. If total knowledge instead had been thought of as the union of all 
technological ideas among the 𝑁 firms … this problem would have been avoided” (Olsson, 
2001, pp. 10-11). 
54  Given that “external Marshallian effects have been identified very early on … one 
contribution of [externality-based] endogenous growth models is to have resolved … 
(mathematical, rather than theoretical) difficulties” (Herrera, 2011, p. 21-22). 
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for a growth model to be certified as ‘neoclassical’ it should exhibit an economy that 
grows along a path of (competitive) equilibrium points. 
Further, and more importantly, there is an unfortunate irony because neoclassical 
economics treats externalities as exceptions. Externalities, that is to say external 
effects on someone else’s utility or production function, lead either to under-
provision or to over-provision. Such suboptimal states are considered to exist only 
temporarily and to be remedied either by targeted government actions (e.g. taxing 
and subsidising) or by internalising them through the creation of new property 
rights (e.g. pollution rights). In other words, in neoclassical economics, externalities 
are the result of the market economy being not sufficiently extensive. Implicit in this 
view is that externalities should disappear once the logic of the market economy has 
penetrated every non-market social relation.  
Externality-based endogenous growth models provide a contrasting view, that is, 
some externalities, not least knowledge spillover, are indispensable for long-term 
sustained economic growth which is as essential to the market economy as Pareto 
optimality, and thus they are never to be neutralised or internalised. 55  More 
generally, the market economy can be sustained only if it does not go beyond its 
limit and imposes restraints on its incessant drive to subordinate all facets of social 
life. 
These two contradictory views are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Whereas the 
exception argument is deployed where externalities need to be internalised, the 
indispensability argument applies to the sphere of innovation, invention, R&D and 
learning. However, necessarily, the economy is dichotomised into the realm of 
Pareto optimality (competitive equilibrium) and the realm of suboptimality (positive 
externalities and growth).56 
                                                
55 This suggests that externalities should be analysed in a general equilibrium setting. 
Externalities as exceptional phenomena are often studied in the context of partial 
equilibrium, see Mishan (1971). 
56 Similarly, Fine (2000, p. 250) says: 
As regards the incorporation of market imperfections, endogenous growth theory is 
essentially cannibalistic. The discipline can plunder itself for the sources of Pareto-
inefficient outcomes and translate these into sources for growth as opposed to 
deadweight losses. Not surprisingly, particularly favoured sources are those that concern 
imperfect competition, since innovation involves temporary monopoly rents, and any 
capital market imperfections that affect the level, composition or use of savings and 
investment.  
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Significantly, externalities are “pervasive” even where Pareto optimality is supposed 
to prevail, according to Hunt and d’Arge (1973, p. 345). “In a market economy any 
action of one individual or enterprise which induces pleasure or pain in any other 
individual or enterprise and is unpriced by a market constitutes an externality”, and 
“practically any social behaviour results in externalities”. This may not be 
considered a theoretical problem by neoclassical economists; however pervasive 
externalities may be, they are subject to potential internalisation. In practice, it is 
almost impossible to create as many taxes, subsidies or property rights as 
externalities. In addition, the internalisation of an externality would result in the 
formation of a new externality (Hunt, 1980, p. 244). For example, suppose that a 
city government introduces congestion charges to internalise the negative 
externality of congestion and pollution. Whilst many people would give up driving to 
the city centre during peak time, rich people would continue to drive regardless. 
Paying congestion charges would then become a sort of symbol of being rich, and 
therefore congestion charge, a tool of internalisation, would constitute a new 
externality, a positive externality for those who can afford the congestion charge and 
a negative externality for those who cannot. In this respect, externalities — a 
negation of the market mechanism57 — are not only pervasive within the market 
economy, but also constituted by them. 
These issues are not taken seriously by neoclassical economists. Instead, externality-
based growth models are criticised mainly for their failure to incorporate the 
mechanism through which innovations occur and propagate. This is based on the 
presumption that the growth of the aggregate knowledge stock is not a by-product 
of the accumulation of (physical or human) capital or knowledge but a result of 
conscious investment decisions made by profit-maximising firms to create new 
technologies and improve existing ones. 
2.4. So-called neo-Schumpeterian growth models 
In view of the lack of proper theorisation of knowledge in earlier models, Romer 
(1994a, pp. 12-13) retrospectively suggests five stylised facts that growth models 
should address: 1) there are many competing firms in a market economy, and they 
                                                
57 “The Achilles heel of welfare economics is its treatment of externalities (if a theory so 
utterly indefensible in so many of its facets can be said to have an Achilles heel!)” (Hunt, 
1980, p. 244). 
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are price-takers; 2) knowledge differs from conventional inputs in that it is non-
rival; 3) so production functions with knowledge as a factor exhibit increasing 
returns to scale; 4) knowledge accumulation is a result of profit-maximising 
decisions; 5) many individuals and firms have market power and earn monopoly 
rents on knowledge. The Solow model accommodates facts #1, #2 and #3, but not 
#4 and #5. Externality-based growth models additionally address #4, but not #5. 
Hence, the goal of the next generation of endogenous growth models was to 
incorporate #5. 
The Romer 1990 model 
In the Romer 1990 model,58 the stylised fact of the existence of monopoly rents is 
addressed by theorising knowledge as a non-rival but partially excludable good, 
provided by the firms in the specialised research sector and protected by intellectual 
property rights. Once a new technology has been produced in the research sector, it 
is sold to a firm in the intermediate goods sector (property rights change hands) and 
is used as a blueprint for a new intermediate durable good such as a machine or tool. 
The new durable good is then rented to firms operating in the final goods sector and 
used in the production process as a conventional factor of production. In short, 
knowledge is neither produced nor used in the final goods sector. Instead, 
knowledge indirectly affects labour productivity in the final goods sector, through 
embodiment in intermediate goods. It is assumed that all things being equal, the 
more distinctive technologies are available, the more output is produced.59 In other 
                                                
58 Similar neo-Schumpeterian models include Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and 
Helpman (1991a, 1991b), Jones (1995) and Young (1998). See Solow (2000) for a neat 
exposition of these models and Aghion, Akcigit, and Howitt (2013) for a survey of 
“Schumpeterian growth theory”. For a journalistic account of the conception and 
development of this model, see Warsh (2006). For a critical review of this book, see 
Mirowski (2007). 
59 Suppose that one unit of capital is required to produce one unit of an intermediate good 
regardless of the type of knowledge used in the production process. Then no matter how 
many different types of intermediate goods (and thus knowledge) are available, a given 
amount of capital stock would always be converted into the same number of intermediate 
goods. For example, 10,000 units of capital would be required to produce 1,000 units of each 
intermediate good if 10 distinct types of intermediate goods are available (total 10,000 
units), and 500 units if 20 types of intermediate goods are available (total 10,000 units). 
According to the variety model of knowledge, the latter 10,000 units with 20 distinct types 
would produce more final goods than the former with 10 distinct types as they embody more 
knowledge.  
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words, investments into innovation activities in the research sector necessarily lead 
to an increase in the aggregate knowledge stock and, thus, in final output by way of 
the increasing variety of intermediate goods. As innovation or creation of new 
knowledge drives economic growth in this model, it is often dubbed as a neo-
Schumpeterian growth model.  
This model treats knowledge in a different way from conventional factors. First, 
knowledge incurs fixed costs only and can be used an unlimited number of times to 
produce as many intermediate goods as necessary without additional cost. The 
presence of fixed costs and the unlimited reusability of knowledge (zero marginal 
cost) demand that the market structure of the intermediate goods sector should be 
other than perfect competition since the average cost curve would be downward-
sloping as long as the fixed costs of knowledge production are high enough to 
mitigate increasing marginal costs of other physical conventional inputs. Second, 
access to knowledge is monopolised due to intellectual property rights, and this 
serves as the source of imperfect competition. Only the rights holder of knowledge is 
entitled to produce the intermediate good powered by the knowledge. This 
introduces a contrast between the final goods sector and the intermediate goods 
sector. Whereas firms in the final goods sector are price takers as in earlier models, 
firms in the intermediate goods sector are price setters. By the same token, whereas 
competitive equilibrium exists in the final goods sector, with all conventional inputs 
including intermediate goods being paid for as much as they contribute to output, 
firms in the intermediate goods sector are under monopolistic competition. They 
wield some market power through product differentiation.  
In more formal terms, the aggregate production function in the final goods sector is 
given as  
𝑌 𝐻! , 𝐿, 𝑥 = 𝐻!!𝐿! 𝑥!!!!!!!!!! , 
where 𝐿 is labour, 𝐻! is human capital devoted to final-goods production, 𝑥!  is a 
number of intermediate good 𝑖 and 𝑥 is a list of all intermediate goods used for final-
goods production (by definition, 𝐾 = 𝑥!!!!! ). Firm 𝑖  in the intermediate goods 
sector, as the sole provider of an intermediate good 𝑖, chooses 𝑥!!  that maximises 
profit 
𝜋 = 𝑝 𝑥!! 𝑥!! − 𝑟𝑥!!, 
where 𝑝(𝑥!) is the inverse demand function for 𝑥!, which is equal to the marginal 
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productivity of an intermediate good 𝑖 , and 𝑟  is the interest rate. Finally, the 
knowledge production function in the research sector is given as 
𝐴 = 𝛿𝐻!𝐴, 
where 𝐴  is the aggregate knowledge stock, 𝐻!  is human capital devoted to 
knowledge production and 𝛿 is a constant.  
Assuming 𝑥! = 𝐾/𝐴 for all 𝑖 (given that all firms in the intermediate goods sector are 
identical), the aggregate production function can be rewritten as 
𝑌 𝐻! , 𝐿, 𝑥 = (𝐴𝐻!)!(𝐴𝐿)!𝐾!!!!!, 
which has exactly the same form as the Solow model except that human capital is 
added as a conventional input. Then, a steady-state satisfies the following 
conditions. First, 𝐻! remains constant so that 𝐴 grows exponentially at a constant 
rate; 𝛿𝐻!  is a constant. Second, wages are identical in the final goods sector and the 
research sector, and consequently, there is no movement of human capital between 
the two sectors, keeping 𝐻!  constant. Third, the price of a technology (𝑃!) is equal to 
the discounted value of all future monopoly profits. Fourth, 𝑃!  is equal to the wages 
paid out to researchers who have invented the technology. 
Knowledge in the Romer 1990 model 
All of these factors combined paint an interesting picture of the economy. First and 
foremost, firms realise no economic profit. Competitive equilibrium exists in the 
final goods sector; monopoly profits realised in the intermediate goods sector are 
fully appropriated by the original inventors (monopolistic competition). The price of 
a new technology – the present value of all future monopoly profits – is exactly as 
much as needed to compensate human capital for their contribution to knowledge 
production. And in this respect, fact #5 – many individuals and firms have market 
power and earn monopoly rents on knowledge – is not adequately addressed in the 
Romer 1990 model despite Romer’s claim otherwise. Although firms do earn 
monopoly profits (or monopoly rents), no excess profit is retained since all 
monopoly profits are paid to researchers. In short, monopoly is no better than 
competition in terms of profitability. After all, there is no reason why firms would 
prefer intermediate goods production to final goods production.  
Second, and by the same token, firms operating in the research sector do not enjoy 
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any excess profit and there is no reason why firms and individuals would choose 
knowledge production over final goods production. Owners of factors of production 
– (physical or human) capital and labour – must be indifferent to what to produce, 
be it knowledge production, intermediate goods production or final goods 
production. It is only the prospect of earning profits that incentivises firms to move 
across sectors; arbitrage profits reduce and eventually disappear due to capital 
movement across sectors.  
Third, then, the economy is structured such that resources are allocated to these 
three pre-existing sectors through profit maximising decisions. 60  This model, 
however, does not explain why the economy consists of these three sectors in the 
first place; their existence is simply taken for granted. In addition, the relation 
between final goods production and knowledge production is simply accidental, 
such that final goods production can continue even in the absence of knowledge 
production although the economy would stop growing. Further, knowledge 
production (= monopoly and growth) is separated from and even contrasted with 
final goods production (= competition). As in earlier models, competition is 
independent of growth; at most, it coexists with growth.61  
Fourth, intellectual property rights play an essential role in economic growth. 
Suppose instead that knowledge were freely available for anyone to use. Then no 
firms in the intermediate goods sector would pay for knowledge and the market for 
knowledge would disappear. As there would be no incentive for anyone to produce 
                                                
60 The division between the research sector and the intermediate goods sector is functional 
rather than structural. The two sectors can be considered as one sector with two functional 
roles. In other words, a firm can invent a new technology and produce a new intermediate 
good based on the new technology. This firm would employ human capital to produce 
knowledge, and physical capital to produce intermediate goods. Economic profit for this firm 
would be zero as factors of production would be fully compensated for their contribution. 
61 Romer (1989, p. 1) traces the tension between growth and competition back to Adam 
Smith: 
With the publication of The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith put two propositions at the 
centre of economic theory. The first was that competition allocates the pre-existing stock 
of productive inputs in a way that is wealth maximising. The second was that savings, the 
accumulation of capital, is the key process whereby the stock of inputs, and therefore 
wealth, grew over time. 
According to him, economists’ interests had been placed upon the first, “not so much 
because they were convinced that it was wrong, but rather because it seemed to be 
incompatible with the theoretical apparatus developed to capture the notion of competition”. 
Similarly, Arrow (2000, p. 173) argues that it is due to “a mathematical accident”. 
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knowledge, no new knowledge would be created, no new intermediate goods would 
be introduced and, consequently, the economy would stop growing. In other words, 
full excludability of knowledge in its use for intermediate goods production is a 
prerequisite for economic growth. Since exclusivity of knowledge requires legal 
protection for knowledge, we can also conclude that intellectual property rights are a 
necessary condition for economic growth. Knowledge, as such, is not the sole engine 
of growth. Institutional arrangements for intellectual property rights are equally 
necessary.62 
In addition, the assumption that knowledge is produced only in a specific sector of 
the economy is arbitrary and unrealistic. Whilst many firms that specialise in 
knowledge production do exist, not least in the semiconductor and chemical 
industries (see Chapter 6), Romer abstracts from the sheer reality that firms 
produce new technologies and make use of them for final goods production in order 
to gain competitive advantages and market power in the final goods sector, 
especially by cutting cost. Significantly, this is ignored not for the sake of simplicity, 
but to produce a sought-for result, i.e. competitive equilibrium. Once differences 
between firms have been introduced, competitive equilibrium would cease to exist 
and the economy as a whole would be represented as being dominated by a few 
monopoly players.63 Equally troubling is the characterisation of the economy that a 
                                                
62 Similarly, Jones (1998, p. 81) says: 
Clearly, sustained economic growth is a very recent phenomenon, and this raises one of 
the fundamental questions of economic history. How did sustained growth get started in 
the first place? The thesis of Douglass North and a number of other economic historians 
is that the development of intellectual property rights, a cumulative process that 
occurred over centuries, is responsible for modern economic growth. It is not until 
individuals are encouraged by the credible promise of large returns via the marketplace 
that sustained innovation occurs. 
By contrast, for Mirowski (2011, p. 66), intellectual property rights are the basis of the 
neoliberal transformation of knowledge into commodity, i.e. commodification of knowledge. 
“The neoliberals had won: Science [and knowledge in general] no longer qualified as a public 
good”. 
63 Solow (1996, p. 233) says, “To judge whether this theoretical enterprise has been a success 
we need a fairly clear idea of what could legitimately have been expected”. NGT is based on, 
and constrained by, the theoretical apparatus of neoclassical economics including general 
equilibrium, the one-sector model and profit- and utility-maximising agents. Interestingly, 
Romer (1989, p. 30) holds a similar view on the weaknesses of earlier models, which reflect 
“the technical constraints economists faced when they first tried to formulate dynamic 
equilibrium models”, and “theory has advanced to the point that these constraints can now 
be relaxed”. 
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firm produces either final goods or knowledge, but not both. A firm may choose to 
produce both knowledge and final goods, but monopolising the use of new 
knowledge that it has produced for its own final goods production is strictly 
prohibited; new knowledge as embodied in a new intermediate good must be 
available for all firms, according to the Romer 1990 model. It is as if this firm 
consists of two autonomous and independent divisions, with an insurmountable 
wall strictly and completely separating the two. Such characterisation of the 
economy seems simply unreasonable. It is too important and fundamental a fact to 
be neglected that firms produce both knowledge and final goods and that the 
purpose of knowledge production is to differentiate (a means of competition). In a 
similar vein, Nelson (1998, p. 499) asks:  
If imperfect competition for some reason has proved attractive or easy to build 
in, what explains why the understanding that firms differ significantly 
[emphasis added] in their capabilities and their strategies has proved 
unattractive or undigestible for the new growth theorists? 
Then, it is also questionable whether the Romer 1990 model is sufficiently 
Schumpeterian. Romer’s own view is that it deserves to be called so, as the 
knowledge stock in his model is designed to grow only if new knowledge is 
produced, thereby increasing the variety of intermediate goods. Hence, he considers 
that his contribution lies in modelling production of new knowledge in the 
monopolistic competition setting. In his words (Romer, 1994b, p. 7): 
The modelling innovation in the neo-Schumpeterian models of growth is that 
they take explicit account of the fixed costs [emphasis added] that limit the set 
of goods and show that these fixed costs matter in a dynamic analysis 
conducted at the level of economy. This contrasts with the standard approach 
in general equilibrium analysis, in which fixed costs are assumed to be of 
negligible importance in markets of realistic size. 
Yet, despite the claims to the contrary,64 he argues that NGT, or at least its neo-
Schumpeterian branch, is new as opposed to OGT, not in terms of theoretical tools 
deployed, but because NGT is “about newness” (p. 37), allegedly in a Schumpeterian 
                                                
64 For example, Fine (2003, p. 209), taking the example of Arrow’s article on learning-by-
doing which dates back to 1962, argues that “the ideas underlying NGT are far from new, and 
there are other precedents in the literature on technical change that anticipate NGT”. 
Herrera (2011, p. 23) goes further and builds a Solowian endogenous growth model “to prove 
in the technical sphere that a continuity between Solowian and endogenous growth models 
exists and prohibits consideration of the latter as a new theory”. 
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sense, but see Park (2007) for a critique of the variety model of knowledge.65 
Similarly, according to Romer (1994b), whereas the distinction between dynamic 
and static analyses in earlier models is limited in the sense that dynamic analysis in 
these models is essentially a static one with dated and state-contingent goods (p. 7), 
NGT is capable of explaining the real dynamic aspect of the economy, which is the 
continuing introduction of new technologies and new goods. Despite this claim, 
incorporating fixed costs and new goods and technologies is not sufficient for 
labelling the Romer 1990 model as Schumpeterian for the following reasons. First, 
the aspect of destruction is missing in this model.66 Second, creativity in this model 
does not lead to surplus profit; there is no pecuniary incentive for innovation. Third, 
innovation is seen not as a necessity or a matter of survival, but as a choice or a 
neutral alternative to final goods production. In reality, on the contrary, firms 
compete with each other on the basis of different (technical and/or organisational) 
knowledge in quality and quantity. Differences in knowledge do not necessarily lead 
to monopoly either, with or without intellectual property rights. Leading players 
emerge based on new, innovative knowledge, but competitors tend to catch them up 
eventually. As we will see in Chapter 3, Marx’s notion of intra-sectoral competition 
captures this incessant cycle of innovation and catch-up, in which knowledge is not 
only compatible with competition, but also the major vehicle of competition, unlike 
in neoclassical growth models, old and new. 
Other aspects of Romer’s knowledge production function have also drawn criticism. 
First, it predicts scale effects. With the knowledge production function given as 𝐴 = 𝛿𝐻!𝐴,67 an increase in population results in a permanent increase in the rate of 
                                                
65 As the title of Park (2007) succinctly summarises, the key point of his critique of the 
Romer 1990 model is “homogeneity masquerading as variety” (p. 379). He provides two 
related explanations. First, although intermediate goods in the Romer 1990 model are 
qualitatively distinct from each other, they are treated in a symmetric fashion in the final 
goods production function. Second, all intermediate goods with various types require the 
same input — physical capital — in quantity and quality and there is the same uniformity 
issue in designs, given that all designs have the same price: 
It turns out that, in a good sample of representative models of horizontal innovation, 
what in effect contributes to economic growth is the increasing quantity of a 
homogeneous intermediate good, not the increasing variety of heterogeneous 
intermediate goods. (p. 391) 
66 Aghion and Howitt (1992) incorporate the notion of destruction although the basic 
structure of the model is the same as Romer’s 1990 model. 
67 As Solow (2000, p. 151) points out, this form of the knowledge production function 
originates from Lucas (1988). 
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knowledge growth, which is easily refuted empirically.68 According to Jones (1995, 
p. 760): 
The number of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D in the United States 
has grown from under 200,000 in 1950 to nearly 1 million by 1987; per capita 
growth rates in the United States exhibit nothing remotely similar to this 
fivefold increase.69 
Second, and more fundamentally, much doubt has been cast on exponential 
knowledge growth itself. Whilst it does guarantee long-term sustained economic 
growth, there is lack of microeconomic evidence and theories of innovation 
supporting its presence,70 not to mention the question of whether knowledge “can be 
                                                
68 Scale effects are, however, useful for cross-country comparison. According to Romer 
(1996, p. 204): 
In an analysis of American and British growth, the insight that is most relevant concerns 
scale. By definition, a nonrival idea can be copied and communicated, so its value 
increases in proportion to the size of the market in which it can be used. 
He also argues that scale effects “should be treated in the manner of Adam Smith: as a 
fundamental aspect of our economic world that follows from the nonrival character of ideas” 
(p. 206). 
69 Jones (1995) proposes an alternative model in which the growth rate of the knowledge 
stock is determined by the growth rate of population. It can be easily shown that the steady-
state growth rate of the knowledge stock and of the final output in this model is !!!!!, where 𝜆 
and 𝜙  are constants measuring the negative externalities of R&D and the degree of 
knowledge spillover, respectively. Consequently, this model requires exponential population 
growth (𝑛) to generate sustained long-term growth, which is the same conclusion drawn 
from the Arrow model. Interestingly, Romer (1987, p. 170) argues that this is the key 
weakness of the Arrow model as an endogenous growth model:  
If the stock of labour is fixed … diminishing returns to investment in capital will 
eventually force growth to stop just as it does in the classical case. One way to generate 
unceasing growth is to allow for exogenous growth in the labour force. 
Young (1998) proposes a model without scale effects that exhibits similar features as 
Romer’s 1990 model. According to Jones (1999), however, the Young model manages to 
remove scale effects only in a special case. 
70 Mirowski (2007, pp. 483-484) quotes widely from leading growth theorists to support his 
argument that there is no convincing link between research and economic growth although 
he “venture[s] to guess that none of those economists actually believes that science is not in 
fact the true first cause of economic growth” (p. 485). For example, a quote from Grossman 
and Helpman (1994) is as follows: “As yet, no empirical study proves that technology has 
been the engine of modern day growth” (p. 32). Even the World Bank (2007, p. 7) is 
sceptical:  
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rendered homogenous”, and, if it can, whether “there exists any cardinal measure of 
the single stock of knowledge” (Steedman, 2003, p. 127), but see also Park (2007) 
for a contrary view.71 Therefore, one may wonder whether exponential knowledge 
growth is a well-established view or a requirement to which the reality must 
conform to fit the neoclassical framework to obtain a sought-after result. It is a 
dangerous and weak spot of NGT; if it is shown convincingly that knowledge is not 
growing exponentially, one should conclude that economic growth would eventually 
stop. Solow (1994, p. 53) expresses a similar concern:  
If an innovation generates a proportionate increase in 𝐴, then we have a 
theory of easy endogenous growth. … But suppose that an innovation 
generates only an absolute increase in 𝐴: then greater allocation of resources 
to R&D buys a one-time jump in productivity, but not a faster rate of 
productivity growth. I do not know which is the better assumption, and these 
are only two of many possibilities. But merely to adopt the more powerful 
assumption is no more than to assume the more powerful conclusion.  
Third, Romer’s knowledge production function suffers from a sort of knife-edge 
problem, that is, 𝜙  (in a slightly modified form of the knowledge production 
function 𝐴 = 𝛿𝐻!𝐴!,) cannot take any other value but 1. Otherwise either growth 
will eventually stop as the rate of knowledge growth approaches zero (𝜙 < 1), or the 
growth rate will increase without a bound to infinity (𝜙 > 1). Obviously, 𝜙 = 1 is too 
unrealistic an assumption and raises a robustness issue.72 
Last but not least and not necessarily to be criticised, positive externalities are 
required in the knowledge production function. Since exponential per capita output 
                                                                                                                                     
Using these [endogenous] growth models, however, it continues to be hard to measure 
the effect of knowledge on economic growth. For example, it is difficult to single out the 
contribution of knowledge to total factor productivity, which is at the heart of the growth 
process and can be affected by other parameters such as the more effective utilisation of 
human or physical capital. 
71 “The number of designs is measured in terms of the number of patents granted. Thus this 
formulation of the production of designs (a form of ‘knowledge’, broadly defined) apparently 
satisfies the condition of cardinal measurability of ‘knowledge’” (Park, 2007, p. 387). 
72 Romer (1994a, p. 18), however, explains that this assumption is taken for the sake of 
simplicity only: 
The mathematical analysis in this more complicated robust model [𝜙 < 1] was much 
harder than the analysis that is possible when 𝜙 is equal to 1. The difference between the 
two models is the difference between studying the phase plane of a nonlinear differential 
equation system and solving a simple linear differential equation. Once it is clear that we 
could build a complicated model that is robust, there is every reason to work with the 
simple special case whenever possible. 
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growth requires exponential knowledge growth, knowledge production functions are 
designed such that the research productivity at any point in time is dependent upon 
the current knowledge stock.73 Consequently, research contributes to final goods 
production in two ways: by producing new knowledge and thus increasing the 
aggregate knowledge stock; and by inadvertently increasing the productivity of 
future researchers. Hence, whereas knowledge must be completely excludable in its 
use in the production of intermediate goods, it must be completely non-excludable 
in its use in the production of new knowledge.74 If knowledge were fully excludable, 
the growth rate of knowledge stock would eventually reach zero and so would the 
growth rate of per capital output. Accordingly, intellectual property rights need to be 
designed such that knowledge is partially excludable, and in this respect, 
“excludability is a function of both the technology and the legal system” (Romer, 
1990, p. S75). 
2.5. Knowledge-based growth models vs. Marx’s value 
theory 
As we have seen so far, NGT, or more precisely, knowledge-based new growth 
models, are not successful as a growth theory with endogenised knowledge 
production. It is not only that a lot of compromises are made to incorporate 
knowledge into the neoclassical framework, but the endogenisation of knowledge 
brings with it more problems such as scale effects and a knife-edge character. As an 
                                                
73 Whilst it is out of necessity that knowledge should grow exponentially, for Romer, it is also 
an essential characteristic of knowledge production. He says in an interview (Kurtzman, 
1997, para. 11): 
One feature of knowledge can be summarised by Isaac Newton’s statement that he could 
see far because he could stand on the shoulders of giants. In other words, his notion was 
that knowledge builds on itself, which means that as we learn more, we get better and 
better at discovering new things. It also means that there’s no limit to the amount of 
things we can discover. This is a very important fact for understanding the broad sweep 
of human history and it is very different from what we are used to thinking about in 
terms of physical objects, where scarcity is the overwhelming fact with which we have to 
deal. 
74 Romer (1990, p. S84) considers this partial excludability of knowledge is consistent with 
the patent system although there exists no patent regime with the permanent protection of 
patents: 
If an inventor has a patented design for widgets, no one can make or sell widgets without 
the agreement of the inventor. On the other hand, other inventors are free to spend time 
studying the patent application for the widget and learn knowledge that helps in the 
design of a wodget. The inventor of the widget has no ability to stop the inventor of a 
wodget from learning from the design of a widget. 
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economics of knowledge, NGT is inferior to micro-level theories of innovation and 
technological change, and these models do not add much to the neoclassical 
understanding of growth. They aspire to be integral models of growth and 
knowledge, but are instead unfortunately trapped between the two. Put differently, 
concerned mainly with endogenously generating exponential growth of the 
knowledge stock, their achievements are both modest and unsatisfactory: modest 
because nothing fundamentally new is added to the structural characteristics of the 
economy as conceived in OGT, for example, the co-existence of competitive 
equilibrium (non-increasing returns) and growth (increasing returns); and 
unsatisfactory because micro-level innovation theories prove to be difficult to be 
translated in a way that fits the neoclassical framework. 
Whereas OGT is focused on showing how stable a growth path is and how the 
growth path adjusts to changes in consumer behaviour, population and knowledge, 
knowledge-based growth models instead try to reconstruct economic growth on the 
basis of knowledge, and therefore the fate of growth depends on how successfully 
knowledge production is designed in terms of generating exponential knowledge 
growth. Unfortunately, assumptions are made too casually in the name of simplicity 
and too selectively for the obvious reason to generate exponential knowledge 
growth. Take Romer’s knowledge production function as an example, in which the 
growth rate of the knowledge stock is assumed to be in proportion to human capital 
devoted to research in the presence of positive externalities of knowledge. Why is 
this assumption less exogenous than Solow’s? As Solow (2000, p. 122) puts it, “some 
things are exogenous after all, at least exogenous to economics”.75 Referring to 
externalities is not an explanation either; it only describes what needs to be 
explained. 
Growth theory, economics of use value 
At a more fundamental level, to some extent, the daunting task of generating 
exponential knowledge growth is the product of neoclassical economics itself. In 
neoclassical economics, an economics of use value, growth can be conceived only as 
an increase in final output regardless of price changes. In addition, all different 
                                                
75 Mirowski (2011, p. 75) criticises NGT from a similar point of view: 
Romer had not truly ‘endogenised’ technical change, since he still made use of the Solow 
trick of equating it with shifting the production function, only now linking that shift to 
yet another unobservable variable dubbed ‘human capital devoted to research’. (Romer, 
1990, p. S83) 
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goods and services are considered homogeneous in that they have utilities, 
representable by a single use value, as exemplified in the utility function of the 
consumption goods variety model of Grossman and Helpman (1991b). In this utility 
function, a consumption index 𝐷 is defined as, 
𝑥(𝑗)!𝑑𝑗!! !/!, 
where 𝑥(𝑗)  denotes consumption of good 𝑗 . According to this function, all 
consumption goods of 𝑛  distinct types are homogenous with the representative 
consumption good in quantity 𝐷, although 𝐷 may vary depending on the design of 
the index function.76 It is implicit in this model, which none bothers to mention, that 
real GDP is equivalent to 𝐷 (or a function of 𝐷), and this, in turn, justifies the use of 
the aggregate production function (i.e. the one-sector model). For number of goods 
considered in a model makes no essential difference. 
With economic growth being equated with a growth in a single representative use 
value, and given non-increasing returns to scale with respect to conventional inputs, 
there must exist something acting as a multiplier or productivity booster for the 
economy to grow, whatever it is called.77 Brought into the Romer 1990 model as 
multiplier, the role of knowledge is necessarily limited only to increasing the 
economy-wide productivity of conventional inputs. And in this limited role, 
knowledge is not a factor of production; no economic agent can choose how much 
knowledge to employ in the production of final output.78 Nor does the aggregate 
knowledge stock, determined endogenously or not, affect profit-maximising 
decisions of individual firms in the final goods sector. Strictly detached from final 
goods production, knowledge is also stripped of diversity in terms of its production, 
                                                
76 This model is a consumption goods variant of the Romer 1990 model. 
77 This multiplier encompasses all factors that can cause “any kind of shift in the production 
function” (Solow, 1957, p. 312). Technical change and knowledge growth are some of the 
loose terms that refer to increases in this multiplier. 
78 That knowledge does not enter the final goods production as a factor of production is 
pretty obvious in the Solow model and externality-based growth models. It is also the case 
for the Romer 1990 model, in which firms in the final goods sector are not involved in 
knowledge production, but take the aggregate knowledge stock, produced in the research 
sector, as given. Although there are differences between OGT and NGT in terms of 
characterisation of knowledge, they equally keep firms in the final good sector out of touch 
with knowledge. 
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consumption and dissemination; knowledge goes through the neoclassical use value 
filter and comes out as a special thing, as non-rival and partially excludable (and 
tradable) good and as disembodied knowledge.79 Further, no distinction is drawn 
between firm-level knowledge production, in which knowledge production is aimed 
largely at reducing production cost, and aggregate-level knowledge production, in 
which knowledge is only a productivity booster, and the former is simply ignored. It 
follows that, at the individual level, each firm faces the choice of either knowledge 
production or commodity production, and the same applies to each worker. At the 
aggregate level, the economy as a whole should allocate resources between 
knowledge production and final goods production with the sole aim of determining 
infinite-horizon output schedule which maximises infinite-horizon utility. Through 
competition across the two sectors, by way of the equalisation of the wage level, an 
equilibrium is established between human capital devoted to knowledge production 
and that to output production, which is seen to strike a right balance between higher 
current output and higher future productivity (and thus higher future output) and 
maximises the infinite-horizon utility of the economy by way of long-term sustained 
per capita output growth. 
In sum, NGT starts with the growth of the real GDP per capita and implicitly equates 
it with a growth in a single use value. From this assumption the need for exponential 
knowledge growth is derived. For this purpose, knowledge is stripped of all its 
richness and reduced to a productivity multiplier and, consequently, competition 
between knowledge production and final goods production comes to the fore as the 
                                                
79  Mirowski (2009) classifies neoclassical attempts to theorise knowledge into three 
categories: as a thing; as an inductive index; and as symbolic computation, and criticises that 
none of these is satisfactory in their “constructions of the epistemology of the agent” (p. 101). 
For him, knowledge is about cognition, learning, communication and decision-making of the 
economic agent. For those who theorise knowledge as a thing, to which Romer belongs: 
cognition is irrelevant; learning is the purchase of a commodity; communication is the same 
as exchange. It goes without saying that such an epistemology is too simple and sounds 
almost inhuman: “A thing-like information absolved the theorists of having to confront 
whatever model of mind was supposedly inherent in the utility function” (p. 116). The 
epistemology of the agent is, however, not in the scope of the endogenisation of knowledge in 
the Romer 1990 model and other knowledge-based growth models and, therefore, it is to 
some extent misleading to impose this line of critique onto these models. In other words, 
knowledge in these models should be understood in a narrower sense. This understanding 
corresponds to what Foray (2004, p. 2) calls “a more restrictive conception of the economics 
of knowledge” which excludes “problems of economic choice in situations of incomplete and 
uncertain information”. 
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enabler of long-term sustained growth by optimally allocating resources. However, 
unfortunately, the bottom-up reconstruction of growth on the basis of knowledge 
turns out to be no simple matter. The difficulties are augmented further by the lack 
of empirical evidence that supports the close link between investments into 
innovation and growth.80 This is not to suggest that NGT is necessarily doomed to 
failure. As Solow (2007, p. 6) puts it: “The most valuable contribution of 
endogenous growth theory has not been the theory itself, but rather the stimulus it 
has provided to thinking about the actual ‘production’ of human capital and useful 
technological knowledge”. Future growth theorists may be able to come up with new 
modelling techniques that allow growth models to become more successful such that 
major findings of microeconomic theories on innovation are accommodated. 
Marx’s value theory, economics of value 
By contrast, in Marx’s value theory, an increase in output in terms of use value does 
not necessarily lead to an increase in value.81 Abstracting from individual differences 
in productivity and sectoral differences in complexity, see Chapter 3 for more on 
this, the same amount of value is produced for the same period of time regardless of 
social productivity improvements although more use values are created in quantity 
and diversity: 
Variations in productivity have no impact whatever on the labour itself 
represented in value. As productivity is an attribute of labour in its concrete 
useful form, it naturally ceases to have any bearing on that labour [emphasis 
added] as soon as we abstract from its concrete useful form. The same labour, 
therefore, performed for the same length of time, always yields the same 
amount of value, independently of any variations in productivity. But it 
                                                
80 This is, however, not to deny the fact that average living standards in the capitalist 
economy have improved significantly due to the rapid development in science and 
technology. Similarly, Mirowski (2011, p. 77) says: 
However, I do not want the reader to leave … with the impression that, in the real world, 
scientific knowledge has nothing whatsoever to do with technological change or that 
science has no causal relationship to economic growth. I would rather hope that the 
reader would realise that the triad of linear model/public good/growth theory is a badly 
flawed and expendable set of concepts to structure inquiry into the economics of science. 
No such simplistic macroeconomic statements concerning science and economic growth 
have been found to hold up very long. 
81  “An increase in the amount of material wealth [use value] may correspond to a 
simultaneous fall in the magnitude of its value. This contradictory movement arises out of 
the twofold character of labour” (CI, pp. 136-137). 
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provides different quantities of use-values during equal periods of time; more, 
if productivity rises; fewer, if it falls. (CI, p. 137) 
In value theory, then, real GDP is nothing but the price form of the total value 
created (v + s), not (a function of) the quantity of the representative consumption 
good, and economic growth is a form of the expansion of accumulation as well as of 
the capitalist relations of production. The growth in use value production in 
quantity, quality and diversity is simply a by-product of value production and 
accumulation. In addition, the problem of generating increasing returns out of non-
increasing returns is non-existent in value theory. For the concept of returns to scale 
applies to productivity defined in terms of use value, but not to value, in terms of 
which accumulation is measured (at the aggregate level). Likewise, whilst knowledge 
is a determining factor of (social and individual) productivity, its effect of boosting 
social productivity has no significance in terms of total value created. 
There are other fundamental differences between economic growth in NGT and 
accumulation in value theory, not least in the way knowledge is conceptualised and 
incorporated into the theory, reflecting more fundamental differences between the 
two theories. First, whereas economic growth in knowledge-based growth models of 
NGT is the direct result of knowledge growth (despite knowledge production not 
necessarily being intended to generate economic growth), capital accumulation in 
value theory does not necessarily depend on knowledge. Accumulation, essentially 
the conversion of a portion of surplus value into capital, can take place without 
technical change,82 not to mention that technical changes themselves are not a 
                                                
82 Marx (CIII, p. 372) says:  
Yet despite the constant and daily transformation in the mode of production, a greater or 
smaller part of this total capital, now this, now that, continues to accumulate for a 
certain period of time on the basis of a given average ratio [emphasis added] of these 
[organic] components, so that its growth does not involve any organic change and is thus 
no cause for a fall in the rate of profit.  
Similarly, He also says that even simple reproduction (in which there is neither 
accumulation nor technical change) is a part of accumulation:  
Simple reproduction on the same scale seems to be an abstraction, both in the sense that 
the absence of any accumulation or reproduction on an expanded scale is an assumption 
foreign to the capitalist basis, and in the sense that the conditions in which production 
takes place do not remain absolutely the same in different years (which is what is 
assumed here). The supposition is that a social capital of a given value supplies the same 
mass of commodity values and satisfies the same quantity of needs in both the current 
year and the previous year, even if the forms of the commodities may change in the 
reproduction process. But since, when accumulation takes place, simple reproduction 
still remains a part of this, and is a real factor in accumulation [emphasis added], this 
can also be considered by itself. (CII, pp. 470-471) 
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continuous process; it is possible to continue accumulation without adopting new 
technologies, by extending the working day and/or increasing the intensity of 
labour. 
Second, in contrast to these models in which knowledge growth causes economic 
growth, in value theory, accumulation explains knowledge growth and vice-versa.83 
Capitalists with varying levels of technical knowledge co-exist and compete against 
each other, meaning there is a minimum productivity requirement for individual 
capitalists to continue their business operations for a foreseeable period of time 
whilst making no profit or even sustaining losses; (a certain level of) knowledge is a 
prerequisite for accumulation. In addition, given that capitalists with higher 
productivities than the sectoral average can realise extra surplus value or surplus 
profit, individual capitalists strive to strengthen and deepen their knowledge base; 
knowledge production is driven by the desire to accumulate more and faster. Last, at 
the economy-wide as well as the sectoral levels, individual capitalists’ knowledge 
production leads to the growth of social knowledge by way of knowledge transfer 
and (partial) spillover. In short, the capitalist mode of production, where production 
is primarily for accumulation, drives the growth of social knowledge through 
competition. 
Third, the relations between knowledge and accumulation in value theory are 
multifaceted, encompassing different spheres and multiple layers of abstraction, 
and are therefore much more complex than the simple one-way and accidental 
relationship between the two demonstrated in NGT. As well as being the result of 
accumulation, knowledge production shapes the trajectory of accumulation, often 
generating contradictory tendencies. For example, on the one hand, a rise in 
productivity drives down the profit rate by raising the organic composition of 
capital, weakening the impetus to accumulation. On the other hand, at a more 
complex level of analysis, it increases the profit rate by increasing the rate of 
exploitation and thereby accelerates accumulation. In addition, a fall in the profit 
rate, in turn, intensifies competition, expanding the scale and scope of knowledge 
production and further accelerating (by increasing the profit rate) and decelerating 
                                                
83 Marx introduces the concept of capital and the transformation of surplus value into capital 
in Chapter 4 of the first volume of Capital. Then he analyses the production of absolute 
surplus value which does not involve technical change, in Chapter 10. Knowledge only first 
appears in Chapter 12 where he discusses competition between individual capitalists centred 
on productivity and the production of relative surplus value. 
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(by decreasing the profit date) accumulation. As knowledge and accumulation have 
effects on each other in diverse and often contradictory ways, no mathematical 
correlation between them can be established, let alone a causal relation, as in NGT. 
All in all, metaphorically speaking, whereas knowledge in NGT is the engine of 
(mechanical) economic growth, in value theory, it is an enzyme produced by the 
capitalist economy (as an organism) functioning as the catalyst for accumulation 
and accompanying tendencies and counter-tendencies. 
2.6. Concluding remarks 
As we have seen in the previous section, NGT is not successful in explaining growth 
on the basis of knowledge despite many theoretical compromises it makes whilst 
bringing knowledge into the analysis on the basis of a neoclassical framing. This is 
not to deny the need for growth theory. It is not only that understanding the long-
term path of real GDP per capita is important in and of itself, but most economic 
policy discourses are organised around GDP growth. There is, then, an imperative to 
develop an alternative growth theory on the basis of Marx’s value theory, taking its 
distinction between value and use value being a solid foundation.84 
In developing such a theory, the top-down approach of NGT should be avoided 
because no such role as productivity booster is deduced from the growth of real GDP 
per capita in value terms. By contrast, it is necessary to take a bottom-up approach, 
the first step of which is to explore why knowledge is produced in the capitalist 
economy in the first place. The short answer to this question is the forces of 
competition among capitalists driven and imposed by productivity differences 
within sectors and complexity differences across sectors, which is a form through 
which an immanent law of capitalism is asserted (compare this with NGT which 
takes the existence of the research sector for granted). In the next chapter, we will 
                                                
84 This thesis is not concerned with developing a theory of real GDP per capita on the basis of 
Marx’s value theory. However, here are some guiding principles for future research: at the 
very abstract level, the growth in real GDP per capita should be understood as the growth in 
total work hours of the economy; at more concrete and complex levels of analysis, the 
following will need to be considered: 1) the division of the total work hours between 
productive labour and unproductive labour; 2) the existence of temporary surplus profit 
within and across sectors; 3) the existence of false social value in the agricultural sector due 
to barriers to capital movement; 4) trade, capital flow, productivity differences across 
countries. 
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also show that knowledge can be incorporated into value theory in a consistent and 
coherent manner albeit in a different context. Suffice for now to conclude this 
chapter by noting that neoclassical economics has turned out to be neither robust 
nor flexible enough to accommodate knowledge, at least in the context of growth. 
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3. Knowledge in value theory: Virtual multiplication of 
labour 
3.1. Introduction 
We have seen in the previous chapter that too many simplifying assumptions are 
imposed on knowledge to incorporate it into growth models without altering the 
core elements of neoclassical economics. Consequently, the theory of knowledge 
underpinning NGT is shallow and little is added to the neoclassical understanding of 
economic growth. Neoclassical growth theory has yet to pass the test of 
incorporating knowledge either anywhere approaching fully, let alone coherently. 
In addition, it is an irony that the continuing and rapid development of social 
knowledge, a systemic characteristic of capitalism, is seen as undermining the 
validity of value theory by some groups of theorists, not least the proponents of 
cognitive capitalism theory (see Chapter 4 for extensive consideration). The 
presumption is that, with the putatively decreasing role of labour in the production 
process, the validity of treating labour as the sole source of value is also being 
eroded, to the extent that labour gives way to knowledge as the source of value. 
Instead of incorporating the role of knowledge into value theory, the seeming 
dominance of knowledge (in some sectors) in contemporary capitalism is taken as 
the reason to reject value theory altogether.  
To the contrary, as argued here, knowledge can be incorporated into value theory. 
First, it can be demonstrated that the labour theory of value is compatible with 
labour-saving, knowledge-using technologies. Second, value theory can be put to the 
test of knowledge to prove its consistency, coherence and flexibility. 
For this purpose, the South Korean controversy on the value and price of 
information commodities (‘Controversy’) such as computer software and digital 
music is of great importance.85 It is not only that the Controversy is instrumental in 
identifying issues discussed in this chapter, especially those around the relationship 
between knowledge and commodity in value production, but it is instrumental for a 
more concrete analysis in Chapter 6, through the consideration of the distribution of 
surplus profit in the form of royalty payments and licence fees to the rights holders. 
                                                
85 The Controversy started in 2002 and is drawing to a close in terms of number of 
publications; since 2014, only two papers (Ahn, 2014; Ha, 2015) have been published. 
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Source vs. Copy 
The Controversy is concerned mainly with the puzzle that the (re-)production of a 
software commodity requires very little, if any, labour, but it is being sold at a high 
price. This raises the question of whether value theory is applicable to software and, 
more generally, to information commodities. Answering this question requires, 
above all, the analysis of the software production process, which broadly consists of 
two phases. 
First, the source code (‘source’) of software is produced. Like any other products of 
labour, the production of a source, also known as coding, requires both means of 
production (e.g. a computer) and labour. This step includes feature requirements 
definition, user experiences (UX) design, visual design, software architecture design, 
programming and testing and, therefore, different types of labour with qualitatively 
distinct skill sets are needed. Second, install packages of the software (‘copy’) are 
produced by compiling the source code and replicating the first copy,86 even at the 
point of sale, especially when a copy is delivered via the Internet. As the second step 
requires little human involvement, most workers in software companies are devoted 
to the first step.  
In neoclassical terms, then, computer software and other information commodities 
such as digital music, e-book and mobile apps — the most prominent examples of 
information commodities at time of writing — have a cost structure with a high fixed 
cost and very low constant marginal cost. In other words, whereas the production 
cost of the first copy, which includes the production cost of the source, is very high, 
subsequent copies cost very little to produce. For these goods, competitive 
equilibrium does not exist because average cost curves are downward sloping, with 
profit per unit increasing as supply grows. This is why information goods markets 
have often been analysed on the basis of the theory of imperfect competition in 
mainstream economics, with knowledge producers realising monopoly profit in 
partial equilibrium settings. However, although it is acknowledged that information 
commodities are special cases, the consensus is that they do not warrant a new 
economic theory. The received view is that ‘‘forces that were relatively minor in the 
industrial economy turn out to be critical in the information economy’’ (Varian, 
                                                
86 All copies are not necessarily identical. It is often the case that a customer-specific identity 
verification code is embedded into each copy to make sure it can be used only by the 
customer who has bought the product. 
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Farrell, & Shapiro, 2004, p. 3), for example, ‘‘pricing, switching costs, scale 
economies, transaction costs, system coordination and contracting’’ (p. 4). In other 
words, information commodities do not pose any fundamental challenges to 
mainstream economics. 
By contrast, the Controversy has yet to reach a consensus. This is mainly because 
different approaches reflect different interpretations of Marx’s value theory, 
especially on such key concepts of value theory as extra surplus value and rent. The 
Controversy has necessarily evolved to become about value theory.87 
The next two sections (2 and 3), then, are devoted to critically reviewing the two 
contending approaches of the Controversy, the ‘cost approach’ and the ‘monopoly 
price approach’, focusing on how each approach theorises the role of the source code 
of computer software in the determination of the value of a software copy. Although 
both the strengths and weaknesses of each approach are highlighted, both are 
rejected for inadequately theorising the relations between source and copy. It is 
shown and criticised, that the source code is considered as means of production in 
the cost approach and having nothing to do with the production of the value of 
software copies in the monopoly price approach. In Section 4, the debate is taken to 
a more general level by introducing a structural distinction between knowledge 
(source) and commodity (copy) and their internal relations in the production 
process are analysed. In addition, given that such a distinction is present in 
commodity production in general, the notion of information commodities as the 
object of analysis is questioned. On the basis of this, in Section 5, an alternative 
approach, called the virtual multiplication approach, is put forward. It is argued that 
knowledge (source) should be seen as taking part in the determination of the value 
of commodities (copies) by determining the productivity and complexity of 
commodity-producing labour, i.e. the virtual multiplication of commodity-
producing labour. 
                                                
87 The following has been fiercely discussed in the Controversy: whether labour expended to 
produce a source contributes to the value of a copy; the nature of the price of a copy, whether 
it is determined by the value of the copy or it is a monopoly price, etc.; and the role of 
intellectual property rights in the determination of the value and price of information 
commodities. 
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3.2. The ‘cost approach’ 
Namhoon Kang, who initiated the Controversy by publishing a book on the value 
and price of information commodities in 2002 (N. Kang, 2002), introduces a crucial 
distinction between the source and the copies of software. For him, this distinction 
is the key to understanding the outstanding divergence between the high price of a 
copy and its low marginal production cost, which is a defining characteristic of 
information commodities.88 Significantly, he suggests that the source should be 
considered as an information commodity: 
The value of an information commodity is the labour time required to 
reproduce the source rather than a copy.89 (N. Kang, 2002, p. 99) 
The value of the source is realised by selling multiple copies … Whether or not 
the value of an information commodity [source] is properly realised depends 
upon the price of a copy and total number of copies sold. If the value of the 
source is properly realised, the information commodity will be reproduced 
without any problem. 
In other words, the high price of a copy is not determined by the value of a copy in 
isolation, but rather by (incorporating a fraction of) the value of the source. This is 
to avoid the inevitable conclusion of taking copies as commodity that the value of 
information commodities is approximately zero, which, then, is at odds with their 
high price (p. 98). 
Although the distinction between source and copy that N. Kang first introduced has 
been an important contribution, it is hard to justify the argument that source is a 
commodity. Commodity production is mass production and “from the beginning, 
replica production’’ (C.-O. Lee, 2005, p. 155),90 but apparently a source is never 
                                                
88  ‘‘Information commodities have characteristics that are quite different from other 
commodities. … From a production point of view … the marginal cost of software is 
approximately zero’’ (N. Kang, 2002, p. 47). All translations from Korean sources are my 
own. 
89 Similarly, K. Lee (2004) argues that ‘algorithm’ rather than the entire source code, which 
consists of multiple algorithms, is an information commodity. What should be considered as 
an information commodity, source or copy, has been one of the major debating points. We 
do not, however, cover this point in detail. 
90 Chae (2004a), N. Kang (2004, 2005), K. Lee (2004), C.-O. Lee (2005), Rieu (2005) are 
reprinted in N. Kang et al. (2007). Page references for these papers are from N. Kang et al. 
(2007). 
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mass produced. For example, mass produced automobiles are replicas of the first 
automobile produced based on the design of an automobile model, where the design 
corresponds to the source and mass produced automobiles are (commodity) copies. 
Information commodities are extreme cases in which the replication cost of copies is 
approximately zero, but this does not justify the selection of source as commodity. 
N. Kang’s view is a variant of what I call the ‘cost approach’ in which both Research 
and Development labour (‘R&D labour’) that produces source and ‘copy labour’ that 
produces copies are considered as producing value. Whilst, for N. Kang, R&D labour 
produces the value of the source and copy labour that of copies, for those who view a 
copy as commodity, the value of a copy is the sum of the direct labour time 
expended for copy production and (a fraction of) the indirect labour time expended 
for source production, leaving value transfer from the means of production (e.g. 
electricity) during copy production aside. For example:  
The value of every commodity is determined by embodied labour time, which 
is the sum of direct labour time and indirect labour time. If we view a copy as 
an [information] commodity, the production cost of the source [per copy] is 
indirect labour time that decreases as the number of produced copies 
increases. The indirect labour portion of the total embodied labour decreases 
as the number of produced copies increases. (C.-O. Lee, 2005, pp. 157–158) 
There is no reason why we cannot say that V/n [the value of the source divided 
by the number of sold copies] is the value of copy. (Rieu, 2005, p. 173) 
Producing 10 million Windows XP copies requires not only copy labour but 
also R&D labour. Hence, by summing up all these labour times [of copy labour 
and R&D labour] and dividing the total labour time by 10 million, we can 
easily get the value of a Windows XP copy. (Kim, 2008, p. 266) 
There is no reason why the labour of researchers producing [a new] model 
[design] should be distinguished from the labour performed at the assembly 
lines. (Jo, 2008, Section 1, para. 5) 
However, the proponents of the cost approach do not explain why there should be 
no distinction between source-producing labour and copy-producing labour other 
than that the former is indirect labour and the latter direct labour. In addition, the 
cost approach is inconsistent with Marx’s value theory in four respects. First, 
according to this approach, the value of a copy is determined ex post facto. For the 
value to be determined, copies should stop being sold in the market so that the 
number of produced/sold copies is finalised. If more copies are sold after this point 
for any reason, the value of a copy falls, even without any changes to the conditions 
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of production (e.g. productivity). Such a view turns socially necessary labour time, 
determined through the economic and social reproduction associated with the total 
circulation of capital and given before production, into average cost of production. 
Second, whilst R&D labour is considered to be indirect labour for the production of 
copies and the source as fixed constant capital, in practice, no value can be 
transferred from source to copy because no changes are made to the source, 
especially in terms of its lifetime, before or after the production of copies. According 
to Marx, means of production transfers value to a final output little by little because 
production results in its “deterioration” (CI, p. 312). However, a source, once 
produced, can be used for the production of copies an unlimited number of times, 
and no deterioration is inflicted on its use value and value during the production 
process, except through technical changes. Third, for N. Kang, who maintains that 
source is a commodity, the realisation of the value of a source is the result of the sale 
of copies, not of the source. Consequently, the source can continue to be held by the 
owner even after its value has been fully realised. His point is that, once the final 
copy has been sold, the source would be useless by definition and thus would have 
no value. However, this is simply wrong. Last, this approach ends up blurring the 
distinction between source and copy. Although it is acknowledged that R&D labour 
and copy labour have different roles in use value production of software copies, 
there is no essential difference between R&D labour and copy labour in terms of 
value production.  
3.3. The ‘monopoly price approach’ 
In an opposing approach to the cost approach, Chae and S. Kang argue that R&D 
labour does not contribute at all to the value of copies. The key argument of the 
monopoly price approach is that, although the source is indispensable for copy 
production, it is not a means of production and does not transfer value during the 
production process of copies. Consequently, as ‘‘virtually no labour time is needed’’ 
(Chae, 2004b, para. 3) to produce a copy, the value of a copy is approximately zero, 
provided that the use of electricity and the wear and tear of computer systems 
incurred by copying and compiling are negligible in terms of value transfer.  
Given the price of a copy is much higher than the value of a copy which is 
approximately zero, it follows that the value of a copy does not determine its price. 
Rather, the high price is argued to be a monopoly price that can only be sustained 
due to intellectual property rights, see Chapter 5. It follows that, if no intellectual 
property rights had existed, the commodification of software and information 
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commodities would not have been possible, because the price of a copy would then 
haven been determined by the value of a copy, and thus would also be 
approximately zero.  
According to this approach, the value of a copy is determined by the new value 
created by direct copy labour alone. Source and R&D labour do not have any role in 
the determination of the value of a copy. S. Kang (2008a, p. 64) argues that R&D 
labour “never produces value” although he takes a more eclectic view in his later 
works, as we will see later.  
Our critique of this approach is twofold. The first line of this critique focuses on the 
fact that concrete labour time expended to produce a copy is considered to be not 
much different from, if not directly equal to, socially necessary labour time. There is 
no doubt that the concrete labour time required to create a copy of software (for 
individual capitalists) is approximately zero. But it is wrong to derive from this that 
socially necessary labour time to create a copy is also approximately zero. Because 
value — socially necessary labour time — is socially determined, there is no pre-
existing fixed conversion ratio between concrete labour time and social labour time. 
It depends on the social circumstances under which the specific concrete labour is 
performed. Significantly, the same (concrete) labour time can create different 
magnitudes of value under different circumstances (in a given period of time). First, 
the more productive is labour, the more value it creates. Suppose that worker A 
produces two chairs per hour and worker B only one chair due to different levels of 
personal skill. As all chairs have the same value due to “the law of market value” 
(CIII, p. 799), worker A creates twice as much social value as worker B for the same 
period of time. Put differently, the value-creating capacity of worker A is twice as 
much as that of worker B. Second, labour performed under better (individual) 
conditions of production creates more value. Suppose that now worker A moves to a 
new workplace that makes use of more advanced production methods and is, 
therefore, able to produce three chairs per hour. In this case, different value-
creating capacities of the same worker arise from different conditions of production 
that are more or less independent of workers’ skill and knowledge. Third, more 
complex labour creates more value than simple average labour. Marx gives an 
example of the labour of a jeweller and the labour of a spinner (CI, pp. 305-306), in 
which the former is complex labour and the latter simple labour. Setting aside the 
question of how complexity is determined, and how complex labour is reduced to 
simple labour, the labour of a jeweller creates more value than the labour of a 
spinner because the former is more complex. In sum, the same amounts of concrete 
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labour time can be converted into different social labour times under different 
circumstances. In the monopoly price approach, however, there is only one pre-
determined conversion scenario between concrete labour time and social labour 
time; concrete copy labour time of approximately zero is considered to be equal to 
social labour time of approximately zero. It is implicit in this approach that the 
value-creating capacity of copy labour is fixed no matter what are the conditions of 
production. In other words, it ignores the variability of the value-creating capacity of 
concrete labour.  
The second line of our critique of the monopoly price approach is that it presumes 
information commodities are inherently different from more tangible (non-
information) commodities in such a way that they deserve special consideration. For 
the proponents of the monopoly price approach, information commodities are 
unique in that the price of information commodities is a monopoly price that is 
determined without consideration of the value of information commodities. Instead, 
intellectual property rights play a decisive role in the determination of price. 
Although it is acknowledged that monopoly pricing as such is not specific to 
information commodities, S. Kang (2008a, pp. 108-109) argues that the monopoly 
price of information commodities is unique in the sense that it cannot be sustained 
without intellectual property rights: “Given that the monopoly price of software 
originates from the unique characteristics of software [emphasis added], the 
monopoly price of software is distinct from that of other commodities. The latter is 
sustained due to the market power of monopoly firms”.91 
                                                
91 As a surprising turn of events, the proponents of the monopoly price approach changed 
their views on R&D labour. According to their most recent contributions (Chae, 2008; S. 
Kang, 2008b), R&D labour does produce value, although R&D labour is still seen not to 
contribute to the value of software copies. Apparently, this was to address the ambiguity 
around whether R&D workers are exploited by capitalists or not. According to Chae (2008), 
“System engineers and programmers employed by capital create value, and thus must be 
exploited by capital [emphasis added]” although he does not explain why and how R&D 
labour produces value. Likewise, S. Kang (2008b, p. 282) argues that “R&D labour 
subsumed under the capitalist production is a productive labour in the sense that it produces 
both use value and value”. He also gives a similar but slightly different account: “R&D labour 
expended to produce the first copy of software — source — is, of course, subsumed under the 
capitalist production aimed at producing surplus value. Therefore it is productive labour that 
creates value” (S. Kang, 2009, p. 97). However, he does not explain why R&D labour creates 
value other than that R&D labour is subsumed under the capitalist production. He also 
changes the definition of R&D labour to incorporate the labour expended to produce the first 
copy as well as the source: “R&D labour which is expended to produce the first copy creates 
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3.4. Knowledge and commodity 
In light of the deficiencies and flaws of both the cost approach and the monopoly 
price approach, we put forward an alternative view on the value and price of 
(information) commodities. The key differences from the two approaches are as 
follows. 
First, the presumption is that there is no need for a special theory of information 
commodities; its position is similar to the view of mainstream economic theories 
that information commodities are, at best, extreme cases in which features that are 
minor in the case of non-information commodities come to prominence, especially 
in the so-called knowledge economy.92 Second, then, the outstanding divergence 
between the high price and very low marginal cost of information commodities is 
also considered to be present in non-information commodities, albeit on a much less 
                                                                                                                                     
the value of the first copy, but it never creates the value of subsequent copies” (S. Kang, 
2009, p. 100). In other words, R&D labour or knowledge labour contributes to the value of 
the first copy or the first commodity, but does not create the value of subsequent copies or 
commodities. An unfortunate consequence is that the value of the first copy would be much 
higher than that of the subsequent copies although nobody would be able to distinguish the 
first copy from the rest because they are identical. According to this interpretation, value 
bifurcates into the value of the first copy and the value of the rest.  
92 The category of information commodities is not well-grounded. First of all, information 
commodities do not comprise a sector of the economy. A sector in value theory is composed 
of individual capitals that produce commodities with the same use value, not of those who 
use the same production technologies or materials, for example, digital technologies in the 
case of information commodities. Apple’s Mac OS X competes with Microsoft Windows, but 
not with nytimes.com although all of them are information commodities. Dictionary 
applications for personal computers compete not only among themselves, but also with 
dictionaries in book form, and in this respect, digital dictionaries and physical dictionaries 
belong to the same sector. Surely, then, there are more factors involved in the determination 
of the value of digital dictionary copies than their being information commodities, and for 
this reason, the value of a digital dictionary copy would be higher than zero even if concrete 
labour time expended to produce it is almost certainly approximately zero, because their 
value should not deviate too much from the value of a physical dictionary. In short, the call 
for a special theory of information commodities is ill-conceived. Information commodities 
exist in digital form and are consumed using digital devices such as personal computers and 
mobile phones. In other words, their key characteristics are described on the basis of the 
common production and consumption technologies, rather than of their use values. 
Although information commodity is a widely used umbrella term cutting across many 
different sectors of the economy, its analytical significance is not thereby established. It is 
difficult from such a concept to derive the structures, processes and tendencies that are 
specific to the capitalist mode of production. 
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prominent scale, because the marginal cost of non-information commodities is 
usually higher than zero. After all, there is no essential qualitative difference 
between information commodities and non-information commodities. Mass 
production of commodities presupposes knowledge, for example, design, blueprint, 
specifications, and in the case of information commodities, the source code. In other 
words, for commodities of any kind, knowledge production has to precede 
commodity production. An inherent aspect of production in general — the 
production cost of the first unit is higher than that of subsequent units because it 
includes the production cost of knowledge — manifests very prominently in the case 
of software, in which source corresponds to knowledge and copy to commodity.93 
Likewise, the question of the role of R&D labour in the determination of the value of 
copies is generalised into that of the role of knowledge labour in the determination 
of the value of commodities. It is not until the latter question is clarified that the 
former can be answered properly. It is in this respect that N. Kang’s distinction 
between source and copy is of great significance and importance.  
Labour presupposes knowledge  
In Chapter 7 of the first volume of Capital, in which Marx demonstrates that the 
capitalist production process is the unity of the labour process and the valorisation 
process, we can find a trace of Marx’s views on knowledge and its relation to the 
commodity. According to Marx, what distinguishes the labour of humans from the 
labour of animals is that the result of human labour already exists, if only ideally, 
before the exercise of labour itself: “The architect builds the cell in his mind 
[emphasis added] before he constructs it in wax” (CI, p. 284) and “at the end of 
every labour process, a result emerges which had already been conceived by the 
                                                
93 For Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella (2001, p. 53), there are similarities between software 
and knowledge: 
Software shares a key characteristic of technology, namely that production is 
characterised by a high fixed cost of producing the first unit and a low marginal cost of 
reproducing it. Moreover, software is typically licensed rather than sold, resembling the 
manner in which technology is transferred. In some cases, however, the resemblance is 
only superficial and licensing reflects merely the extremely low marginal cost of 
reproduction compared to the fixed costs of development. In other cases, software 
represents technology embodied in code. It can therefore be seen as one form (and an 
increasingly important one) in which knowledge is held and transferred. 
While software does embody knowledge or technologies in various forms, it is hard to 
make a distinction between software as embodied knowledge and software as a product 
(sold to other companies or the final users) or component (sold to other companies and 
embedded in larger and more complex systems). 
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worker at the beginning [emphasis added], hence already existed ideally”. In the 
same vein, he also says, “this activity [commodity-producing labour] is determined 
by its aim, mode of operation, object, means and result” (CI, p. 132), each of which is 
a specific type of knowledge. From a slightly different angle, the production of an 
idea (or knowledge) is “an expression of [human’s] own nature” (CW34, p. 136).94 
He says, “Milton produced Paradise Lost for the same reason as a silkworm 
produces silk”. Paradise Lost, a product of Milton’s own nature, was produced in 
manuscript form before it started being mass produced as commodities by factory 
labour. Milton’s (knowledge) work was the precondition for the factory labour.95 
In other words, the labour process presupposes knowledge, the goal of the labour 
(i.e. what to produce) on the one hand and the technical methods and modes of co-
operation to realise the goal (i.e. how to produce) on the other hand.96 Commodity 
production requires not only commodity-producing labour in the labour process, 
but also labour of a different kind that produces knowledge, which would enter into 
the labour process, as objectified in means of production, as the productive powers 
of individual labour as well as social labour, or more realistically, as combinations of 
                                                
94 Marx often mentions science and art together and he associates them with the activities in 
surplus time or disposable time: “In relation to the whole of society, the production of 
disposable time [can] also [be considered] as the creation of time for the production of 
science, art, etc.” (CW28, p. 328). See also Marx (CW30, p. 190; CW31, p. 27). Science and 
art in capitalism, however, are means of increasing surplus labour time in capitalism: 
“[Capital] increases the surplus labour time of the masses by all the means of art and science, 
because its wealth consists directly in its appropriation of surplus labour time; for its direct 
aim is value, not use value” (CW29, pp. 93-94). 
95 Milton’s example shows that Marx draws a distinction between the final manuscript 
(knowledge) and books (commodities). Similarly: 
Productive labour is labour which produces commodities, material products, whose 
production has cost a definite quantity of labour or labour time. These material products 
include all products of art and science, books, paintings, statues, etc., in so far as they 
take the form of things [emphasis added]. In addition, however, the product of labour 
must be a commodity in the sense of being ‘A VENDIBLE COMMODITY’, that is to say, a 
commodity in its first form, which has still to pass through its metamorphosis. (CW31, p. 
27) 
Carchedi (2011, p. 186) argues that knowledge has always been a commodity in capitalism, 
“starting from the production and popularisation of the printed book”. This, however, 
ignores the essential, ontological difference between knowledge and commodity. A 
commodity is produced on the basis of knowledge, no matter how much knowledge is 
embodied into the commodity during the production process. 
96 For Marx (CW34, p. 323), knowledge “determines the material process of production more 
or less directly”. 
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both.97 
There is, then, a separate process dedicated to knowledge production. We call this 
the ‘knowledge production process’, in which labour produces knowledge of a 
variety of types, each with its own specific use, for example, product specifications 
(e.g. colour, size, features, blueprint, etc.), technical design, production line design, 
production technologies, the skill of individual workers, modes of co-operation and 
many others. Further, knowledge exists in many different forms. Whereas the skill 
of individual workers exists as objectified in the workers’ brains and bodies and thus 
cannot be separated from them, designs and blueprints do not necessarily require 
human embodiment.98 More importantly, knowledge is inherently different from 
commodities in that knowledge can be used an unlimited number of times for the 
production of commodities, unlike means of production, because use of knowledge 
never causes wear and tear although it can become obsolete due to technical 
advance, in a similar way as moral depreciation.99 
Knowledge production involves not only living (knowledge) labour but also diverse 
types of means of production, as does the labour process. For example, the visual 
design of a new automobile model requires pencils, sketchbooks and computers 
(means of production) as well as visual designers (workers). To produce a new 
automobile model, trial products go through intense testing. The labour expended in 
testing — which is more or less simple, average labour compared with design labour 
— is also knowledge labour because it is labour that contributes to the production of 
knowledge, an automobile model in this case. 100  Contrary to popular belief, 
                                                
97 In a slightly different context, Marx (CW28, p. 113) acknowledges the distinction between 
knowledge and commodity: “Because in its preparation nature undertook the work of art 
[emphasis added], and for its first discovery only ROUGH LABOUR [emphasis added], neither 
science nor developed instruments of production, required”. 
98 The distinction between human and non-human forms of knowledge is reflected in the 
mainstream distinction between tacit knowledge and codified knowledge, drawn ultimately 
on the basis of reproduction cost, with the reproduction cost of perfectly codified (and 
codifiable) knowledge being (potentially) zero. 
99 See also Carchedi (2011, p. 186). 
100 Then the distinction between knowledge labour and commodity-producing labour has 
nothing to do with the more popular distinctions between intellectual labour and manual 
labour and between material labour and immaterial labour, which are based on either the 
human faculties utilised in labour or the materiality of final output, whereas the distinction 
between knowledge labour and commodity-producing labour draws from the division of the 
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knowledge labour is not necessarily complex, nor is it only a mental process. 
Furthermore, considering that the skill of individual workers is also a type of 
knowledge, training and education are essential components of knowledge 
production. When a worker produces commodities in the labour process, he or she 
performs commodity-producing labour. When the same worker learns and practices 
new production techniques, he or she performs knowledge labour. The worker may 
acquire skills whilst producing commodities, i.e. learning-by-doing. In this instance, 
the worker performs both commodity-producing labour and knowledge labour at 
the same time.101 
The knowledge production process: Examples of software and automobile 
As implied earlier, the distinction between source and copy is a particular and 
extreme case of the distinction between knowledge and commodity. R&D labour is 
knowledge labour and copy labour is commodity-producing labour (Figure 1). 
                                                                                                                                     
production process into the knowledge production process and the commodity production 
process. 
Tsogas (2012, p. 383) criticises the distinction between knowledge and commodity in Jeon 
(2011) that it reproduces the distinction between intellectual and manual labour:  
This interpretation re-creates for knowledge and commodity the antithesis between 
intellectual labour and manual labour. In fact, it is the idealistic presumption of a 
distinction between intellectual labour and manual labour that creates an equally 
idealistic ontological distinction between knowledge and commodity, where knowledge 
can affect commodity production (i.e. knowledge directs and organises commodity 
production and exchange), but it remains separate and unaffected by it. That is, 
knowledge is acquired somewhere else or pre-exists and is external to production, like 
the Kantian categories a priori are external to thought. It is this idealism that Sohn-
Rethel wants to shutter — and we concur — by advocating the ontological unity of 
knowledge and commodity. 
This critique is misleading in two respects. First, as we mentioned earlier, knowledge labour 
has both intellectual and manual aspects, and so does commodity-producing labour. Second, 
although knowledge precedes commodity production, there is no presumption that the 
relation between them is uni-directional. Major improvements of the production methods 
are often suggested by commodity-producing workers; there is a feedback loop between 
knowledge production and commodity production. 
101 Marx (CW34, p. 323) points out that the skill of workers costs capitalists nothing: 
The natural growth of population is one of the results of reproduction; it is firstly itself 
accumulation (of human beings) and secondly the prerequisite of the process of 
accumulation (WITHIN CERTAIN LIMITS). It costs the capitalist nothing, no more than does 
the skill accumulated (piled up) by the working class through practice alone [emphasis 
added] and TRANSMITTED as a result (advantages of labour) to its remplaçants 
[replacements].  
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Figure 1. Knowledge production process and labour process (software) 
Let us look into the knowledge production process of software such as Microsoft 
Windows in more detail. Different types of labour are needed to produce the source 
code of Microsoft Windows. Those who understand both market requirements and 
technical details of computers write feature specifications. On the basis of the 
specifications, architects design the software architecture and programmers write 
code. Quality assurance (QA) engineers write test cases and run unit tests, 
regression tests, integration tests, and acceptance tests to verify that the source code 
is being developed in accordance with the specifications and to determine that the 
final product is fit for use.102 All these workers, regardless of the content of their job 
role, are doing knowledge labour. They are knowledge workers not because their 
labour requires a higher level of knowledge than workers who are engaged in 
relatively simple and repetitive labour, but because they work to produce knowledge 
(i.e. the source code of Windows). This conception of knowledge labour is different 
from that found in the theories of the knowledge economy, where knowledge labour 
is more or less a classificatory concept based on education level, industry, and 
occupation.103 
Once knowledge production, including the definition of requirements, design, 
coding and testing, has been completed, copies are mass produced based on the 
source code, i.e. knowledge. This mass production process is the labour process 
                                                
102 This, however, should not be understood as a linear, waterfall type of process; there is a 
feedback loop in the software development process. For example, test cases are often defined 
before coding starts. 
103 For example, see Machlup (1962). 
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whereby copies of Windows are produced, in which very little, if any, living labour is 
expended, in this case, for replicating the first copy which is produced by compiling 
the source code.  
Knowledge production is also required for other more tangible commodities. Take 
the example of the production of a new automobile model (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Knowledge production process and labour process (automobile) 
As in the example of software, mass production of automobiles can begin only after 
a new automobile model has been produced, which involves various types of tasks 
and processes. First, the product concept and initial design are created (design 
phase). This requires both engineering and visual considerations. Second, 
prototypes are built based on the design (prototyping phase). A prototype requires 
much more labour time to build than each mass-produced automobile as no 
automated production process exists for prototypes yet. Prototyping usually involves 
close collaboration between the design group and the development group, and goes 
through multiple iterations. Any flaws found in this phase are instrumental for 
fixing and improving the initial design. Third, once a prototype has been selected, 
various types of testing are performed (testing phase). Depending on the severity of 
the defects found at this stage, the prototype may be rejected, and even design 
changes can still occur; again, the whole process should not be understood as linear. 
This cycle of design, build and test is repeated until a prototype passes the quality 
gate and it is only after this that the prototype, now a new model, can be mass 
produced. As is the case with software, all labours expended to produce the new 
model, and the design of a new assembly line for mass production, are knowledge 
labour, regardless of type, complexity and importance. 
81 
3.5. An alternative approach: The virtual multiplication of 
commodity-producing labour 
Production in capitalism is, then, the unity of knowledge production and commodity 
production, with the latter being the unity of the labour process and the valorisation 
process. There is a clear distinction between the two, but at the same time they are 
internally related; knowledge production in capitalism is mainly for the production 
of surplus value by way of commodity production, and commodity production, in 
turn, requires knowledge production. Therefore, whilst each should be analysed 
separately from the other, their interdependence should never be forgotten.104 
Now that the relation between knowledge and commodity in terms of use value 
production is firmly established, we should also question the nature of their relation 
in terms of value production. As mentioned earlier, use of knowledge in the labour 
process never results in wear and tear of the knowledge, so that it can be used an 
unlimited number of times.105 This means that, whether or not knowledge has 
                                                
104 Although Ross (2013) provides an excellent exposition of the role of free and open source 
software (FOSS) in the software industry and in capital accumulation, he fails to distinguish 
between knowledge labour and commodity-producing labour and instead raises the problem 
of the measurability problem of knowledge labour (drawing from the concept of immaterial 
labour), which, from our point of view, is misplaced, because knowledge labour as such does 
not create value, regardless of whether it is measurable or not: 
The fact that the immateriality of the creative and knowledge-work labour processes 
prevents the accurate apprehension of the ratio of surplus value to variable capital 
means that the rate of surplus value (𝑠! = !!), and therefore the rate of profit (𝑝! = !!), 
cannot be anticipated. (p. 206) 
Similarly, May (2002, p. 44) also puts more emphasis on similarities between knowledge 
labour and commodity-producing labour:  
The relations between knowledge capitalists and knowledge workers remain essentially 
the same as between their predecessors under ‘modern’ capitalism. Capitalists control 
and deploy the knowledge outputs in a similar way to the products of their more 
materially oriented workers. 
105 Marx also points out that the use of knowledge costs little (if any) to reproduce:  
Once discovered, the law of the deflection of a magnetic needle in the field of an electric 
current, or the law of the magnetisation of iron by electricity, cost absolutely nothing. 
But the exploitation of these laws for the purposes of telegraphy, etc., necessitates costly 
and extensive apparatus. (CI, pp. 508-509) 
A constant accumulation of the worker’s personal skill takes place, through practice, and 
through the TRANSFER of acquired skill to the new generation of workers which is growing 
up. This accumulation costs capital nothing although it plays a role of decisive 
importance in the reproduction process. The accumulation of scientific knowledge 
should also be added here, in so far as it is applied to the material production process. 
This accumulation is continuous reproduction on a continuously expanding scale. The 
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value,106 knowledge does not transfer value to the commodities produced based on 
it. Consequently, knowledge labour never contributes to the value of commodities 
either directly or indirectly.107 Nevertheless, this does not mean that knowledge 
(labour) has nothing to do with the production of the value of commodities. On the 
contrary, knowledge (labour) plays an important role in the determination of the 
value of commodities, by determining the productivity of commodity-producing 
labour within a sector and the complexity across sectors. In this section, we 
incorporate the role of knowledge into value theory in a consistent and coherent 
manner, by making use of the abstract concepts that Marx deploys in the first 
volume of Capital, especially complex labour, the collective worker and 
individual/social value. 
Different levels of knowledge within a sector and the productivity of commodity-
producing labour 
For Marx, the productivity of labour is always “the productivity of concrete useful 
labour” (CI, p. 137). It “determines only the degree of effectiveness of productive 
activity directed towards a given purpose [emphasis added] within a given period of 
time”. The comparison between labours in terms of productivity is, in principle, only 
possible when they produce the same commodity, that is, when they belong to the 
same sector. 
                                                                                                                                     
results of knowledge achieved are taught and reproduced as the elements of knowledge, 
and worked on further by the learners as elements of knowledge. Here the cost of 
reproduction never stands in proportion to the original cost of production. (CW34, p. 
228) 
Scientific knowledge is the branch of objectified labour in which reproduction–the 
labour time necessary to ‘appropriate’ it–stands in the lowest ratio to the labour time 
required originally in production. (p. 323) 
106 Knowledge is not a commodity and therefore it does not have value. It is a fictitious 
capital and has price (arising from the capitalisation of surplus profits). 
107 Compare this with Carchedi (2011, p. 221):  
The use value of knowledge is a mental use value. Accordingly, new knowledge (a mental 
transformation) is, by definition, a new mental use value, because, by transforming our 
perception, theorisation and comprehension of objective reality, it transforms the use to 
which new knowledge can be put … It follows that any production of knowledge is at the 
same time the production of a new mental use value and, if performed by mental 
labourers for the capitalists, is production of value and surplus value [emphasis added] 
as well. 
In other words, for him, knowledge is a use value instead of a factor contributing to the 
determination of the use value of commodities. In addition, he does not explain how the 
mental use value is commodified and traded in the market. 
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Suppose that two individual capitalists, or more precisely, workers employed by two 
capitalists, produce the same commodity, but their productivities are different. This 
can be due to either or other, or more likely, both of two reasons. First, when 
workers are identical, they make use of different production methods, embodying 
different levels of knowledge. The more advanced is the production method or 
design (e.g. through the use of machines with better quality) that commodity-
producing labour makes use of, the higher is the productivity of labour, that is, a 
greater number of commodities are produced within a given period of time. Such 
knowledge, which is often objectified into machinery, exists independently of 
commodity-producing workers, although they need to learn how to use new 
machinery and techniques. Second, workers themselves have different levels of 
knowledge or, more specifically, of skill, intelligence, resilience, etc. Under such 
circumstances, although workers make use of the same production method or 
design, the labour productivity across workers varies. Considering these two 
differentiating aspects, Marx (CI, p. 130) says: 
This [productivity of labour] is determined by a wide range of circumstances; 
it is determined amongst other things by the worker’s average degree of skill, 
the level of development of science and its technological application, the social 
organisation of the process of production, the extent and effectiveness of the 
means of production, and the conditions found in the natural environment. 
For Marx, however, personal differences among workers do not attract much 
attention; we too will also focus on the first element — that of different production 
methods. 
Significantly, that individual capitalists in a sector usually have and use different 
levels of knowledge is a systemic feature of capitalism. Individual capitalists, under 
the pressure of competition, ceaselessly attempt to increase the productivity of 
labour.108 Given a (social) value, an increase in the productivity of an individual 
                                                
108 The pace of the development of productivity varies across sectors. According to Marx 
(CIII, pp. 368-369): 
Since the development of labour productivity is far from uniform in the various branches 
of industry and, besides being uneven in degree, often takes place in opposite directions, 
it so happens that the mass of average profit (= surplus value) is necessarily very far 
below the level one would expect simply from the development of productivity in the 
most advanced branches. And if the development of productivity in different branches of 
industry does not just proceed in very different proportions, but often also in opposite 
directions, this does not arise simply from the anarchy of competition and the specific 
features of the bourgeois mode of production. The productivity of labour is also tied up 
with natural conditions, which are often less favourable as productivity rises – as far as 
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capitalist through the use of more advanced knowledge (especially technical and 
practical applications of scientific discoveries) would result in a decrease in the 
individual value of the commodities. This is due to the fact that less labour time is 
required to produce the same commodity. As the new individual value is lower than 
the social value, the capitalist can realise extra surplus value. Put differently, 
knowledge (labour), by increasing the productivity of commodity-producing labour, 
makes it act as potentiated or multiplied labour: ‘‘The exceptionally productive 
labour acts as intensified labour [potentiated labour; potenzierte Arbeit]; it creates 
in equal periods of time greater values than average social labour of the same kind’’ 
(CI, p. 435).109 In other words, knowledge contributes to the production of the value 
of commodities by virtually potentiating or multiplying commodity-producing 
labour, and, consequently, capitalists with higher productivities than the sectoral 
norm, through the virtual multiplication of labour arising from a higher level of 
knowledge, accrue extra surplus value.110 
Kim (2008) criticises the notion of the virtual multiplication of labour. From his 
point of view, it ‘‘can lead to the conclusion that the source of extra surplus value is 
not labour but productive power itself [emphasis added]’’ (p. 280).111 This is based 
                                                                                                                                     
that depends on social conditions. We thus have a contrary movement in these different 
spheres: progress here, regression there. 
109 ‘Intensified labour’, used in both the Fowkes translation and the first English edition of 
Capital, is not a good translation of potenzierte Arbeit (potentiated labour) because it gives 
the false impression that the intensity of commodity-producing labour increases due to the 
use of better knowledge than the social average. Intensity of labour increases only when 
labour becomes more intense, for example, by increasing the degree of control and 
monitoring, and by reducing breaks. Although an increase in productivity has the same effect 
as an increase in intensity in the sense that both result in more output in a given period of 
time, the role of knowledge in the determination of value should be distinguished clearly 
from that of intensity of labour. Throughout this thesis, we use ‘multiplied labour’ as the 
translation of potenzierte Arbeit. Interestingly, according to Bidet (2007, p. 21), in the 
French edition of Capital, potenziert is translated as complexe [complex], which is 
unfortunate because this blurs the distinction between productivity and complexity. Bidet 
himself mixes up complexity with productivity and “propose[s] to show that, in the theory of 
the capitalist mode of production, skilled [complex] labour can only be tackled in the context 
of ‘more productive’ labour [emphasis added]”. Similarly, Saad-Filho (2012, p. 57) argues 
that “differences or changes in the intensity or complexity of labour, and differences or 
changes in the level of education and training of the workforce, have identical effects on 
value production”. 
110 See also Ebert and Zavarzadeh (2014, p. 409). 
111 He also says: “That labour with a higher productive power produces more value [for a 
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on the presumption that individual values are created first and then distributed 
among capitalists based on productivity to form the social value. Extra surplus value 
is viewed as the result of the value transfer from the capitalists with relatively low 
productivities to those with relatively high productivities although he does not 
explain the real processes by which value is transferred among capitalists in the 
same sector.112 
The category of extra surplus value presupposes that there is a multiplicity of 
individual capitalists with varying productivities of labour, which is in fact the 
specific character of Marx’s theory of competition within a sector. That is, despite 
the fact that the individual productivity of labour and the individual level of 
knowledge vary and precisely because of that, a single social value is formed out of 
competition within a sector (without involving value transfer within the sector); 
with no productivity difference (as in perfect competition), no competitive pressure 
would be systematically generated. In Marx’s theory, competition within a sector is 
centred on productivity, although there are many other factors affecting competition 
                                                                                                                                     
given period of time] means productive power itself produces value. If this were true, the 
labour theory of value would collapse” (Kim, 2008, p. 290).  
112 Kim (2008, pp. 291-294) argues that Marx’s example in Chapter 12 of the first volume of 
Capital (CI, pp. 433-435) substantiates his claim that value transfer occurs among capitalists 
within a sector due to productivity differences. Without going into too much detail, his 
interpretation of the example can be summarised as follows: 1) there are two individual 
capitalists in a sector. 2) there is no difference in productivity between the two capitalists, 
and they produce the same number of commodities. Consequently, all commodities 
produced in this sector have the same individual and social value, which is 12 (6c + 3v + 3s); 
3) the productivity of a capitalist is doubled, whereas the productivity of the other capitalist 
remains the same. The former employs the same number of workers, so its output is also 
doubled and the individual value of commodities this capitalist produces goes down to 9 (6c 
+ 1.5v + 1.5s); 4) the social value is adjusted to 10, the total sum of all individual values 
divided by the number of commodities (12 * 1/3 + 9 * 2/3), and this is the result of value 
transfer from the capitalist with the lower productivity to the capitalist with the higher 
productivity; 5) the choice of 10 as the new social value by Marx, then, is not arbitrary. This 
interpretation is flawed in at least three respects. First, Marx never mentions that there are 
two capitalists in this sector. Second, the choice of 10 is apparently arbitrary. His point is 
that for the capitalist with a higher productivity to “command a more extensive market” (CI, 
p. 434), the price (not value) should be “above their individual but below their social value, 
say [emphasis added] at 10d. each”. Third, there are cases where the social value of a 
commodity is determined by the worst production condition (e.g. agricultural products). In 
these cases, no value is transferred even from the capitalists with the lowest productivity; 
social value is not the result of value transfer between individual capitalists. 
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(e.g. proximity to the market) driving each capitalist to innovate either to accrue 
extra surplus value or to catch up with first-movers.113 The first-movers’ better 
production methods eventually become universal, and consequently, their extra 
surplus value is eroded. In addition, through the constant repetition of 
differentiation and equalisation the social average level of knowledge within a sector 
grows.114 
Different levels of knowledge across sectors and the complexity of collective 
commodity-producing labour 
Different levels of knowledge among sectors also affect the production of value. In 
this case, knowledge takes part in the production of the value of commodities by 
determining the complexity of commodity-producing labour. That is, if the sectoral 
average level of knowledge is higher than the economy-wide average level of 
knowledge, all commodity-producing labours (average simple labour) in this sector 
act as if they are complex (or complicated) labour, “intensified [potentiated; 
potenziert], or rather multiplied [multipliziert] simple labour” (CI, p. 135),115 which 
is in addition to the virtual multiplication of labour within a sector. Consequently, 
                                                
113 “The development of the natural sciences themselves //and they form the basis of all 
knowledge// as also the development of all knowledge with regard to the production process, 
itself takes place on the basis of capitalist production, which generally first produces the 
sciences’ material means of research, observation and experiment. In so far as the sciences 
are used as a means of enrichment by capital, and thereby become themselves a means of 
enrichment for those who develop them, the MEN OF SCIENCE compete with each other 
[emphasis added] to discover practical applications for their science. Moreover, invention 
becomes a métier by itself. With capitalist production, therefore, the scientific factor is for 
the first time consciously developed, applied, and called into existence on a scale which 
earlier epochs could not have imagined” (CW34, p. 34). 
114 It is worth noting that Marx introduces the concept of extra surplus value in the context of 
the production of relative surplus value. It is one of the ‘‘immanent laws of capitalist 
production’’ (CI, p. 433) and these laws ‘‘manifest themselves in the external movement of 
the individual capitals’’. The “external movement” refers to the above process of innovation 
and catch-up, which results in the continual fall in the social value of commodities. The fall 
in the values of consumer goods in turn brings about the fall in the value of labour power and 
the portion of necessary labour time in the working day. As a result, more (relative) surplus 
value is appropriated by capitalists. 
115 Marx explains the distinction between complex labour and simple labour by way of an 
analogy with job hierarchy: “Just as, in civil society, a general or a banker plays a great part 
but man as such plays a very mean part, so, here too, the same is true of human labour” (CI, 
p. 135). 
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capitalists in the sector with a higher average level of knowledge than the economy-
wide social average accrue surplus profit, in the sense that the ‘sectoral value’ of 
commodities produced in this sector, simply defined as the weighted average of 
individual values of the sector, is always lower than the social value. In other words, 
virtual multiplication applies at two different levels, within and across sectors, 
respectively. It is the source of two different types of surplus profit related to 
knowledge: higher level of individual knowledge than the sectoral average level and 
higher level of sectoral knowledge than the economy-wide social average level.116 
Marx analyses complex labour in Capital only briefly.117 First, in Chapter 1 of the 
first volume of Capital, the discussion does not go beyond the statement that 
complex labour is reduced into multiplied simple labour:118 
Experience shows that this reduction is constantly being made. A commodity 
may be the outcome of the most complicated labour, but through its value it is 
                                                
116 Virtual multiplication is an important part of the normalisation (within a sector) and 
homogenisation (across sectors) of labour. For more on normalisation and homogenisation, 
see Saad-Filho (2002, Chapter 5). 
117 We do not review the reduction problem in this chapter because, for our purpose, it is 
sufficient that complex labour is being reduced to multiplied simple labour in reality 
(fortunately, the reduction is not a technical process taking place in the head of accountants, 
but is the result of real social processes) and therefore the complexity of different labours 
and the value-creating capacity of different types of labour vary. For more on the reduction 
problem, see C.-O. Lee (1990, pp. 101-139; 1993, pp. 471-476), Rosdolsky (1977, pp. 506-
520), and Bidet (2007, Chapter 2). 
118 In terms of scope, the first chapter of David Ricardo’s Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation is similar to the first section of Chapter 1 of Volume 1 of Capital. In this chapter, 
Ricardo draws a distinction between value and utility; argues that the value of a commodity 
is determined by its scarcity and the relative quantity of labour necessary for its production; 
mentions that commodities which are not useful are not values; and labours with different 
skills get differently rewarded. Especially, on the last point related to complexity and skill, he 
says: 
We may fairly conclude, that whatever inequality there might originally have been in 
them, whatever the ingenuity, skill, or time necessary for the acquirement of one species 
of manual dexterity more than another, it continues nearly the same from one 
generation to another; or at least, that the variation is very inconsiderable from year to 
year, and therefore, can have little effect [emphasis added], for short periods, on the 
relative value of commodities. (Ricardo, 1817, 1.27) 
The words emphasised in the above is similar to Marx’s view that “the various proportions in 
which different kinds of labour are reduced to simple labour … appear to the producers to 
have been handed down by tradition” (CI, p. 135). For Marx’s summary and defence against 
Bailey of Ricardo’s view on complex labour, see Marx (CW32, p. 350). 
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posited as equal to the product of simple labour, hence it represents only a 
specific quantity of simple labour. The various proportions in which different 
kinds of labour are reduced to simple labour as their unit of measurement are 
established by a social process that goes on behind the backs of the producers; 
these proportions therefore appear to the producers to have been handed 
down by tradition. (CI, p. 135) 
He, then, immediately suggests that complex labour be ignored: “In the interests of 
simplifications, we shall henceforth view every form of labour power directly as 
simple labour power; by this we shall simply be saving ourselves the trouble of 
making the reduction”. 
Second, in Chapter 6, in which he discusses the value of labour power, Marx (CI, pp. 
275-276) argues that the value of labour power with a relatively higher complexity is 
higher than that of ordinary labour power due to education and training costs. In 
other words, education and training costs are part of the reproduction costs of the 
labour power of a higher sort:119 
In order to modify the general nature of the human organism in such a way 
that it acquires skill and dexterity in a given branch of industry, and becomes 
labour power of a developed and specific kind [emphasis added], a special 
education or training [emphasis added] is needed, and this in turn costs an 
equivalent in commodities of a greater or lesser amount. The costs of 
education vary according to the degree of complexity of the labour power 
required. These expenses (exceedingly small in the case of ordinary labour 
power) form a part of the total value spent in producing it.  
Third, at the end of Chapter 7, whilst emphasising that workers are exploited 
regardless of their skills, he gives an example of complex labour, the labour of 
jewellers, as opposed to the labour of spinners. Complexity of labour, then, unlike 
productivity of labour, is a concept for the comparison of the value-creating capacity 
between different types of concrete labours.120 Whereas two individual labours 
                                                
119 It is unfortunate that knowledge production — education and training — is mixed up with 
other consumer goods. Skills acquired through education and training can be re-used 
without re-training and re-education in principle, so they don’t have to be reproduced every 
time labour power is reproduced. For this reason, education and training are not part of the 
reproduction costs, but is rather a multiplier. This does not mean that differences in the 
value of labour power across sectors can be explained exclusively on the basis of training and 
education. For critiques of the reduction of complex labour based on education and training 
costs, see Saad-Filho (2002, p. 58) and Fine (1998, pp. 186-187). 
120 Saad-Filho (2002, p. 57) does not distinguish complexity from productivity: 
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producing the same type of commodity can have different productivities, two 
individual labours producing two different types of commodity can have different 
complexities.121 In addition, he states that complex labour is what it is due to labour 
power being complex:122 
All labour of a higher, or more complicated, character than average labour is 
expenditure of labour power of a more costly kind, labour power whose 
production has cost more time and labour than unskilled or simple labour 
power, and which therefore has a higher value. This power being of higher 
value, it expresses itself in labour of a higher sort, and therefore becomes 
objectified, during an equal amount of time, in proportionally higher values. 
(CI, p. 305) 
Again, however, instead of further elaborating the concept of complex labour, he 
suggests that the complexity of labour and labour power be ignored: “We … save 
ourselves a superfluous operation, and simplify our analysis, by the assumption that 
the labour of the worker employed by the capitalist is average simple labour” (p. 
306). 
Fourth, although Marx does not mention complex labour in the second volume of 
Capital, he does refer to complex labour in the third volume as a reason why the 
                                                                                                                                     
All else constant, more intense or complex labour, and better educated and trained 
workers, generally create more use values and, consequently, more value per hour. The 
quantitative difference depends upon the relationship between individual and social 
productivity [emphasis added] in each branch, that is known precisely only ex post.  
121 Similarly, according to C.-O. Lee (1993, p. 474): 
The reduction problem of skilled, complex labour to unskilled, simple labour must not be 
mixed up with the question of finding a social-average of different individual labours. 
One relates to inter-sectoral production while the other relates to intra-sectoral 
production.  
122 Then, the value of labour power can vary across sectors. As Fine (2012a, p. 124) says: 
The moral and historical element in the value of labour power should not be understood 
as an average across all workers. Rather it reflects differentially determined and 
differentially distributed norms of consumption and labour market conditions, across 
both monetary remuneration and the levels and composition of use value consumption. 
This is reflected in different food, health, pension, housing and transport systems and so 
on, each deeply and uniquely rooted in different ways and to a different extent in 
capitalist production and exploitation. And labour markets are also differentially 
organised and rewarded according to the ways in which the labour process within and 
across different workplaces have been integrated into economic and social reproduction. 
This is not to deny the significance of class struggle and organisation at the point of 
production (and elsewhere) nor the validity of the value of labour power as a concept. 
Rather, it is to locate and reconstruct such concepts at more concrete levels in 
conformity to the more complex material functioning of capital itself. 
See also Fine (1998, Chapter 7), Fine (2008) and Saad-Filho (2002, pp. 48-53). 
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level of wages can vary among workers: 
Other distinctions, for instance in the level of wages, depend to a large 
measure on the distinction between simple and complex labour … and 
although they make the lot of the workers in different spheres of production 
very unequal [emphasis added], they in no way affect the degree of 
exploitation of labour in these various spheres. (CIII, p. 241) 
This suggests that the complexity of labour power in a sector is one of the factors 
determining the wage level of the sector, although complexity is not reduced to wage 
differentials or vice-versa (Saad-Filho, 2002, p. 57). Rather, given that wage is the 
price form of the value of labour power, wage differentials across sectors should be 
reproduced as a concrete form of the differences in the value of labour power across 
sectors.  
For Marx (CIII, pp. 241-242), however, again, the distinction between complex and 
simple labour does not affect the general analysis, so it can be ignored: 
If the work of a goldsmith is paid at a higher rate than that of a day-labourer, 
for example, the former’s surplus labour also produces a correspondingly 
greater surplus value than does that of the latter. And even though the 
equalisation of wages and working hours between one sphere of production 
and another or between different capitals invested in the same sphere of 
production, comes up against all kinds of local obstacles [emphasis added], 
the advance of capitalist production and the progressive subordination of all 
economic relations to this mode of production tends nevertheless to bring this 
process to fruition. Important as the study of frictions of this kind is for any 
specialist work on wages, they are still accidental and inessential as far as the 
general investigation of capitalist production is concerned and can therefore 
be ignored [emphasis added]. In a general analysis of the present kind, it is 
assumed throughout that actual conditions correspond to their concept, or, 
and this amounts to the same thing, actual conditions are depicted only in so 
far as they express their own general type.  
In sum, for Marx, complex labour is not a very important concept since the general 
laws of capitalism can be derived and explained without reference to this concept. In 
addition, there is a tendency towards equalisation and simplification of labour in 
capitalism, especially in the stage of large-scale industry based on machinery, 
although new skills do arise with the development of the social division of labour.123 
                                                
123 “Admittedly, a small class of higher workers does take shape, but this does not stand in 
any proportion to the masses of ‘deskilled’ workers” (CW34, p. 34). 
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However, the notion of complexity is still useful for analytically capturing the 
differences in the value-creating capacity of simple labour across sectors. In the 
specifically capitalist mode of production, knowledge and skills once possessed by 
skilled workers are systematically separated from workers and come to be 
objectified in the means of production, especially machinery, and the labour 
process. In other words, production based on machinery and large-scale industry 
separates “the intellectual faculties of the production process from manual labour” 
(CI, p. 548) and deprives “the work itself of all content”. At the same time, however, 
even if machinery dominates individual workers in the labour process, workers still 
use machinery as instruments of production at the collective level. Marx, quoting 
Ure, describes these two seemingly contradictory aspects of the factory as a whole, 
“a form of social labour organised on the material basis of machinery” (CW34, p. 
123) as below (CI, pp. 544-545):  
Dr Ure, the Pindar of the automatic factory, describes it, on the one hand, as 
‘combined co-operation of many orders of work people, adult and young, in 
tending with assiduous skill a system of productive machines continuously 
impelled by a central power’ (the prime mover); and on the other hand as ‘a 
vast automaton, composed of various mechanical and intellectual organs, 
acting in uninterrupted concert for the production of a common object, all of 
them being subordinate to a self-regulated moving force’. These two 
descriptions are far from being identical. In one, the combined collective 
worker appears as the dominant subject [übergreifendes Subjekt], and the 
mechanical automaton as the object; in the other, the automaton itself is the 
subject, and the workers are merely conscious organs, co-ordinated with the 
unconscious organs of the automaton, and together with the latter 
subordinated to the central moving force. The first description is applicable to 
every possible employment of machinery on a large scale, the second is 
characteristic of its use by capital, and therefore of the modern factory 
system.124 
At the collective level, then, knowledge separated from individual workers and 
instead embodied in machinery,125  appears as the knowledge of the collective 
                                                
124 Similarly, “Capital now appears both as the collective power of the workers, their social 
power, and as the unity which binds them together and thereby creates this power” (CW28, 
p. 507). 
125 “This process of separation starts in simple co-operation, where the capitalist represents 
to the individual workers the unity and the will of the whole body of social labour. It is 
developed in manufacture, which mutilates the worker, turning him into a fragment of 
himself. It is completed in large-scale industry, which makes science a potentiality for 
production which is distinct from labour and presses it into the service of capital” (CI, p. 
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worker, hence the expression, the productive power of social labour. The collective 
worker is ‘‘formed out of the combination of a number of individual specialised 
workers’’ (CI, p. 468) and exists as ‘‘individualised in particular workers or groups of 
workers’’ (p. 469). Therefore, when individual workers perform simple average 
labour, knowledge objectified into the labour process, especially machinery, can 
make the labour of the collective worker act as complex labour, depending on the 
average level of knowledge in the sector embodied in the machinery, compared with 
the social average (across sectors).126 
The collective worker arises from simple co-operation which is ‘‘the fundamental 
form of the capitalist mode of production’’ (p. 454). Marx’s analysis of the capitalist 
forms of co-operation includes both logical and historical elements: the former is 
concerned with the formation of the level of collectivity in general and collective 
labour or combined labour in particular; the latter focuses on the distinctions 
between the capitalist forms of co-operation and the historical processes of the 
becoming-autonomous of knowledge production — the historical externalisation of 
the internal opposition between knowledge production and commodity production, 
see Chapter 6.  
First, the collective worker is formed out of co-operation as such. When individual 
workers collaborate, they work together to achieve common goals. Under co-
operation, individual workers not only perform individual labours but also function 
as organs of the collective worker. Importantly, the productivity and complexity of 
collective labour exceeds the sum of individual contributions both quantitatively (i.e. 
how much) and qualitatively (i.e. what can be achieved). Second, in its simplest 
form, co-operation can take place by simply gathering workers together; but in most 
cases, co-operation involves the co-ordination, organisation and supervision of the 
labour process and shared means of production (e.g. machinery). This means that 
knowledge also becomes collective as labour becomes collective.127 This gives rise to 
                                                                                                                                     
482). 
126 Although for Marx the complexity of labour is the concept that captures the different 
value-creating capacities of individual workers due to different levels of individual 
knowledge, we are concerned here with the complexity of the collective worker. 
127 Collective knowledge, or the productive powers of social labour, consists of the knowledge 
embodied in the labour process (including but not limited to machinery and knowledge for 
co-ordination, organisation and supervision) and skills of individual workers. The notion of 
collective knowledge is crucial for explaining why complex labour is of little importance to 
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a group of workers more or less dedicated to the production of such collective 
knowledge, which is separated from commodity production (within a firm). Marx 
mentions the emergence of overseers in this context, but knowledge work as such is 
not identified. Third, the historical separation of knowledge production and 
commodity production “is completed in large-scale industry, which makes science a 
potentiality for production which is distinct from labour and presses it into the 
service of capital” (CI, p. 482). 128  Unlike in manufacture, which is based on 
handicraft and “excludes a really scientific division of the production process” (p. 
                                                                                                                                     
Marx; it is because knowledge of the collective worker increasingly takes the form of 
machinery. Similarly, Bidet (2007, p. 29) says: 
It is significant, moreover, that Part Five of Volume One [of Capital], which deals 
systematically with the factors determining the amount of surplus value (and thus value) 
produced, introduces in place of the former triptych productivity/intensity/skill (factors 
that weight the average social duration that defines value), a new problematic of 
duration/productivity/intensity, marked by the absence of any category such as skill or 
specialisation [emphasis added]. This absence flows logically from the development of 
Part Four, which shows that the commodity, in terms of both exchange-value and use 
value, is the fruit of collective labour.  
128 The collective worker, the concept first introduced in Marx’s discussion of manufacture, is 
applicable also to the stage of large-scale industry. For example: 
A fundamental transformation takes place in the composition of the collective labourer 
[emphasis added] or, in other words, the combined working personnel. In contrast with 
the period of manufacture; the division of labour is now based, wherever possible, on the 
employment of women, of children of all ages and of unskilled workers, in short, of 
‘cheap labour’, as the Englishman typically describes it. (CI, p. 590) 
With the progressive accentuation of the co-operative character of the labour process, 
there necessarily occurs a progressive extension of the concept of productive labour, and 
of the concept of the bearer of that labour, the productive worker. In order to work 
productively, it is no longer necessary for the individual himself to put his hand to the 
object; it is sufficient for him to be an organ of the collective labourer [emphasis added], 
and to perform any one of its subordinate functions. (pp. 643-644) 
Similarly, Marx says elsewhere: 
The social productive powers of labour, or the productive powers of directly social, 
socialised (common) labour, are developed through cooperation, through the division of 
labour within the workshop, the employment of machinery, and in general through the 
transformation of the production process into a conscious application of the natural 
sciences, mechanics, chemistry, etc., for particular purposes, technology, etc., as well as 
by working on a large scale, which corresponds to all these advances, etc. //This 
socialised labour alone is capable of applying the general products of human 
development, such as mathematics, etc., to the direct production process, just as, 
conversely, the development of the sciences presupposes that the material production 
process has attained a certain level. (CW34, pp. 428-429) 
Since with the development of the real subsumption of labour under capital or the 
specifically capitalist mode of production it is not the individual worker but rather a 
socially combined labour capacity that is more and more the real executor of the labour 
process as a whole. (p. 443) 
94 
458),129 in machinery-based production, the human portion of the collective skills 
tends to become marginalised.130 Science is incorporated into the labour process ‘‘as 
an independent power’’ (CI, p. 799), and this is reflected in Marx’s distinction 
between “universal labour’’ and “communal labour” (CIII, p. 199). Whereas the 
former corresponds to (scientific) knowledge labour, the latter is another name for 
collective labour: 
We must distinguish here, incidentally, between universal labour and 
communal labour. They both play their part in the production process, and 
merge into one another, but they are each different as well. Universal labour is 
all scientific work, all discovery and invention. It is brought about partly by 
the co-operation of men now living, but partly also by building on earlier 
work. Communal labour, however, simply involves the direct co-operation of 
individuals. 
In sum, in capitalism where production is based on co-operation and collaboration, 
‘‘useful knowledge’’ for commodity production (Mokyr, 2002, pp. 1–27), bifurcates 
into the knowledge of individual workers and the knowledge objectified in the 
labour process in general and the means of production in particular, with increasing 
                                                
129 Marx (CW30, p. 255) equates machinery with “the application of SCIENTIFIC POWER”. 
130 “Such polarisation of conception and execution, and its impact on waged work, have been 
the main theme of labour process theory. Braverman’s (1974) notion of deskilling suggests 
that there is a tendency in capitalism to deprive workers of skills, fragmenting and sub-
dividing work into a set of functions. ‘Semi-artistic’ workers in simple cooperation are 
transformed into partially skilled workers in manufacture (CI, p. 504), and into versatile, 
unskilled workers in machinery-based production, ‘to the level of an appendage of a 
machine’ (p. 799). The deskilling thesis, however, has been criticised from a number of 
perspectives: that in some cases, it goes hand-in-hand with the emergence of new jobs 
requiring different kinds of skills than those of craft workers; that the notion of skill in 
Braverman is partial and takes craftworkers as ideal; that the broader social determination 
and construction of skills are neglected; that Braverman ignores the importance of consent 
and autonomy, as opposed to contestation, as part of capitalist and worker strategies; and 
that the corresponding role of subjectivity of workers and class struggle in the formation of 
the labour process is overlooked (Wardell, 1999; Meiksins, 1994). Marxist labour process 
theorists have argued that deskilling is a tendential law, inherent in the capitalist mode of 
production as an underlying force (Hassard & Rowlinson, 1994 and 2000; Spencer, 2000). 
Capital does mechanise and systematise skills in an attempt to increase labour productivity 
and to minimise the risk of sabotage. Not only is the separation between conception and 
execution never absolute, but it is continuously evolving and redefining what is and what is 
not recognized as skill, including the articulation with the specifically value-producing 
requirements of capitalism, from command in the workplace through to the attempts to 
ensure realisation in the sale of commodities” (Fine et al., 2010, pp. 77-78). 
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emphasis upon the latter. With the development of science and its technological 
applications on an unprecedented scale, knowledge also tends to become 
autonomous, within and across firms, albeit not completely detached from 
commodity production.131 
The Value of information commodities 
As we have seen so far, knowledge allows for virtual multiplication both within and 
across sectors (Figure 3), which is one of the social processes that go on ‘‘behind the 
backs of producers’’ (CI, p. 135), determining the productivity and complexity of 
commodity-producing labour and thereby the value of commodities,132 although 
productivity and complexity cannot be reduced to the effect of knowledge alone. An 
example of other factors determining the value-creating capacity of commodity-
producing labour is economy of scale through centralisation, which does not 
necessarily involve new knowledge. Knowledge production itself is also determined 
by a multiplicity of factors. For example, an expansion of the market can spur 
capitalists on to a greater investment into R&D. 
                                                
131 “Exploitation of science, of the theoretical progress of humanity. Capital does not create 
science, but it exploits it, appropriates it to the production process. There is at the same time 
a separation of science, as science applied to production, from direct labour, whereas at 
earlier stages of production the restricted measure of knowledge and experience is directly 
linked with labour itself, does not develop as an autonomous power separated from labour, 
and therefore in general never goes beyond a collection of procedures carried on traditionally 
and only expanding very slowly and little by little. (Learning by experience of the MYSTERIES 
OF EACH HANDICRAFT.) No separation of hand from brain” (CW34, p. 33). 
132 Value is the category that expresses the homogenisation of qualitatively distinct concrete 
labours. By the same token, the role of knowledge, the virtual multiplication of labour, 
expresses the homogenisation of different types of knowledge in capitalism, as the result of 
the subsumption of knowledge under the value dimension. Qualitatively different types of 
knowledge are reduced into homogeneous abstract knowledge, with quantitative differences. 
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Figure 3. The determination of the productivity and complexity of commodity-producing labour 
Going back to information commodities, we can draw the following conclusions. 
First, the source of software corresponds to knowledge and the copies to 
commodities. Second, R&D labour that produces the source is knowledge labour. It 
does not contribute to the value of the copies directly or indirectly (as constant/fixed 
capital). Third, R&D labour can virtually multiply copy labour. The extent of virtual 
multiplication depends upon 1) the difference between the level of individual 
knowledge and the sectoral norm and 2) and the difference between the sectoral 
average level of knowledge and the economy-wide social average. At this abstract 
level of analysis, we can only conclude that the value of information commodities 
can be, but not necessarily, higher than zero despite very little concrete labour 
required in copy production itself.  
This is consistent with Marx’s view: 
The specific productivity of labour in one particular sphere [emphasis added], 
or in one individual business in this sphere [emphasis added], concerns the 
capitalists directly involved in it only in so far as it enables this particular 
sphere to make an extra profit [Extraprofit] in relation to the total capital, or 
the individual capitalist in relation to his sphere. (CIII, p. 300) 
Although Marx refers to productivity differences between sectors rather than 
complexity differences, he clearly recognises two separate processes, within and 
across sectors, of determining the value-creating capacity of labour. 
This approach is distinct from both the cost approach and the monopoly price 
approach. First, the cost approach argues that R&D labour is productive labour that 
creates the value of either source or copy. In the latter case, source is considered a 
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means of production that contributes to the value of the final products in a 
piecemeal fashion. This is wrong; knowledge (i.e. source) is qualitatively different 
from commodities and does not have value. Second, although the monopoly price 
approach rightly argues that R&D labour does not create value, it is wrong in the 
sense that R&D labour is considered as having nothing to do with the determination 
of the value of copies. 
3.6. Concluding remarks 
Drawing on the structural distinction between knowledge and commodities, we have 
clarified the role of knowledge in value production. On this basis, we have also 
shown that it is possible to extend value theory to incorporate knowledge at a 
relatively abstract level of analysis without abandoning or compromising any of the 
core elements of value theory, which demonstrates the consistency, coherence and 
strength of value theory, and not least in allowing for a favourable comparison with 
the shallowness and inconsistencies of NGT.  
The social processes of virtual multiplication are, however, only a starting point for 
the development of more complex and concrete analyses. In this respect, although 
motivated by, and developed under heavy influence of, the Controversy, this 
approach does not attempt to offer conclusive arguments as to the nature of the 
value and price of information commodities, for example, whether the price of 
information commodities is monopoly price or not, whether the value is close to 
zero or not, and whether the value includes extra surplus value or not in case price is 
significantly higher than zero.  
First, dissecting the determinants of the value, if not price, of a particular 
information commodity (e.g. Microsoft Windows) is not a simple task, involving 
detailed and concrete analysis of the social structures and processes attached to the 
production of the information commodity at various levels of abstraction: the sector 
to which the information commodity belongs should be identified; competitive 
dynamics (mainly around knowledge production) within the sector and across the 
value chain should be analysed; the average knowledge level of the sector should be 
determined; finally, the sectoral average level of knowledge should be compared 
with the social average. For this purpose, horizontal categories such as extra surplus 
value are not sufficient and should be complemented by the analysis of social 
structures and processes specific to the commodity and sector in question. 
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Second, relatively simple applications or impositions of horizontal categories as in 
both cost and monopoly price approaches cannot go beyond static analysis and tend 
to collapse different levels of abstraction. Whereas there are only two levels of 
abstraction — value and (monopoly) price — in the monopoly price approach, the 
price is reduced to the total sum of its components in the cost approach, see Chapter 
5. Instead, Marx refines the concept of value and introduces more concrete and 
complex concepts, e.g. extra surplus value, price of production and rent, step-by-
step, as the analysis moves from the abstract to the concrete. In doing so, Marx also 
introduces a concept pertaining only to a specific sector, i.e. ground rent. 
In subsequent chapters, these points will be further developed, by extending our 
critique of the two approaches in the Controversy for their inadequate theorisations 
of intellectual property rights (Chapter 5) and by providing sketches of industry-
specific theories of intellectual property rights (Chapter 6). 
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4. Cognitive capitalism theory: Cognitive capitalism or 
cognition in capitalism? 
4.1. Introduction 
One question that has drawn much interest among theorists is how to characterise 
the economic importance ascribed to knowledge and technological development. On 
the one hand, knowledge and technological development are seen to be always 
essential for the economy. According to this view, the lack of accounts of knowledge 
in economic theories is considered as a flaw, which needs to be fixed by properly 
incorporating the role of knowledge in a consistent and coherent manner, as 
attempted in Chapter 3 for Marx’s value theory (and by new growth theorists less 
than successfully for neoclassical growth theory as demonstrated in Chapter 2). On 
the other hand, in some theories and discourses, the recent recognition of the 
central role of knowledge in the economy is viewed as reflecting a new underlying 
reality. It is argued that, whilst knowledge has always been important, qualitative 
changes that the capitalist economy is undergoing have elevated the practical and 
theoretical significance of knowledge and technology to a far higher level. Such 
theories face the task of identifying and analysing the essence of the new reality. 
Cognitive capitalism theory (CCT) is one such theory which asserts that recent 
changes represent a fundamental transformation in capitalism. Proponents of this 
theory argue that capitalism is in transition to a new stage of development, although 
the extent of the transformation is not so extreme that these changes do not entail 
the emergence of a new mode of production.  
According to Paulré (2004, para. 11), the objective of CCT is “to address the role of 
knowledge in understanding the evolution and transformation of contemporary 
capitalism”.133 The new stage of capitalism, called cognitive capitalism, is, then, 
characterised by the appropriation by workers of the cognitive aspect of work and 
the mutation of the power relations between capital and labour (around knowledge), 
more favourably to labour. Cognitive labour134 is a type of labour that produces 
                                                
133 All translations from Italian and French sources are my own. 
134 Note that the term cognitive has nothing to do with cognitive science, a study of mental 
operation or thought. It is used “simply as an adjective derived from knowledge” (Paulré, 
2004, para. 4). 
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knowledge, co-operation and communication and it is suggested as the hegemonic 
form of labour in the stage of cognitive capitalism. Consequently, this leads to the 
argument that the determination of the value of commodities by socially necessary 
labour time is rendered dubious because cognitive labour (or knowledge-producing 
labour) is immeasurable by labour time. By contrast, capital is seen to be 
increasingly becoming parasitic, playing no meaningful roles in the production 
process. According to this view, whilst capital still appropriates part of surplus 
products created by labour, it does so only through legal means, not least intellectual 
property rights. Consequently, profit as an economic category is disappearing and 
becoming like rent (see Chapter 5). In sum, it is argued that Marx’s labour theory of 
value suffers a crisis of validity in the wake of cognitive capitalism. 
The significance of CCT lies in the fact that it is one of the few, if not the only, leftist 
accounts of contemporary capitalism from a viewpoint of knowledge. This is 
contrasted with the flourishing development of knowledge-based economy theories 
based on mainstream economics, supported by governments of advanced countries 
and international organisations such as the World Bank and the OECD. Further, 
whilst Marxist political economy is actively engaged with contemporary capitalism, 
its focus is placed upon neo-liberalism, globalisation and financialisation. We see a 
clear need to develop and refine Marxist accounts of the knowledge economy in 
order to fill this theoretical vacuum, to which CCT has obviously contributed. This 
scarcity, however, ironically requires us to critically engage with CCT. First, any 
Marxist theory of the knowledge economy or technological development in 
contemporary capitalism cannot avoid being evaluated in light of CCT. Second, the 
influence of CCT is clearly increasing. It has drawn attention from many theorists 
and activists to the extent that the term ‘cognitive capitalism’ is being used in much 
the same way as the knowledge economy. Indeed, it is used casually without much 
theoretical consideration and reflection. For example: “Contemporary ‘cognitive’ or 
‘informational’ [references removed] capital is ever more dependent on social 
production to generate value and profits” (Arvidsson, 2009, pp. 16-17); “Adaptation 
to participatory modes of innovation, to open models of intellectual property (IP), is 
antithetical to both the industrial and cognitive modes of capitalism” (Bauwens, 
2009, p. 132). Third, and most importantly, whilst it is argued to be based on Marx’s 
methods, CCT misrepresents Marx’s theory of capitalism, in general, and value 
theory, in particular, as we will show later.  
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Focus of the critique 
Whilst we are observing changes such as the rapid adoption and diffusion of 
information and communication technologies, we can still claim that they represent 
no fundamental change in the essence of capitalism, but comprise only new 
appearances through which more or less the same essence manifests. This type of 
critique, on the basis of empirical facts and numbers, is simple, but can also prove to 
be effective. If we can convincingly demonstrate that the core of capitalism still 
remains intact, the claimed need to develop a new value theory can simply be 
discarded. For example, many have shown that traditional industrial labour still 
accounts for a significant portion of total work hours as opposed to the alleged 
hegemony of cognitive labour, rejecting one of the core arguments of CCT 
empirically. In addition, the relative and continuing growth of the service sector in 
terms of share of total employment or GDP, in which cognitive labour is believed to 
be dominant, may be interpreted in different ways (Huws, 2003, pp. 129-131). All 
these are suggested as evidence by opponents that nothing has really changed. Their 
arguments are neither flawed nor insufficient, but not so entirely successful in 
outcome. For proponents of CCT always respond by arguing that the transition is 
still ongoing and that what matters is not the current status of capitalism, but the 
tendencies towards a new stage of capitalism. They suggest that cognitive labour is 
the hegemonic form of labour under cognitive capitalism only as a tendency, not as 
yet an established fact.135 
An alternative approach is to focus on the way the major arguments of CCT are 
derived, criticising assumptions and methods deployed in the analysis rather than 
the final outcome as such. Our critique will take this approach, actively and critically 
engaging with the interpretation of Marx’s value theory by cognitive capitalism 
theorists, on the basis of the virtual multiplication approach we put forward in 
Chapter 3. We focus on showing that their interpretations of Marx’s value theory are 
flawed. By doing this, the call for a new theory on this basis can be disregarded. 
Therefore, we do not question whether or not capitalism is transitioning to a new 
phase, but instead attempt to demonstrate and criticise how this conclusion is 
drawn; in this approach, then, the analysis of facts and numbers is not of primary 
concern. Rather, the focus is placed upon the (alleged) essential differences between 
                                                
135 For critiques of CCT from this perspective, see Camfield (2007), Wright (2005) and 
Husson (2003 and 2007). For responses, see Vercellone (2004) and Hardt and Negri (2004, 
pp. 140-152). 
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cognitive capitalism and industrial capitalism, most notable among them being the 
change of the hegemonic form of labour from industrial labour to cognitive labour 
and labour’s appropriation of the role of knowledge production. Significantly, these 
changes are considered to be essential, not in themselves, but because value theory 
is seen to be unable to address them. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Sections 2 and 3 summarise 
the key arguments of CCT, especially in its relation with other similar theories. 
Section 4 demonstrates that the interpretations of Marx’s value theory by the 
proponents of CCT are fundamentally flawed. The presumption in CCT is that 
abstract labour is an ahistorical, naturalistic and physiological category which 
became the substance of value as the result of the imposition of the industrial form 
of the division of labour (the separation between conception and execution). This 
not only reduces the concept of commodity-producing labour into simple, repetitive 
manual labour but also bypasses the role of knowledge in value production. 
Therefore, it is this weakened version of value theory that is rejected by the 
proponents of CCT. Section 5 criticises the interpretation of the concept of the 
general intellect in CCT, allegedly the dominant form of the division of labour in 
contemporary capitalism. Section 6 concludes the chapter. 
4.2. The regulation approach, post-Workerism and the 
knowledge economy 
Before embarking on our critique, it is necessary to trace the origin of CCT, focusing 
on its similarities with, and differences from, the regulation approach, knowledge-
based economy theories and post-Workerism. This will help situate our critique in a 
proper context.  
Whilst the origin of CCT dates back to early 1990s (Toscano, 2007, p. 5), its 
development as a separate research stream started when the thesis of cognitive 
capitalism was drafted during a symposium held in Amiens in 1999 (Paulré, 2004). 
Major contributors include Antonella Corsani, Patrick Dieuaide, Andrea Fumagalli, 
Maurizio Lazzarato, Jean-Marie Monnier, Yann Moulier-Boutang, Bernard Paulré, 
and Carlo Vercellone. 136  The early thoughts are summarised in the document 
(‘Draft’) which describes the cognitive capitalism research program of MATISSE 
                                                
136 Since then, quite a few varied views have emerged even if they do not differ from each 
other to the extent that they have to be considered as alternatives (Paulré, 2008, p. 79). 
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(Modélisations Appliquées, Trajectoires Institutionnelles, Stratégies Socio-
Économiques) — ‘Le capitalisme cognitif comme sortie de la crise du capitalisme 
industriel (Cognitive Capitalism as an exit from the crisis of industrial capitalism)’ 
(Corsani et al., 2001).  
The regulation approach, knowledge-based economy and the like 
The Draft shows that the thesis of cognitive capitalism has been developed under the 
significant influence of the French regulation school. This is more than evident in 
the use of such concepts as regime of accumulation and mode of development; 
cognitive capitalism is suggested as a new regime of accumulation that arises out of 
the crisis of Fordist regime of accumulation. In the same vein, Paulré (2004, para. 
12) defines cognitive capitalism as a new “system of accumulation” in which the 
accumulation is centred on knowledge production, especially science and 
technology. However, the concept of cognitive capitalism goes beyond the regulation 
approach in the sense that the transition to cognitive capitalism involves 
discontinuity or rupture from the Fordist regime of accumulation. Nor is CCT a 
theory of post-Fordism. The transition is considered as an exit, not only from the 
crisis of Fordism but also from that of industrial capitalism as a whole, which 
encompasses both Fordism and post-Fordism.137 CCT therefore occupies “a unique 
position” (Corsani et al., 2001, p. 4) within the regulation approach. Braudel’s study 
of the long dynamic of capitalism inspired this view on the transition from one stage 
of capitalism to another, with industrial capitalism being one of them.138  
CCT also draws from other contemporary economic and social theories that attempt 
                                                
137 Paulré (2004, para. 13) says, “We believe that the crisis of Fordism in fact disguises or 
indicates that of industrial capitalism”. For Lucarelli and Fumagalli (2008, p. 77), post-
Fordism indicates only “the passage from Fordism to CC [cognitive capitalism]”. 
138 Vercellone (2007, p. 14) also says: 
It is necessary to note that the notion of cognitive capitalism has also been developed as 
a response to the insufficiency of the interpretations of the current mutation of 
capitalism in terms of the transition from a Fordist to a post-Fordist model of flexible, or 
what is sometimes referred to as ‘Toyota-ist’, accumulation. … Theories of post-Fordism, 
while capturing some significant elements of rupture, often remain bound to a factory-
inspired vision of the new capitalism seen as a further development of the Fordist-
industrial logic of the real subsumption of labour by capital. For these reasons, the 
category of post-Fordism appears to us to be inadequate for comprehending the 
profound transformation of the antagonistic relation of capital to labour related to the 
development of an economy founded on the driving role of knowledge and the figure of 
the collective worker of the general intellect. 
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to capture the mode of development or “dynamic efficiency” of capitalism as 
opposed to “static efficiency” represented by the general equilibrium framework 
(Antonelli, 2007, p. 13). Such theories include knowledge economy theories, NGT, 
economics of innovation, evolutionary economics and theories of post-industrial 
society and network society.139 For the proponents of CCT, they are useful and 
instrumental for stimulating debate on the role of knowledge in contemporary 
capitalism. In addition they provide raw materials for CCT; for example, the role 
and nature of knowledge, the effects of the diffusion of information and 
communication technologies, public policy on education and intellectual property 
rights, to name just a few. These theories focus on the special aspects of knowledge 
as compared with material goods, especially its role and its peculiar way of 
production and diffusion in the broader economy. However, they do not go further 
to ask if these changes are linked to more fundamental transformations. CCT takes 
the phenomenal changes identified by them as a given, but attempts to provide an 
alternative interpretation. Whilst cognitive capitalism shares the same 
characteristics with the knowledge economy or the information society where 
knowledge is seen to play a central role, CCT criticises these for being technology-
deterministic, ahistorical, positivist and non-confrontational in lacking social and 
historical analyses and unduly focusing on the rapid technological development as 
the source of social and economic changes (Vercellone, 2004). Vercellone (2005, p. 
2) also argues: 
The interpretation provided by neo-classical theories of endogenous growth 
and the knowledge-based economy take into account neither the antagonism 
between capital and labour nor the conflicts between knowledge and power 
investing the transformations of the division of labour. 
In short, in cognitive capitalism, “there is antagonism, but it is new” (Moulier-
Boutang, 2006, para. 25). Although the quantitative growth of knowledge sectors 
and/or knowledge workers is certainly a notable development, knowledge alone is 
not considered sufficient to substantiate the establishment of a new (knowledge) 
economy, considering that knowledge has always been important for the economy 
(Paulré, 2004). 
                                                
139 For details, see Corsani et al. (2001). Moulier-Boutang (2002) suggests 14 features of 
cognitive capitalism, some of which, for example, the emergence of network form, knowledge 
as public good, expansion of the scope of positive externalities, and importance of tacit 
knowledge, are well known as the features of the knowledge economy. 
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By contrast, the notion of cognitive capitalism aims to capture the qualitative 
changes of the underlying social forces. It is suggested that a new form of the 
conflictual capital-labour relation, marked by the hegemony of cognitive labour and 
the rise of rent as the central category, represents such fundamental qualitative 
changes. In the same vein, technological determinism is rejected: “The emphasis on 
technology should not be interpreted as meaning the determining role of technology 
as an exogenous causal factor” (Corsani et al., 2001, p. 8); “Cognitive capitalism 
cannot simply be equated with a society characterised by the development of the 
new ICT (information and communication technologies)” (pp. 11-12); “Investments 
in the information and communication technologies in the material sense of the 
term, on which economists often focus their attention, are rather a symptom or a 
signal of ongoing changes” (Paulré, 2004, para. 18). Monnier and Vercellone (2014, 
p. 62) summarise the difference between the knowledge economy and cognitive 
capitalism as follows: 
It can be asserted that the difference and the contradiction between 
knowledge-based economy and cognitive capitalism refer to the Marxian 
contradiction between productive forces and social relations of production. 
Cognitive capitalism tries to set limits and submit to the logic of profit and of 
commodification a dynamic of knowledge economy that contains in itself the 
possibility of a transition to a society based on non-market primacy. In that 
spirit, the concept of cognitive capitalism allows to emphasise on the historical 
dimension and the conflictual relationships between its two components. 
Post-Workerism 
It is especially in the respect of the centrality of class struggle in method, that CCT 
owes much to post-Workerism, a major strand of Autonomist Marxism.140 Major 
proponents of post-Workerism include Antonio Negri, Michael Hardt and Maurizio 
Lazzarato. They have much contributed to a French journal, Futur Antérieur and its 
sequel, Multitudes,141  central themes of which include Autonomist Marxism, in 
general, and post-Workerism and CCT, in particular. 
Notably, Vercellone, a proponent of CCT, co-wrote an article about cognitive 
capitalism with Negri (Negri & Vercellone, 2007), which indicates that post-
                                                
140 See Wright (2002 and 2008) for a history of Autonomist Marxism, focusing on its 
diversity. See also Dyer-Witheford (1999). 
141 Multitudes was founded by a proponent of CCT, Yann Moulier-Boutang. 
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Workerism and CCT were converging.142 Further, in his later book in English, 
Reflections on Empire, Negri (2008, pp. 63-64) explicitly reveals the affinity 
between CCT and post-Workerism: 
Today, we find ourselves in a way of life and in a way of producing that are 
characterised by the hegemony of intellectual labour. It has been said that we 
have entered the era of cognitive capitalism. … The originality of cognitive 
capitalism consists in capturing within a generalised social activity, an 
innovative element which produces value. 
Indeed, post-Workerism and CCT share crucial aspects of methodology and similar 
views on class struggle, history, and Marx’s value theory. Thus, many of the 
strengths and weaknesses of post-Workerism are also present in CCT. Due to such 
similarities, it is difficult to distinguish CCT from post-Workerism clearly, and our 
critique of the former partly takes the form of critique of the latter. It is therefore 
important and instrumental to summarise briefly some of the key arguments of 
post-Workerism. 
First, post-Workerism views capitalism as consisting of several stages, each of which 
is characterised by a distinct class subject, class antagonism and dominant form of 
labour. Transition from one stage of capitalism to another is driven by class struggle.  
Second, contemporary capitalism is allegedly the third stage of capitalism or the 
third cycle of struggle between labour and capital. Post-Workerism, which is built 
upon the collapse of Workerism corresponding to the end of the second cycle of 
class struggle represented by the mass worker143 and the social factory, attempts to 
capture the essence of the third stage through the concept of immaterial labour 
(Lazzarato, 1996) and social (or socialised) worker. Similarly, the mass worker 
emerged from the crisis of the first cycle of class struggle as a new class subject, 
responding to the attempts of capitalists to subordinate the previous class subject — 
the professional worker — by way of the automation of the production process and 
the introduction of assembly lines. Struggles of the mass worker against capital took 
the forms of sabotage, refusal to work and worker-student alliance, and the class 
subject was redefined through this mass movement as a more creative and flexible 
                                                
142 It is worth mentioning, however, that there is no mention of cognitive capitalism in Hardt 
and Negri’s (2009) Commonwealth, published after Negri and Vercellone (2007). 
143 Mass workers are deskilled workers doing repetitive/manual work in assembly lines 
which “meets Marx’s definition of ‘abstract labour’” (Bowring, 2004, p. 106). 
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labour power. 
Third, the transition to the third cycle of struggle — the age of Hardt and Negri’s 
(2000 and 2004) Empire and Multitude — which is still underway, started with the 
formation and struggle of the mass worker against capital. In the face of sabotage 
and the mass worker’s refusal to work, capitalists had to adopt different strategies in 
order to reconfigure class composition. Globalisation of production sites, off-
shoring, shift to service work, outsourcing and adoption of flexible production 
methods are some of the countering strategies adopted by capitalists. More 
specifically, capital had to give up the production mechanism represented by 
Fordism and assembly lines to cope with this new class subject: “Capital had to 
abandon the large scale factory, its linear production, its inflexible working day and 
its mechanistic logic and employ open networks and flexi-time and give space to 
creativity” (Aufheben, 2006, p. 29); “Capital was forced to move into immaterial 
production to dominate a new labour power that had redefined itself, autonomously, 
as creative, communicative and affective” (p. 27). Similarly:  
If there had not been worker and student revolts in the 1960s, if there had not 
been 1968 and the second wave of the women’s movements, if there had not 
been the whole series of anti-imperialist struggles, capital would have been 
content to maintain its own arrangement of power, happy to have been saved 
the trouble of shifting the paradigm of production! (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 
275) 
Fourth, with the collapse of class struggle represented by the mass worker, what 
used to be rigid is now replaced by what is flexible. Labour becomes increasingly 
immaterial and so does capitalist control. Labour is involved more in the production 
of images, meanings and cultural elements of material goods which, in the previous 
stage, was monopolised by capitalists or a group of specialised workers. The mass 
refusal was “not only a negative expression but also a moment of creation” (p. 274). 
Capital has to become flexible accordingly. As “the truly creative moment had 
already taken place [emphasis removed]” (p. 276), capital needs to appropriate this 
moment, rather than creating it anew.  
Fifth, immaterial labour144 is suggested as becoming the hegemonic form of labour 
in the third cycle of class struggle.145 Immaterial labour is not measurable, and in its 
                                                
144 For a critical review of the concept of immaterial labour, see Haug (2009). 
145 For Lucarelli and Vercellone (2011, pp. 87-88), the growth of intangible capital, both in 
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nature, cooperative, flexible, communicative and affective,146 encompassing both 
intellectual work and service labour.147 Immaterial labour or biopolitical labour is 
immeasurable because being measured means being imposed, which is in 
diametrical opposition to its being flexible, creative and communicative. Labour, 
then, becomes life itself.148 
Sixth, despite the immeasurability of immaterial biopolitical labour, labour is still 
seen as the source of value. According to Hardt and Negri, “what is different today, 
however, in the era of biopolitical production, is that intellectual and/or affective 
invention has become the primary source of value and wealth in society” (Brown & 
Szeman, 2005, p. 383). However, no account of the new immaterial labour theory of 
value is provided. 
4.3. Cognitive capitalism theory 
Whilst sharing many crucial aspects with post-Workerism, especially those of 
methodology, CCT is distinguished from post-Workerism in several respects. The 
key difference lies in its focus on the central role of knowledge. In place of 
immaterial labour, cognitive labour, a type of immaterial labour,149 is suggested as 
the hegemonic form of labour in cognitive capitalism. Likewise, class struggle 
between capital and labour is viewed as centred on the role of knowledge 
production, instead of encompassing all aspects of life as implicit in the category of 
biopolitical labour. In addition to narrowing down the focus onto knowledge, CCT 
attempts to conceptualise the new reality at a more logical and abstract level than 
                                                                                                                                     
absolute and relative terms, to the extent that it “has exceeded the portion of physical capital 
in the global capital stock and it now represents the main factor for economic growth and 
competitiveness”, expresses the transition from “the Taylorist division of labour” to “a 
cognitive division or organisation of labour”. 
146 See Hardt (1999) for more on affective labour. 
147 This aspect of immaterial labour is crucial for distinguishing cognitive labour from 
immaterial labour. For Vercellone (2007 and 2011), cognitive labour and immaterial labour 
are similar concepts, with cognitive labour being more specific. Monnier and Vercellone 
(2014, p. 65) suggest that cognitive labour can be either material or immaterial labour. 
148 Caffentzis (2005, p. 97) criticises Negri and Hardt that they “willfully ignore the well 
known ontological distinction between labour and action”. 
149 According to Hardt and Negri (2004, p. 108), “conventional terms such as service work, 
intellectual labour, and cognitive labour all refer to aspects of immaterial labour”. 
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post-Workerism, such that its analysis of the economic aspect of contemporary 
capitalism is more advanced and sophisticated than that of post-Workerism: “Of 
course, this problem will basically be addressed from the viewpoint of economists” 
(Paulré, 2004, para. 2). 
Cognitive capitalism theory, as the nomenclature suggests, is also based on the view 
that capitalism consists of several stages even though CCT and post-Workerism 
periodise capitalism in different ways. Whereas post-Workerism tries to periodise 
“the history of real subsumption of labour under capital” (Bowring, 2004, p. 105) by 
identifying three successive stages of capitalism whose first stage dates back only to 
1848, CCT shares Braudel’s view that capitalism has a long history, which came into 
being far earlier than the industrial revolution (Moulier-Boutang, 2002).150 In CCT, 
cognitive capitalism is the third stage of capitalism, preceded by industrial 
capitalism which started with the first industrial revolution.151 In this respect, and as 
mentioned earlier, the transition to cognitive capitalism is called a rupture, not a 
transition within industrial capitalism from Fordism to post-Fordism. The 
transition to cognitive capitalism is seen to be so profound that Moulier-Boutang 
(2002, p. 3) puts it as a “grand transformation” in a Polanyian sense. We therefore 
need new theories for the new capitalism: “It makes us leave behind the political 
economy born in the eighteenth century” (Moulier-Boutang, 2006, para. 23). 
The originality of CCT lies in conceptualising the succession of stages of capitalism 
as the logical and historical development of the capitalist division of labour.152 
According to Vercellone (2007, p. 19), the three stages of capitalism correspond to 
three successive forms of the capitalist division of labour — formal subsumption, 
                                                
150 “It is a confirmation of one of the lessons of Braudel who, in opposition to approaches 
assimilating too early the essence of capitalism to its industrial configuration, reminds us 
that capitalism is an ‘old history’” (Corsani et al., 2001, p. 14). 
151  In its first stage, capitalism was mercantilist capitalism “based on the models of 
production of the putting-out system and of centralised manufacture” (Vercellone, 2007, p. 
15). 
152 No one except Vercellone and Moulier-Boutang explicitly associates the periodisation of 
capitalism covering all the three stages of capitalism with the evolution of the capitalist 
division of labour. However, considering that this view is already present in the Draft, we 
may conclude that others’ silence on this matter does not mean rejection of this view, but 
implicit approval. There is at least a general agreement among theorists that the emergence 
of cognitive labour and a new form of the capitalist division of labour is a necessary 
condition of the transition to cognitive capitalism. 
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real subsumption and the general intellect, respectively, all of which are discussed in 
Marx’s works. Each form of the division of labour is distinguished from the others 
by its distinctive configuration of production and appropriation of knowledge. In 
this view, whereas knowledge was originally produced, owned and controlled by 
workers in the stage of formal subsumption or mercantilist capitalism, the role of 
knowledge production was systematically detached from workers and centralised to 
a small group of specialised workers during the stage of industrial capitalism, with 
(scientific and/or technological) knowledge mainly objectified in fixed capital. In 
this form of the division of labour, commodity-producing workers are seen to play a 
passive role, and are under real subsumption to capital. It is argued that the 
situation is being reversed in the transition to cognitive capitalism or the stage of the 
general intellect, in which the role of knowledge production or conception is being 
re-appropriated by workers. In this stage, “the traditional terms of the opposition 
between ‘dead labour’ and ‘living labour’ of industrial capitalism gives way to a new 
antagonism between the ‘dead knowledge’ and ‘living knowledge’” (Corsani et al., 
2001, p. 19). Social knowledge exists as a “mass intellectuality” (Virno, 2007, p. 6) or 
a “diffuse intellectuality” (Vercellone, 2007, p. 16) within living labour as opposed to 
fixed capital. Moulier-Boutang (2002, p. 8) also speaks of “the centrality of living 
labour which is not reduced to dead labour in machinery”. 
The evolution of the capitalist division of labour is certainly not simply a technical 
process. As is the case in post-Workerism, it is seen as the terrain, as well as the 
result, of class struggle. Technological determinism is clearly rejected. Rather, 
knowledge production and its technological application are understood as a means 
of undermining and containing the resistance of the working class. In the stage of 
industrial capitalism in particular, capital incessantly attempted to introduce new 
production technologies in order to subordinate labour to capital and to empty 
workers of traditional production knowledge. As this involves deskilling and 
degradation of work, “the labour process remains irreducibly conflictual” 
(Vercellone, 2007, p. 17), and “the analysis of technical progress as an expression of 
a relation of forces concerning knowledge is everywhere present in Marx’s work” (p. 
18). Further, in the tradition of Autonomist Marxism, technological development is 
understood primarily as a weapon for capital against the working class. As Aufheben 
(2006, p. 29) puts it, “this [deskilling] is class struggle which appears, post facto, 
crystallised in the objective laws of capital or in the objective rationale of innovation, 
progress and development of capitalist production”. 
In sum, the conflictual relation centred on knowledge is the defining feature of the 
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capital-labour relation in cognitive capitalism, with cognitive capitalism itself 
essentially resulting from the class struggle around knowledge production. Based on 
this view of the determining role of class struggle in historical development, 
Vercellone (2007) goes further and argues that the re-appropriation of knowledge 
by workers was possible by the expansion of public education, which is also a result 
of the struggle between labour and capital in industrial capitalism, or, more 
specifically, in Fordism. 
4.4. Misinterpretations of Marx’s value theory in cognitive 
capitalism theory 
Having reviewed key aspects of cognitive capitalism theory, we are now ready to 
move on to our critique. As mentioned earlier, we will focus on demonstrating that 
value theory is misinterpreted in CCT, which leads to the equally misleading bold 
argument that value theory is no more valid in contemporary capitalism. In short, 
the marginalisation of direct labour time in the knowledge-intensive sectors is 
viewed in CCT as representing the demise of value theory on the basis of a 
(mis)interpretation of value theory.153 
Our critique begins by drawing attention to the argument that value theory, or the 
law of value, presupposes a specific form of the division of labour and is therefore 
valid only in a specific stage of capitalism. In this sense, value theory, being a theory 
of industrial capitalism, is taken by CCT as a barometer of the status of industrial 
capitalism: as long as new changes can be explained by value theory, capitalism 
remains to be industrial capitalism; conversely, such phenomena that seemingly 
contradict value theory are taken to indicate that fundamental mutations are taking 
                                                
153 Leaving aside the problem that CCT proposes no alternative value theory replacing Marx’s 
labour theory of value, the notion that value theory can be rejected because of some new 
phenomena that seem to contradict value theory is at odds with Marx’s own view. Marx 
(CW43, pp. 68-69) criticises such a notion, by saying that: 
Even if there were no chapter on ‘value’ at all in my book, the analysis I give of the real 
relations would contain the proof and demonstration of the real value relation. The 
chatter about the need to prove the concept of value arises only from complete ignorance 
both of the subject under discussion and of the method of science. … Where science 
comes in is to show how the law of value asserts itself. So, if one wanted to ‘explain’ from 
the outset all phenomena that apparently contradict the law, one would have to provide 
the science before the science. It is precisely Ricardo’s mistake that in his first chapter, 
on value, all sorts of categories that still have to be arrived at are assumed as given, in 
order to prove their harmony with the law of value.  
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place behind them. 154  Significantly, this argument is based on a naturalistic 
interpretation of value theory. This interpretation views abstract labour as pure 
expenditure of human energy, which comes to the fore under a specific form of the 
division of labour where the role of knowledge production, or conception, is 
deliberately separated from workers and is monopolised by capitalists. It is argued 
that simple commodity-producing execution work prevailing in industrial capitalism 
approximates abstract labour, not the abstract aspect of labour, but labour being 
stripped of its concrete aspect and becoming pure expenditure of human (physical) 
energy. In this sense, the separation between conception and execution is implicitly 
considered to be a defining aspect of the category of value, not a consequence of it.  
Second, related to the first point, that abstract labour and value are social categories, 
expressing equivalence between human labours, is neither acknowledged nor 
recognised in CCT. Simple execution work is seen as directly abstract labour and 
quantitative relations between human labours are ignored, despite varying 
productivity and complexity of labour. In other words, the quantitative conversion 
of concrete labour time into abstract labour time is not studied and social processes 
involved in this conversion are short-circuited, within which knowledge plays an 
important intrinsic role of virtual multiplication as we have seen in Chapter 3. 
Knowledge is seen to be produced solely by capitalists and to contribute nothing at 
all to value production. Not surprisingly, then, in taking the view of the predominant 
role of knowledge under the stage of cognitive capitalism, value becomes a 
redundant category.  
Third, and more fundamentally, such misinterpretation is based on a specific view 
of the relation between conception (knowledge-producing labour) and execution 
(commodity-producing labour). Different roles of conception and execution in the 
production of use value and value in capitalism are not analysed in CCT. Instead, 
although both are indispensable parts of the production process as a whole, labour is 
seen to create wealth as either execution alone (in industrial capitalism) or 
conception alone (in cognitive capitalism). Not only are execution (or industrial 
labour) and conception (or cognitive labour) contrasted with each other, but the two 
                                                
154 For the proponents of CCT, however, this does not mean Marx is wrong. Given that the 
object of value theory is believed to gradually give way to a new reality, for them, it is 
compatible with Marx’s method and his historical materialism to reject the validity of value 
theory in the stage of cognitive capitalism. The presumption is that with the emergence of a 
new reality, new theories should be developed, and that is what Marx’s method requires. 
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are seen to mutually exclude each other. Put differently, the one is viewed as the 
negation of the other and no inter-relation between them is analysed. In this 
interpretation, Marx’s value theory is degraded into an execution-labour theory of 
value where no consideration of conception (or knowledge) is present. In addition, 
what holds for the old theory (the execution-labour theory of value) is considered 
obsolete in the new theory (the conception-labour theory of value). For example, in 
cognitive capitalism, the presence of the single measure of wealth is seen to be 
dubious, and the distinction between material wealth and wealth in general (in value 
terms) is absent. 
Abstract labour and value in cognitive capitalism theory 
In CCT, abstract labour is first and foremost a naturalistic category. According to 
Hardt and Negri (2004, p. 144), all the qualitatively different (concrete) industrial 
labours are “equivalent or commensurable because they each contain a common 
element, abstract labour, labour in general, labour without respect to its specific 
form”. Conceptualised in this way, abstract labour is measured by one of the 
“natural units of measure” (p. 156). Whilst there is nothing wrong with this 
definition of abstract labour, it is not sufficient.155 For the social and historical 
aspects of abstract labour, which are more fundamental than the physiological 
aspect, are neither acknowledged nor recognised. According to this interpretation, 
Marx’s labour theory of value belongs to the “energy and entropy paradigm of 
labour” (Moulier-Boutang, 2012, p. 53; see also p. 117 and Moulier-Boutang, 
2002).156 Similarly, Lebert and Vercellone (2011, p. 8) say:  
                                                
155 “‘Physiological’ definition derives from a mental generalisation across all types of concrete 
labour. Although simple and often adequate, it may be insufficient for two reasons. First, it is 
excessively general; several forms of purposeful energy expenditure are not generally 
considered labour, for example those activities directly related to the upkeep and 
reproduction of the individual and the household, leisure and self-expression, and the arts. 
Second, this transhistorical definition is analytically sterile. Inspection of reality shows that 
certain types of labour, for example cooking, design, management, or personal services, can 
vary significantly over time and place in terms of the work process and the circumstances in 
which these activities are performed. In spite of the importance of these features of human 
labour, the physiological definition of labour cannot be developed systematically in order to 
explain them” (Saad-Filho, 2002, pp. 10-11). 
156 Moulier-Boutang (2004, para. 2) also argues that the energy paradigm does not hold in 
cognitive capitalism: “The source of value becomes the cooperation between brains and not 
just the use of the force of muscular work and energy expenditure [emphasis added]”. 
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At the heart of this transformation [in the laws of functioning of the economy] 
is the transition of the energy paradigm [emphasis added] of work in 
industrial capitalism towards a new social organisation of production, based 
on the rise of cognitive and immaterial dimensions of work, but, more 
generally, that of the role of knowledge. 
For Marx, by contrast, abstract labour is primarily a social category. In the first 
volume of Capital, immediately after he suggests abstract labour as the common 
element of various concrete labours, he refers to it as “social substance” (CI, p. 
128).157 He does so before he introduces more complex concepts such as money and 
capital. His interest is in laying bare the social dimension underneath generalised 
commodity production and exchange, and apparently, the physiological 
understanding of abstract labour, that all commodities are the outcome of human 
energy expenditure, which is true at anytime and anywhere, falls short for this 
purpose. Simply, it is not a good foundation on which to reconstruct (in thought) a 
historically specific mode of (social) production. Abstract labour, for Marx, above 
all, expresses the equivalence between human labours, which is a historical 
product,158 as is shown by the example of Aristotle who failed to recognise human 
labour as the common element contained in two different commodities in exchange 
due to the necessarily historical limitations of his perspective (CI, pp. 151-152). 
Significantly, for the proponents of CCT, abstract labour, an ahistorical and 
naturalistic category for them, became the substance of value in (industrial) 
capitalism. From this point of view, contrary to the previous mode of production, 
where measuring labour by time had little social significance (in fact, it was the 
other way around), labour time was elevated to become the measure of labour as the 
                                                
157  Cremin and Roberts (2011, p. 184) also criticise Hardt and Negri’s physiological 
understanding of abstract labour. They attribute Hardt and Negri’s misinterpretation to their 
privileging of the very beginning of the first volume of Capital: 
By insisting that the first few pages of Capital do in fact faithfully represent Marx’s main 
arguments on value, Hardt and Negri ignore … [a] more rigorous and developed analysis 
and simply reduce Marx’s value theory to a statement about the collective amount of 
individual concrete labour that taken as a whole across production constitutes social and 
abstract labour. In other words, Hardt and Negri attribute a rather simplistic theory of 
value to Marx which can be termed an ‘embodied theory of value’. This theory of value is 
based on the idea that everyday concrete labour is recognized as physiological labour 
embodied in commodities during production. 
158 “The secret of the expression of value, namely the equality and equivalence of all kinds of 
labour because and in so far as they are human labour in general, could not be deciphered 
until the concept of human equality had already acquired the permanence of a fixed popular 
opinion” (CI, p. 152). 
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result of the systematic separation of the cognitive aspect of labour from workers. 
Whereas capitalists were responsible for knowledge production, workers were 
increasingly forced to perform simple labour, at the rhythm and pace dictated by 
capitalists, such that commodity-producing labour was transformed to be primarily 
about the (measurable) expenditure of human energy. Especially with the 
introduction of machinery to the production process and the establishment of large-
scale industry, labour became “ever more abstract, not only under the form of 
exchange-value, but also in its content, emptied of any intellectual and creative 
quality” (Vercellone, 2007, p. 24). In short, in CCT, (industrial-)value, of which 
abstract labour is the substance, is the result of the separation between conception 
(knowledge-producing labour) and execution (commodity-producing labour). 
For Marx, by contrast, time is the measure of labour and value at a more abstract 
level. Whereas generalised commodity production and exchange and the division of 
labour are presupposed in his analysis of value, capital is brought into the analysis 
after commodity, value, and money. Value and abstract labour also precede more 
complex concepts such as the division of labour (within a workplace) and the 
separation between conception and execution, logically, if not historically. 
Therefore, Marx’s analysis of labour in Chapter 1 of the first volume of Capital does 
not mention the separation between conception and execution; on the contrary, 
labour is seen as the unity of conception and execution: “Tailoring and weaving, 
although they are qualitatively different productive activities, are both a productive 
expenditure of human brains [emphasis added], muscles, nerves [emphasis added], 
hands etc., and in this sense both human labour” (CI, p. 134).159 Law-like tendencies, 
not least the tendency of deskilling, are also the results of, not preconditions for, 
value. Likewise, a specific form of the division of labour cannot be taken as a 
prerequisite for the validity of value theory, nor for the real existence of value. 
                                                
159  Similarly, Marx (CW30, p. 168) says, “It [the capitalistic production] is a greater 
spendthrift than any other mode of production of man, of living labour, spendthrift not only 
of flesh and blood and muscles, but of brains and nerves [emphasis added]”. Lucarelli and 
Vercellone (2014) also acknowledge that labour, for Marx, is the unity of conception and 
execution although their emphasis is on the immeasurability of labour and worker’s 
resistance to control due to the cognitive aspect of labour: 
It is important to recall that for Marx, labour as a cognitive activity — understood as the 
inseparable unity between thought and action — is the very essence of man (see Capital 
Book I, ch.7). It seems to us that the crucial point is the following: if the cognitive 
dimension of labour is the very essence of human activity, awareness of this might be 
understood as an impediment to the capitalist control of production and, therefore, 
accumulation (p. 8; page reference is from an early draft). 
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Cognitive labour and industrial labour as two independent forms of labour 
Cognitive capitalism theory takes it the other way around. For the proponents of 
CCT, it is precisely through the separation between conception and execution that 
time became the measure of execution labour which is physiologically and 
ahistorically abstract, and abstract labour the substance of value. In the sense that 
value is the result of the historically specific form of the division of labour, contrary 
to abstract labour, it is both a social and historical category although it is also a 
directly social category, with the separation between conception and execution, a 
class relation, being imposed from without.160 
Significantly, it is seen that, under the industrial form of the division of labour, 
labour is either cognitive labour or execution labour and it is only the latter that 
creates (industrial-)value. In addition, whilst labour is viewed as the source of 
wealth both in industrial and cognitive capitalism, labour is understood to create 
value either in its industrial form alone or in its cognitive form alone. Industrial 
labour and cognitive labour are contrasted with each other, to the extent that they 
appear to mutually exclude each other: the former is repetitive, pure consumption of 
human energy and the latter is creative, cooperative and intellectual; the former is 
measured by time and the latter is immeasurable by time; the former is expended in 
the labour process as dictated by capital and the latter organises and co-ordinates 
itself; the former produces commodities according to knowledge objectified in fixed 
capital or machinery and the latter produces such knowledge. It is as if one is the 
pure negation of the other; cognitive labour is labour which is not industrial labour; 
industrial labour is labour which is deprived of its cognitive aspect.161 
                                                
160 “The imposition of work as imposition of abstract labour thus represents capital’s 
attempted transformation of the multi-dimensionality of life into the one-dimensionality of 
work. The potentially boundless and qualitatively distinct forms of human activities and 
human relations are turned into the potentially boundless different forms of the same thing: 
work” (De Angelis, 1995, p. 113). 
161 It is worth noting that the distinction between knowledge labour (conception) and 
commodity-production labour (execution) is different from the distinction between material 
and immaterial labour. Knowledge labour can create material products and commodity-
producing labour immaterial products. For the latter, Marx (CW34, p. 144) gives examples of 
“artists, orators, actors, teachers, doctors, clerics, etc.”: 
With non-material production, even when it is conducted purely for exchange, hence 
produces commodities, two things are possible: … 2) The product is not separable from 
the act of producing, as with all executant artists, orators, actors, teachers, doctors, 
clerics, etc. … E.g. teachers in educational institutions may be mere wage labourers for 
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Any type of the division of labour involves a separation between conception and 
execution to some extent. However, as long as both forms of labour are required and 
indispensable for commodity production, their different roles in value production as 
well as in use value production should be recognised and analysed. Execution alone 
cannot produce commodities and thus alone cannot produce (industrial-)value 
either. In other words, execution cannot stand on its own without conception and 
vice-versa. This internal relation may appear in many different forms which change 
and develop historically. For example, in contemporary capitalism, the separation 
between conception and execution has been developed to the extent that knowledge 
can be bought and sold. In addition, knowledge production is not only for internal 
use to enhance the productivity and complexity of commodity-producing labour or 
to develop new products, but also for making profit by way of knowledge licensing, 
although conception and execution can be detached only imperfectly from each 
other. This can and should, however, be theorised on the basis of the internal 
relation between conception and execution at the abstract level, as a form of its 
externalisation. In sum, for Marx, commodity production and, thus, value 
production, are anchored firmly in the unity of conception and execution. 
The contrary is the case in CCT, in which the internal relation between conception 
and execution is lost. They are seen to be independent of each other, as if one can 
exist irrespective of, and/or prevail over, the other. Likewise, Marx’s value theory is 
understood as an execution-labour (or industrial-labour) theory of value in which 
there is no place for conception or knowledge-producing labour. Knowledge 
production monopolised by capitalists is seen as a technological means of 
domination, which forces workers to perform abstract labour, and as a tool to 
                                                                                                                                     
the entrepreneur who owns the institution; there are many such education factories 
[emphasis added] in England. Although they are not productive workers vis-à-vis the 
pupils, they are such vis-à-vis their employer. He exchanges his capital for their labour 
capacity, and enriches himself by this process. Similarly with enterprises such as 
theatres, places of entertainment, etc. Here the actor’s relation to the public is that of 
artist, but vis-à-vis his employer he is a productive worker. All the phenomena of 
capitalist production in this area are so insignificant in comparison with production as a 
whole that they can be disregarded entirely. (CW34, pp. 143-144) 
Similarly: 
The material determination of labour, and therefore of its product, in itself has nothing 
to do with this distinction between productive and unproductive labour. For example, 
the cooks and WAITERS in a public hotel are productive labourers, in so far as their labour 
is transformed into capital for the proprietor of the hotel. These same persons are 
unproductive labourers as MENIAL SERVANTS, inasmuch as I do not make capital out of 
their services, but spend revenue on them. In fact, however, these same persons are also 
for me, the consumer, unproductive labourers in the hotel. (CW31, p. 15) 
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increase relative surplus value, without affecting the production of value. In 
conclusion, by reducing Marx’s value theory into an execution-value theory of 
labour, CCT not only misinterprets but also narrows the applicability of value 
theory, and on this basis, rejects the validity of value theory in contemporary 
capitalism. 162  CCT takes a dialectical unity in labour between conception and 
execution, and dehistoricises it to allow for certain tendencies, of deskilling and the 
like under capitalism, to be realised as absolute in separating the two in industrial 
capitalism and, further, conversely, for labour to appropriate conception in cognitive 
capitalism. 
Law of value in crisis and the emergence of cognitive labour as the source of 
material wealth 
With cognitive labour becoming the hegemonic form of labour in cognitive 
capitalism, it is argued that the law of value is in crisis because cognitive labour is, 
by its nature, difficult to measure. As Caffentzis (2005, p. 89) points out, 
                                                
162 Lebert (2011, p. 106) criticises this line of critique of CCT in Fine et al. (2010) as being 
“Ricardian Marxist (marxo-ricardienne)” in the sense that “it apprehends the law of value 
primarily as a law of the (universal) measure of the magnitude of value, not as a historical 
product of the law of surplus value”, although he does not define “the law of surplus value”. 
He continues: 
[The] distinction is, however, explained in the passages of The Poverty of Philosophy on 
‘automatic shop’, the result of socio-historical process of ‘subordination of man to the 
machine’. And Marx considers labours that are not reducible to this logic — immaterial 
labours with high professional autonomy — and notes that these labours in his time 
concern a very small part of the use of labour power. What would happen if, historically, 
this share was gaining importance in the capital accumulation process? The model of the 
automatic workshop would be called into question, and with it the abstract labour time 
standard that enables the measurement and comparison of labour. This is the starting 
point of the criticism of the theory of the labour time value [la théorie de la valeur temps 
de travail] in the approach of cognitive capitalism. 
In other words, he argues that like Marx who ignored conception since it was negligible in 
his time, CCT should ignore execution, as it is increasingly becoming marginalised in 
contemporary capitalism. It is argued, however, that this does not amount to the rejection of 
the validity of the law of value: 
To put it otherwise, in the approach of cognitive capitalism, the separation between 
conception labour and execution labour is to understand it [the law of value] as the 
result of the historical process leading to the real subsumption of labour to capital during 
industrial capitalism, the process (never completely finished) which finds a form of 
culmination during the Fordist period; it is by no means a premise from which this 
approach [of cognitive capitalism] would base a radical critique of the notion of the 
“Marxist” law of value that would serve to provide a disconnected alternative. It is only 
the interpretation [of the law as] “the theory of the labour time value” which is disputed 
in a setting where, by nature, and as contemplated elsewhere in Fine et al. (2010), the 
inseparability between cognitive and physical forms of work becomes the norm. 
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interestingly, “the ‘Law of value’ is not explicitly defined in Marx’s work”. Nor is the 
law defined in the works of cognitive capitalism theorists. Notably, however, Negri 
and his followers have been using this term frequently since as early as 1978.163 
Hardt and Negri (2004, p. 145), for whom the law of value is first and foremost 
about imposing a measure,164 say: 
According to this law of value [emphasis added], which defines capitalist 
production, value is expressed in measurable, homogeneous units of labour 
time. … This law, however, cannot be maintained today in the form that 
Smith, Ricardo, and Marx himself conceived it. The temporal unity of labour 
as the basic measure of value today makes no sense.  
For Corsani et al. (2001, p. 16), the law of value is at the core of Marxist political 
economy, and therefore the crisis of the law of value reveals a more fundamental 
crisis, the crisis of the entire political economy (based on the law of value): “The 
categories of political economy (trade, value, ownership, production, consumption, 
labour, etc …) are in crisis”. 
Despite the lack of definition, an example provided by Vercellone (2007, pp. 33-34) 
suggests that the law of value, 165  for the proponents of CCT, refers to the 
determination of value by labour time and the determination of price by value: 
The time of labour directly dedicated to the production of commodities 
intensive in knowledge becomes insignificant; or, to put it in the language of 
neoclassical economy theory, where the marginal costs of reproduction are 
practically nothing or extremely low, these commodities should be given for 
free.  
In this example, the value of commodities in a knowledge-intensive sector is 
considered to be close to zero because the labour time expended to produce each 
commodity is very little as is the case with information commodities (see Chapter 3). 
                                                
163 For example, Negri (1991, p. 24) speaks of “money as the crisis of the law of value”. 
According to Caffentzis (2005, p. 91), “the phrase [the law of value] is not in common use 
outside of the pages of post-Marx Marxist and Soviet-era economists”. 
164 On the other hand, “The law of value also takes a … form, which regards the value of 
labour as a figure of antagonism, as the subject of an open and ever present rupture in the 
system rather than an element of equilibrium” (Hardt & Negri, 2009, p. 314). 
165 Vercellone (2007, p. 16) uses “the law of value-labour” instead, to distinguish the value 
created by commodity-producing labour in industrial capitalism from the new value created 
by cognitive labour in cognitive capitalism (value-knowledge). In this chapter, we use 
industrial-value (old value) and cognitive-value (new value). 
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In reality, however, such commodities as software166 and microprocessors are sold at 
the price far higher than their marginal cost or direct labour time expended per 
output. Such divergence is seen as revealing that the law of value is in crisis in the 
sense that value no longer governs the determination of price.167 
Despite the putative crisis of the law of value due to the expansion of the role of 
knowledge in commodity production, value remains a central category of cognitive 
capitalism and labour the source of wealth, even if value and wealth in cognitive 
capitalism cannot be taken as the same value and wealth in industrial capitalism: 
“Labour does remain the fundamental source of value in capitalist production, that 
does not change” (Hardt & Negri, 2004, p 145); “Labour, particularly in the form of 
knowledge, remains nevertheless the principal source of the creation of wealth, but 
it can no longer be measured on the basis of labour time directly dedicated to 
production” (Vercellone, 2007, p. 30); “The main source of value now lies in the 
creativity, versatility and strength — invention of employees — and not in capital 
assets and in the work of execution” (Negri & Vercellone, 2007, para. 32); Moulier-
Boutang (2012, p. 4) asks, “Are we … going to remain obstinately stuck to the 
perspective of the value of working time, of the utility or scarcity of resources, in 
order to measure a wealth that depends on the time of life and on the 
superabundance of knowledge?” It goes without saying that labour time is not a 
good measure of knowledge, the product of cognitive labour. First, the distinction 
between labour time and non-labour time is becoming unclear in knowledge labour. 
Ideas flash through mind and workers can continue to think at home. Second, and 
more importantly, a given amount of labour time can lead to either a useless idea or 
an epoch-changing idea. Whilst it is more likely that better and/or more knowledge 
is produced if more cognitive labour-time is expended, labour time is not a decisive 
factor in evaluating the economic benefit of knowledge.168 Consequently, in cognitive 
                                                
166 For Moulier-Boutang (2012, p. 68), software production is on the basis of “a cognitive 
division of labour”:  
In as much as it is a production of knowledge through knowledge that has been acquired, 
interpreted and contextualised, the development of software (for example) derives from 
a cognitive division of labour and not from a Smithies division of labour. 
167 In this respect, Vercellone’s view has some affinity with the monopoly price approach. 
168 Similarly, Moulier-Boutang (2012, p. 165) says: 
In a society where production operates through the living and is geared to creating the 
living (bio-production and biopolitics) and living knowledge by means of the activity of 
living knowledge, the measuring of working time goes into crisis. Doubly so, in fact. On 
the one hand, the classic system of working time has now become largely porous. The 
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capitalism, either a new measure of cognitive-value is required or the notion of 
measure should be abandoned.169 
Unfortunately, however, CCT only demands that a new value theory be developed, 
but does not take on this task itself. In addition, the quantitative aspect of the new 
cognitive-value is simply ignored. It is not only that the determination of the 
magnitude of cognitive-value is not explained, but it is even unclear if the new 
cognitive-value, or the value of the ‘common’ in the language of Hardt and Negri, 
determines the price of commodity and/or knowledge. Furthermore, the qualitative 
equivalence between different types of cognitive labour and of knowledge is not 
questioned.170 For the proponents, this is not a weakness because homogenisation is 
seen to be unnecessary. Given that social wealth in cognitive capitalism is 
represented by the abundance of use values, different types of cognitive labour and 
different types of knowledge do not have to be homogenised. Nor do their 
magnitudes have to be expressed by a single intrinsic measure. Negri and his 
followers are even hostile to the notion of measure. For example, Hardt and Negri 
(2004, p. 153) criticise that “economics has evolved as a theory of the measure”, 
being “really completely fixed and static”. Measure is also seen to be impossible: 
“One can no longer hope to find any natural units of measure” (p. 156). This point is 
repeated most clearly by Virno (2007, p. 6) who says, “[the models of social 
knowledge] are not units of measure; they constitute the immeasurable 
presupposition of heterogeneous operative possibilities”. According to Caffentzis 
                                                                                                                                     
labour code is felt by employers (and sometimes even by employees) as simultaneously 
too restrictive and too lax. What does it mean to do 35 hours of mental work per week? 
What is the meaning of a system that measures productive output only in terms of the 
final product and does not measure it in relation to the products of an activity that 
requires continuous preparation, updating and training, and a joint sharing of things? 
169 Hence, it is argued that capital strives to impose a new measure: 
Contemporary attempts to reinvent measure in terms of market values, goodwill, 
intangible assets, and the like demonstrate the inadequacy of the law of value for 
measuring productivity, but they do indicate a real change in the nature of productive 
power, which is still based on labour. (Hardt & Negri, 2009, p. 316) 
170 Virno (2007, p. 6) mentions abstract knowledge: for example, “the fact that social 
relations are ordered by abstract knowledge rather than the exchange of equivalents”. 
However, he neither defines abstract knowledge nor analyses real social processes that 
establish a qualitative equivalence between different (concrete) knowledges. The scale and 
scope of knowledge trade, which is distinct from commodity exchange, is certainly rapidly 
increasing, and we may say that abstract homogenous knowledge is formed out of this 
generalised knowledge exchange, with the economic value of knowledge being expressed in 
the money form. 
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(2005, p. 96), “the value they [Hardt and Negri] cherish and refer to … is both 
immeasurable and beyond measure”. In short, for the proponents of CCT, labour 
remains the source of wealth in cognitive capitalism, but in fundamentally different 
ways than in industrial capitalism. 
This suggests that (cognitive-)value in cognitive capitalism is more similar to use 
value than to (industrial-)value. According to Vercellone (2007, p. 34), wealth in 
cognitive capitalism is based on “abundance and use value [emphasis added], and 
therefore on free appropriation”. In addition, social knowledge, collaboration and 
co-operation are seen to play a far more important role in wealth creation than 
commodity-producing labour in cognitive capitalism. In the same vein, Hardt and 
Negri (2004, p. 150) argue, “we must understand the production of value in terms of 
the common [emphasis added]”.171 Monnier and Vercellone (2014) attempts to 
redefine and extend the concept of productive labour accordingly:172 
The concept of productive labour as labour that produces use value, a wealth 
that escapes market logic and wage relations subjected to capital [emphasis 
added]. In short, it regards questioning the assimilation of the concept of 
labour and the concept of employment and strongly affirming that labour can 
be unproductive in terms of capital while producing non-market wealth and 
therefore giving rise to income that is in turn, economically and socially 
significant. (p. 67) 
With the focus of analysis being placed on use value, a lot of factors contributing to 
the (re)production of use value including labour power are necessarily brought into 
                                                
171 “We define the common as the potential of expanding social cooperation which attends 
the paradigmatic transformation of productive forces and the prominence of new forms of 
labour in contemporary capitalism such as the increasingly socialised production of 
knowledge [emphasis added]. Consequently the common is not relegated to specific 
common goods such as water, for example. Conversely the naturalistic approach leads to a 
subordinate position that is not able to overcome the public-private dichotomy. In Toni 
Negri’s recent writings, the common refers to a form of socialisation that breaks down the 
former divisions between work and life, between production and reproduction, and between 
material and immaterial” (Lucarelli & Vercellone, 2011, p. 79). 
172 Similarly, Morini (2007, p. 44) says: 
In areas where there is a greater diffusion of cognitive capitalism our comprehensive 
action becomes, ever more glaringly, productive labour. A characteristic peculiar to 
current production is indeed the use of our ability for creation, reaction and 
relationships. These are the linguistic and cooperative exchanges: the precarious person 
becomes part of a network of relationships and in fact has no sense of consistency 
outside of these. Personal, social and communicational identities identify with each 
other in a sort of short circuit. 
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the analysis, not least unpaid life activities of men, often called free labour, 
especially in the context of housework: “Life itself is put to work and the role of 
working relations is emphasised, directly incorporated within the productive 
activity. Thus, economic management assumes as its object living life rather than 
static life” (Morini & Fumagalli, 2010, p. 236). Consequently, in the stage of 
“biocapitalism” (p. 235),173 which is “a process of accumulation that not only is 
founded on the exploitation of knowledge but of the entirety of human faculties, 
from relational-linguistic to affective-sensorial”, the distinction between labour and 
non-labour becomes even more loose and the question of remuneration of such 
activities is raised. 
The expansion of free labour goes hand in hand with its subordination to 
value-producing social labour since these tendencies push toward a blurring 
of the separation between labour and non-labour as well as blurring the 
sphere of production and that of reproduction. (Monnier & Vercellone, 2014, 
p. 67) 
In addition, inevitably, there is now a multiplicity of theories of (use) value:174 
It is necessary to subdivide the analysis in three phases: value generated by 
the diffusion of knowledge, namely linguistic-cognitive labour (knowledge 
theory of value); value generated by affective and reproductive labour (affect 
theory of value); value generated by symbolic and imaginary labour, 
                                                
173 Biocapitalism also entails “the shift from a production of money by means of commodity 
(M-C-M’) to a production of money by means of the commodification of bios [M-C(bios)-M’] 
has modified the mode of production and the process of exploitation” (Morini & Fumagalli, 
2010, p. 239). 
174 It is striking that Lucarelli and Fumagalli (2008) refers to economies of scale and 
increasing returns to scale, defined in terms of use value, whilst discussing the role of 
knowledge: 
Cognitive capitalism (CC) has generated two new economies of scale [emphasis added] 
that have a positive impact on the nature of production returns and therefore on 
productivity. On the one hand we have dynamic economies of learning (learning by 
doing, learning by using, etc.) strictly depending on the characteristics of information 
and communication technologies; on the other, we have new spatial economies, related 
to the existing network and capabilities that affect a given territory and are able to 
increase diffusion of knowledge. (p. 78) 
Due to the fact that it is not exhausted by consumption, the cumulativeness of knowledge 
and the speed of its diffusion necessarily imply increasing returns to scale [emphasis 
added]. 
By contrast, “In the Fordist context, the evolution of productivity depends upon the 
evolution of the techniques of production, on the investment flow, and on the presence of 
static (size) scale economies [emphasis added]” (p. 75)  
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especially in the process of branding (image theory of value). (Morini & 
Fumagalli, 2010, p. 241) 
There is no reason why there should and can be only three theories of value.175 Each 
and every aspect of life contributes to the production of wealth in its own peculiar 
way, each requiring a specific theory of value. Where homogenisation is considered 
unnecessary and even impossible, the categorisation of essentially heterogeneous 
activities into knowledge, affect, image, and many more is meaningless. Then, 
despite the narrower and more economic focus of CCT, it is back to Hardt and 
Negri’s original conception of biopolitical society. 
In addition, in terms of use value production, everything contributes to the 
production of everything else, either directly or indirectly, and either positively or 
negatively. Hence, for the proponents of CCT, drawing a solid line between factors of 
production which are remunerated and life activities which are not is doomed to 
failure. As Hardt and Negri (2009, p. 317) argue, “In the biopolitical context, value 
overflows any threshold of political and economic control … [biopolitical exceeding] 
overflows the barriers that the tradition of modern political economy built to control 
labour power and the production of value”. Whilst they suggest that a new theory of 
value is required, they therefore ask themselves, “will it really be a theory of value?” 
(p. 316).176 
4.5. The general intellect 
Although not directly related to the (mis)interpretation of value theory in CCT, we 
touch upon the topic of the general intellect in this section, not least because it is 
argued to represent the new form of the capitalist division of labour in cognitive 
capitalism. In particular, this section is concerned with the argument that the 
general intellect which Marx presents (for the first and only time) in the Grundrisse 
anticipates the re-appropriation of the role of knowledge production by workers, 
often suggested as strong evidence that Marx shares the CCT view and anticipates 
                                                
175 Fumagalli (2010, p. 53) also speaks of “bio-economic value”. 
176 As Toms (2008, p. 435) observes:  
Without a theory of profit creation, there can also be no theory of profit distribution. 
Without a theory of profit, there can be no theory of rent, nor a theory of price or market 
competition. Of course, immeasurability implies that all these theories are now surplus 
to the requirements of a value theory that only requires us to acknowledge there is a 
power to act and with it comes an associated excess or social surplus. 
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the advent of cognitive capitalism.177  
We will criticise this argument by showing that the general intellect refers to social 
knowledge in general, if not in a narrower sense, knowledge objectified in fixed 
capital. We will briefly review some passages of the Grundrisse related to the 
general intellect, also known as the Fragment on machines (‘Fragment’), which is a 
misnomer according to Haug (2010). The aim is both to summarise the 
interpretation of these passages in CCT, and criticise it.  
In the Fragment, Marx argues that with the rapid development of science and 
technology, at some point, labour time can cease to be the measure of value:  
In the degree in which large-scale industry develops, the creation of real 
wealth becomes less dependent upon labour time and the quantity of labour 
employed than upon the power of the agents set in motion during labour time. 
And their power—their POWERFUL EFFECTIVENESS—in turn bears no relation to 
the immediate labour time which their production costs, but depends, rather, 
upon the general level of development of science and the progress of 
technology, or on the application of science to production. (The development 
of science itself, especially of natural science, and with it of all the other 
sciences, is, in turn, related to the development of material production.) E.g. 
agriculture becomes mere application of the science of the exchange of 
matter—in terms of how that exchange can be regulated to the maximum 
advantage of the social body as a whole … Once this transformation has taken 
place, it is neither the immediate labour performed by man himself, nor the 
time for which he works, but the appropriation of his own general productive 
                                                
177 For Heinrich (2013, p. 203), however, “the path from the Grundrisse to Capital witnesses 
not only transformations of individual aspects, but also of the fundamental conceptual 
questions”. He argues that Marx’s analysis, in the Grundrisse, of the decreasing role of 
labour in the production of real wealth, of the growing contradiction between real wealth 
production and value production pointing to the eventual collapse of capitalism, and of the 
notion of the general intellect, was superseded by the concept of relative surplus value in 
Capital (pp. 212-213): 
In the treatment of the ‘concept of relative surplus value’ in Chapter Twelve [of the first 
volume of Capital], Marx speaks of the ‘riddle’ with which one of the founders of political 
economy, Quesnay, had tormented his opponents and for which they owed him an 
answer: namely, the fact that, on the one hand, capitalists were only interested in 
exchange value; but that, on the other hand, they constantly sought to lower the 
exchange value of their products. Marx also could not provide an answer to this riddle in 
the Grundrisse. There, he had effectively named the contradiction nominated by 
Quesnay. But rather than resolving it, he had comprehended it as a contradiction of 
capital. … In the Grundrisse, Marx had ascribed to this ‘contradiction’ a potential to 
overthrow the capitalist mode of production. In Capital, against the background of the 
analysis of the production of relative surplus value, this contradiction is resolved: the 
capitalist is not interested in the absolute value of the commodity, but rather, merely in 
surplus value contained within it and able to be realised by means of sale.  
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power, his comprehension of Nature and domination of it by virtue of his 
being a social entity—in a word, the development of the social individual—that 
appears as the cornerstone of production and wealth. (CW29, pp. 90-91) 
Consequently: 
Production based upon exchange value collapses [emphasis added], and the 
immediate material production process itself is stripped of its form of 
indigence and antagonism. Free development of individualities, and hence not 
the reduction of necessary labour time in order to posit surplus labour, but in 
general the reduction of the necessary labour of society to a minimum, to 
which then corresponds the artistic, scientific, etc., development of 
individuals, made possible by the time thus set free and the means produced 
for all of them. (p. 91) 
Given that it is capital which strives to develop science and technology without limit, 
and therefore reduces the role of labour in the production of real (material) wealth, 
“capital itself is a contradiction-in-process” (p. 91). Put differently, capital, as the 
productive powers, “make the creation of wealth (relatively) independent of the 
labour time” (p. 92), on the one hand,178 and, as the relations of production, it tries 
“to confine them within the limits necessary to maintain as value the value already 
created”, on the other hand. The productive powers and the relations of production, 
“two different aspects of the development of the social individual”, and hence a 
developed form of the dual nature of the commodity, necessarily clash with each 
other; “they are the material conditions for exploding that basis”. 
Once this well-known conclusion is drawn, Marx steps back and considers the 
meaning of the development of fixed capital. 
The development of fixed capital shows the degree to which society’s general 
science, KNOWLEDGE, has become an immediate productive force, and hence 
the degree to which the conditions of the social life process itself have been 
brought under the control of the GENERAL INTELLECT and remoulded according 
to it. It shows the degree to which the social productive forces are produced 
not merely in the form of knowledge but as immediate organs of social 
praxis [emphasis added], of the actual life process. (CW29, p. 92)  
The passage quoted above makes it abundantly clear that Marx equates the 
                                                
178 For Caffentzis (2008, p. 61), because of this, which he calls the “incommensurability 
tendency”, “the labour theory of value is increasingly falsified”. He also argues that the 
incommensurability tendency is interconnected with the law of the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall (LTRPF). 
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development of fixed capital with the appropriation of knowledge, especially science 
and technology, by capitalists, for the purposes of commodity production. 
Knowledge, produced by the general intellect, increasingly takes the form of fixed 
capital, “immediate organs of social praxis” and therefore becomes an “immediate 
productive force” of social labour. Marx’s emphasis is, then, on knowledge becoming 
increasingly associated with commodity production. 
For the proponents of CCT, by contrast, the general intellect is the totality of living 
knowledge. For Vercellone (2007, p. 33), “living knowledge” clashes with “dead 
knowledge” in cognitive capitalism, in which the capitalist division of labour takes a 
new form, “the historical emergence of the figure of the collective worker of the 
general intellect” (p. 30). He also speaks of the “overturn[ing of] the relation of 
subordination of the living knowledge incorporated in labour power to the dead 
knowledge incorporated in fixed capital” (p. 18) and argues that with the general 
intellect, “Marx announces the advent, after the stages of formal and real 
subsumption of labour to capital, of a new stage of development of the division of 
labour” (p. 19). Virno (2007, p. 6) suggests mass intellectuality, “the entirety of post-
Fordist living labour”, as “the prominent form in which the general intellect is 
manifest today”. Similarly, Hardt and Negri (2009, p. 267) say, “In today’s economy, 
in contrast, knowledge that is widespread across society—mass intellectuality—is 
becoming a central productive force, out of reach of the system of control, and this 
shift undermines the industrial paradigm”. Whilst Moulier-Boutang (2012, p. 162) 
rightly associates the general intellect with “the development of science becom[ing] 
the force of production par excellence”, but his focus is not on science as the force of 
production, but on “exploitation of the inventive force of living labour [emphasis 
added]”.179 For Morini and Fumagalli (2010, p. 238), “This general intellect is the 
new source of (surplus) value … Every singularity becomes a ‘knot’ in the network of 
collective intelligences, that organically connect economic and desiring flows”. 
Such interpretation of the Fragment in which the general intellect is equated with 
living knowledge vis-à-vis knowledge objectified in fixed capital, or dead knowledge, 
is highly questionable. Clearly, as we have seen, with the concept of the general 
intellect, Marx draws attention to the increasing (free) appropriation of knowledge 
by capital for commodity production in the form of fixed capital. Virno (2007, p. 5) 
                                                
179 For more on the interpretations of the general intellect within cognitive capitalism theory, 
see Haug (2010). 
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also admits this point: “According to Marx, the general intellect — that is knowledge 
as the main productive force — fully coincides with fixed capital, that is the 
‘scientific power’ objectified in the system of machinery”.180 He, however, suggests 
going beyond Marx by extending the concept of the general intellect to encompass 
“formal and informal knowledge, imagination, ethical inclinations, mentalities and 
‘language-games’”, although his emphasis is on informal knowledge embodied in 
living labour. Hence, “General intellect needs to be understood literally as intellect 
in general: the faculty of thought, rather than the works produced by thought (a 
book, an algebraic formula, etc.)” (p. 6). 
In the Fragment, instead, Marx envisions a society where labour remains to be 
necessary for the creation of real wealth although playing only a minor role.181 In 
such a society, production of real wealth, i.e. use values, will be dependent more on 
the state of science and technology rather than on total direct labour time. The 
Fragment is, then, about the contradiction between the powers of production and 
the relations of production in capitalism. He argues that capital pushes the 
development of the powers of production to the limit to the extent that it comes into 
conflict with the capitalist relations of production. Marx does not, however, mention 
counter-tendencies which are also consequences of the development of the 
productive powers (e.g. the expansion of commodity production in diversity) in the 
same passages. Further, with his focus on knowledge objectified in fixed capital, 
Marx does not give much attention to knowledge of workers, which is formed out of 
the mutually contradictory processes of deskilling and re-skilling.182 As is the case 
                                                
180 Vercellone (2007, p. 27) disagrees with Virno: “Our interpretation diverges from that of 
Paolo Virno, according to which Marx identifies the general intellect with fixed capital in 
toto, in contrast to the way that the same general intellect presents itself as living labour”. 
181 According to Smith (2013, p. 7): “Marx … expected that the general intellect could develop 
to this point only within communism. He did not foresee capitalism’s transformation into a 
system in which the ‘principal productive force’ was the general intellect in the form of mass 
intellectuality”. 
182 In the same vein, Smith (2013, pp. 15-16) says:  
Virno and Vercellone are correct to stress the tendency to reduce workers to mere 
appendages of machine systems in the period from Marx’s day through Fordism, and the 
resulting tendency for individual workers to be alienated from the scientific-technical 
knowledge embodied in them. These tendencies are objective material realities, 
experienced as such by individual workers. But the account in Capital also implies that 
the workforce as a whole simultaneously developed new capacities and new forms of 
knowledge in the course of its practical experience. An exclusive focus on ‘deskilling’ in 
this period oversimplifies Marx’s position. Such an exclusive focus understates the extent 
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with the nature of tendencies in the LTRPF (and counteracting tendencies), it is not 
possible to predict the outcome of the interplay of such contradictory tendencies.183 
4.6. Concluding remarks 
For the proponents of CCT, the dual nature of the commodity is the result of the 
separation between conception and execution, the imposition of time as the measure 
of labour. In other words, commodities are use values regardless of time and place, 
upon which social relations, organised around the division of labour in terms of 
knowledge production, can be imposed or not. For this reason, the struggle over 
knowledge is essentially the struggle over power (Vercellone, 2007, pp. 13-14). 
Knowledge is, then, the epicentre of class struggle.  
The proponents argue that with the emergence of cognitive capitalism as the 
hegemonic form of labour, the role of knowledge production is being appropriated 
by workers, and capitalists are therefore required to devise new mechanisms of class 
struggle, e.g. intellectual property rights, to continue to appropriate surplus 
products, although in a different form to surplus value.184 
This, then, raises the question of how to define surplus and the extent of the new 
type of exploitation. Dispensing with the value dimension, cognitive capitalism 
theorists face a daunting task: they must either discard the need for an economic 
theory given the alleged immeasurability of cognitive labours, or develop a new 
value theory on a par with Marx’s value theory, essentially a social theory in the 
                                                                                                                                     
to which the general intellect was already ‘diffused’ at the time of the industrial 
revolution, that is, not monopolised by a small group of scientific-technological experts. 
183  Caffentzis (2008) seeks to explain the relation between “the incommensurability 
tendency” and the LTRPF, but mistakenly equates the former with the transformation of 
commodity values into prices of production:  
In the transformation of commodity values into prices of production the 
incommensurability thesis is preserved and finally made compatible with the falling rate 
of profit tendency. If the value-to-price-of-production transformation did not occur, the 
high organic composition industries would suffer from inadequate profit rates and would 
be unable to develop into a hegemonic presence in production. Indeed, the 
transformation makes it possible for there to be electricity-generating nuclear power 
plants that successfully realise an average rate of profit (on the basis of an enormous 
investment in fixed and circulating capital) even though the workers within them create 
a tiny fraction of the surplus value created by workers in a typical sweatshop. (pp. 63-64) 
184 As long as the relations between capital and labour are expressed through wage and 
profit, the new form of the division of labour is within capitalism (Monnier & Vercellone, 
2014, p. 62). 
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form of an economic theory. In case of the former, the economic analysis of social 
reproduction would no longer be possible, which is not an option, given that CCT 
aspires to be an economic theory of contemporary capitalism. On the other hand, it 
looks, however, very unlikely that the latter can be achieved unless they manage to 
find a common element with which all things in the world can be brought into a 
single quantitative dimension, other than the concept of utility in neoclassical 
economics. In short, cognitive capitalism theory, with its rejection of the validity of 
Marx’s value theory in contemporary capitalism, has no option but reverting back to 
an economics of use value.  
However, unfortunately, they are caught in their own snare: with the prevalence of 
becoming common, everything is related to everything else, rendering the task of 
identifying factors contributing to a product and, therefore, developing a consistent 
and coherent theory of the formation of price, let alone value and price theory 
themselves, almost impossible. Considering the flourishing of publications related to 
cognitive capitalism, they seem to bypass all these difficulties by simply focusing on 
intellectual property rights and basic income (see the next chapter). But this should 
not be viewed as indicating that their theoretical adventure is successful. 
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5. Intellectual property rights and rent theory 
5.1. Introduction 
Marshall (1920, Book V, Chapter IX) explains the difference between rent, quasi 
rent, and interest by way of supposing an imaginary meteoric stone which is “harder 
than diamonds” (V.IX.8). 185  When this stone is used for the production of 
commodities requiring cutting of metal or stone, the productivity of labour is 
significantly higher than when using diamonds which is the second best production 
method in terms of productivity. Marshall considers three cases. 
First, a few thousand stones fall from the sky and they are all picked up at once by a 
few people. They are so hard and not affected by wear and tear, so that they can be 
used an unlimited number of times for the production of commodities. The owners 
of the stones benefit from a permanent increase in productivity and producer 
surplus. Alternatively, they can loan the stones to other firms and charge as much as 
the reduced production cost per unit (rent). 
Second, not all stones are recovered at once but “scattered over the surface of the 
earth on public ground, and that a laborious search might expect to be rewarded by 
finding one here and there” (V.IX.13). The stones are hard enough and use of them 
in production does not cause wear and tear as in the first case. Those who put efforts 
into searching for the stones and manage to recover some would see their 
productivities go up (as long as the expected cost reduction per unit is greater than 
the search cost per unit) although the increase in productivity will eventually be 
generalised once all firms make use of the stones. As in the first case, the stones can 
alternatively be obtained from existing owners (quasi rent).  
Third, the stones are not hard enough and are soon destroyed once used in 
production. In addition, there is “an inexhaustible store” (V.IX.14) of these stones, 
so supply is unlimited and the price of the stones is kept constant (interest or 
normal profit). Given that the stones are better than diamonds, all competing firms 
have no choice but to use the stones unless the stones are too expensive. However, 
none of them would enjoy any competitive advantage by using the stones as 
everybody has access to this advanced technology. 
                                                
185 See also Dooley (1991). 
132 
Marshall uses this analogy to consider the effects of the presence of fixed cost and 
fixed supply on the price of a means of production. Without going into detail, 
however, suffice it to say that the stones in the three cases correspond to land, 
capital goods with a fixed supply in the short term and raw materials, and yield rent, 
quasi rent and interest (normal profit), respectively. 
These three cases provide a neat framework to assess different types of benefit 
which knowledge can bring to its producer. First, as we have seen in Chapter 3, 
knowledge allows for the virtual multiplication of commodity-producing labour. A 
capitalist making use of better knowledge than the sectoral average realises an extra 
surplus value, and if imitation of knowledge is strictly prohibited, and thus the 
knowledge is monopolised, the extra surplus value is perpetuated as long as the 
knowledge is not rendered obsolete by new knowledge. The capitalist can also 
choose to license the knowledge to his competitors. He can charge a lump sum 
licence fee and/or a royalty fee (per unit) for the use of knowledge.  
Second, in case it is permitted to produce similar knowledge (or knowledge with 
similar productivity effects as the original knowledge), the monopoly effect lasts for 
only a limited period of time. Extra surplus value vanishes as soon as the once-
innovative knowledge becomes generalised due either to imitation of the original 
knowledge within the sector or the end of temporary legal protection of knowledge. 
This does not mean that knowledge becomes readily available to everybody after a 
certain period of time. Followers should still invest time and effort to produce 
similar knowledge, and they may choose to obtain a licence from the original 
inventor instead and even to get consulting services to integrate knowledge with 
their production processes, given that knowledge cannot be perfectly codified and 
involves absorption costs (Foray, 2004, pp. 95-96). In any case, because the 
economic benefit from new, innovative knowledge can be significant, and such 
knowledge can sometimes be a source of huge competitive advantage, capitalists 
strive to produce knowledge. In addition, as knowledge becomes generalised 
eventually and can become rendered obsolete by new knowledge, leading capitalists 
also continue to innovate to strive to be ahead of competitors. 
Third, knowledge is freely available. In this case, knowledge is considered a natural 
force such as air flow and solar energy which should be applied in the production 
process using “complementary assets” (Foray, 2004, p. 98) such as related 
technologies and workers with scientific and technological knowledge (e.g. wind 
power needs to be extracted from air flow and sunlight should be absorbed using 
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solar panels to turn solar energy to useful energy).186 As is the case with natural 
forces, free knowledge is so prevalent that we do not usually notice its presence. For 
example, in most countries, electricity is taken for granted as much as sunlight. Of 
course, electricity is a commodity, but none pays for knowledge related to the 
generation of electricity and even its existence is rarely acknowledged. 
This type of classification can go further. For example, knowledge can be either 
perfectly monopolised, with its imitation or diffusion being completely blocked 
through technical and/or legal means, or freely available. Knowledge can also either 
be readily usable once obtained or require significant adaptation and absorption 
efforts including education, training, and process alterations.187 Most knowledge 
probably sits between the two extremes both in terms of excludability and 
absorption cost. We may therefore classify all possible configurations into a number 
of categories,188 considering the three cases we have reviewed only as examples, and 
                                                
186 “The properties of steam always existed. Its industrial usefulness is a new scientific 
discovery which the capitalist has appropriated. As a consequence of this scientific discovery, 
the productivity of labour and with it relative surplus value rose. In other words, the quantity 
of unpaid labour which the capitalist appropriated from a day’s labour grew with the aid of 
steam. The difference between the productive power of steam and that of the soil is thus only 
that the one yields unpaid labour to the capitalist and the other to the landowner, who does 
not take it away from the worker, but from the capitalist. The capitalist is therefore so 
enthusiastic about this element ‘belonging to no one’” (CW31, p. 278). 
187 “Winter (1987) made a significant advance by recognising that knowledge, and hence 
corporate knowledge, is a more complex object than the simple dichotomy between codified 
and tacit suggests. He noted that for many purposes, what matters is the extent to which 
knowledge can be transferred or imitated. Accordingly, Winter (1987) developed a taxonomy 
whereby he distinguished among eight pairs of attributes of knowledge: articulable or tacit; 
teachable or unteachable; articulated or nonarticulated; observable or nonobservable; simple 
or complicated; system-independent or system-dependent; context-independent or context-
dependent; monodisciplinary or transdisciplinary. The first element of each pair denotes 
forms of knowledge that make it easier to transfer across individuals or organizations, while 
the second makes transferability more difficult” (Arora et al., 2001, p. 96). 
188 As Marshall (1920) says in the context of his imaginary stone parable, the difference 
between rent, quasi rent and interest (normal profit) is “only one of degree” (V.IX.21): 
The difference [among the three cases] is fundamental, but it is only one of degree. 
Biology tends to show that the animal and vegetable kingdoms have a common origin. 
But yet there are fundamental differences between mammals and trees; while in a 
narrower sense the differences between an oak tree and an apple tree are fundamental; 
and so are in a still narrower sense those between an apple tree and a rose bush, though 
they are both classed as rosaceæ. Thus our central doctrine is that interest on free capital 
and quasi rent on an old investment of capital shade into one another gradually; even the 
rent of land being not a thing by itself, but the leading species of a large genus. 
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attach an economic concept to each. For example, we may say knowledge yields 
monopoly rent in the first case and monopoly profit in the second case, the key 
difference between them being the presence of legal protections. And by doing so, 
we can internalise knowledge into the framework of existing theories, with the study 
of the specificity of knowledge relegated to relatively micro level analyses. 
However, this type of static and technical/legal understanding of rent (or monopoly 
profit) is not sufficient in the sense that it cannot go beyond stating that (a portion 
of) surplus profit is appropriated by some people for some technical and legal 
reasons. In addition, it applies across all sectors of the economy, necessarily 
abstracting from qualitative differences between sectors in terms of use of 
knowledge and reliance on intellectual property rights.  
It is against this background that we engage once more with the Controversy, both 
the monopoly price approach and the cost approach, and with cognitive capitalism 
theory, focusing on their interpretations of Marx’s theory of rent and the ways they 
bring rent and intellectual property rights into the analysis. But Section 2 begins by 
reviewing Marx’s theory of rent, drawing on Ben Fine’s contribution to the 
development of Marxist theory of rent, so that we can have a solid foundation for 
assessment of these theories. In short, there is no general theory of rent in Marx. 
Although Marx’s analysis of ground rent in Part 6 of the third volume of Capital 
might be useful for developing a theory of knowledge and of intellectual property 
rights in particular, imposing Marx’s category of ground rent on knowledge, more 
specifically on licence and royalty fees, should be avoided because this blurs the 
essential differences between landed property and intellectual property despite 
(superficial) similarities between them. In the Controversy, which is discussed in 
Section 3, one of the fiercely debated topics is whether the huge difference between 
the price and (individual) value of information commodities, in the presence of 
intellectual property rights, should be viewed as (monopoly) rent or not, which 
developed into a debate on the purpose and scope of Marx’s theory of ground rent. 
In Section 4, we criticise CCT’s claim that profit is increasingly becoming rent in 
contemporary cognitive capitalism. We demonstrate that this is based on CCT’s 
flawed interpretation of Marx’s value theory, especially the concept of profit. More 
fundamentally, it is not only that CCT is becoming a use value theory, as suggested 
in Chapter 4, but the distribution theory of CCT is on the basis of factor 
contribution, which is apparent in its reliance on the concept of externalities. 
Section 5 concludes the chapter. 
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5.2. Marx’s theory of ground rent189 
Whilst the existence of landed property as such is the necessary condition for 
appropriating a portion of surplus value as ground rent, Marx, in his analysis of 
ground rent, is concerned specifically with “the form of landed property 
corresponding to the capitalist mode of production” (CIII, p. 1025). This capitalist 
form of landed property was established by divorcing “all landed property from 
capital and labour”, which is, in turn, the result of “the constant tendency and law of 
development of the capitalist mode of production … to transform labour into wage-
labour and the means of production into capital”.190 The essence of the historical 
specificity of the capitalist form of landed property is that “the landowner can 
behave in relation to the land just as any commodity owner can with his 
commodities” (p. 753). In other words, “land as a condition of labour [is completely 
separated] from landed property and the landlord”. (p. 755).191 On this basis, Marx’s 
purpose of analysing this specific form of landed property is “to consider all the 
specific relationships of production and exchange that arise from the investment of 
capital on the land [emphasis added]”. More specifically, Marx is interested in 
demonstrating that this form of landed property, although it is the precondition for, 
and the result of, the capitalist mode of production itself, obstructs the development 
of “a rational agriculture” (p. 757), i.e. the capitalist form of agriculture. In this 
respect, Marx’s theory of ground rent is both an application of his value theory and a 
theory of agriculture in capitalism.192 
                                                
189 This section draws on Fine (1979, 1980b, 1982a, 1982b, 1990, 1994) and Fine and Saad-
Filho (2010, Chapter 13). See also Swyngedouw (2010). 
190 Similarly, Marx says, “The form of landed property with which we are dealing is a specific 
historical form [emphasis added], a form transformed by the intervention of capital and the 
capitalist mode of production” (CIII, p. 751). This form is historically specific in the sense 
that it “presupposes the expropriation of the rural workers from the soil and their subjection 
to a capitalist who purses agriculture for the sake of profit”. 
191 Given the historical specificity of the object of study, “there is therefore no general theory 
of rent, nor can the conclusions reached for one instance in which a rent relation exists be 
automatically applied to others” (Fine, 1979, p. 248). 
192 Fine and Saad-Filho (2010, p. 134) say: 
For Marx, private ownership of land acts as an obstacle to capital accumulation, because 
the landowners capture part of the surplus value produced in the economy. To a limited 
extent the same is true of orthodox rent theory, whether Ricardian or neoclassical. … In 
neoclassical theory, the agricultural producers pay rent because of a combination of 
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Landed property intervenes in the formation of value and price of production and 
has impacts on how capitalist investment into agriculture is organised. First, landed 
property affects the determination of the value of agricultural commodities in the 
presence of productivity differences arising from fertility differences (differential 
rent I). Productivity differences exist in all other sectors of the economy, which is a 
normal state in Marx’s understanding of competition. A market value is necessarily 
formed out of inter-sectoral competition centred on productivity, despite, and 
because of, productivity differences. Consequently, some individual capitals realise 
extra surplus value, and some realise only a part of (normal) surplus value, which 
drives all individual capitals to increase their productivities: to continue to realise 
extra surplus value in case of the leaders; and either to realise the whole surplus 
value produced or to survive in case of the followers. Hence, the tendency to 
productivity equalisation and the counter-tendency to productivity differentiation 
co-exist within a sector. Productivity differences arising from fertility differences, 
however, cannot be equalised nor, then, differentiated, and therefore there is no 
incentive for capital investment on the worst land unless the market value is set on 
the basis of the individual value of commodities produced on the worst land. In 
addition, that the worst land needs to be cultivated implies that either additional 
investments into the lands currently in use is not possible for economic and/or 
technical reasons due (partly) to landed property (e.g. restrictions to additional 
investments into existing lands) or additional investments into existing lands are 
not sufficient to produce as many commodities as the social need.193 Given that the 
owners of lands with higher fertilities demand to be compensated and there is no 
option but to cultivate the new land with the worst fertility, the market value is 
determined by the production conditions on the worst land.194 
                                                                                                                                     
private ownership and natural or technical constrains — for example, a shortage of land, 
either in overall supply or in the supply of land of better quality or location. 
By contrast: 
Marx’s starting point is the social conditions under which part of the surplus value is 
appropriated by the landowners in the form of rent. In other words, the theory of rent 
derives from the relationship between landed property and capitalist production, and 
these are, of necessity, historically specific, rather than technically given. (Fine & Saad-
Filho, 2010, pp. 134-135) 
193 “It is clear from the need to take new land into cultivation that the additional capital 
investments which yield no rent do not satisfy the demand” (CIII, p. 888). 
194  Hence, the following does not apply to the determination of the market value of 
agricultural commodities: 
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Second, landed property demotivates capital investments into the lands currently in 
use, and thereby obstructs the development of the agricultural industry as a whole 
(differential rent II). As in other industries, productivity increases in agriculture 
must go hand in hand with concentration and centralisation. Landowners, however, 
who are not necessarily interested in the progress of industry and its benefits, not 
least cheaper agricultural products and the production of relative surplus value, 
intervene and appropriate surplus profit arising from further capital investments on 
existing lands, regardless of the movement of prices of production in which these 
result, see Chapters 41-43 of Volume 3 of Capital. In other words, “they put away in 
their own private purses the result of a social development achieved without their 
participation … this is equally one of the greatest obstacles to a rational agriculture” 
(CIII, p. 757). Capitalists invest in technological development and knowledge 
production to realise surplus profit. When this incentive does not exist, due to the 
appropriation of surplus profit by landowners, there is no point in bothering with 
innovation: “The farmer avoids all improvements and outlays which are not 
expected to give their full return during the duration of his lease”.195 Consequently, 
the value of agricultural products is higher than it would have been without landed 
property. However, in case of this second form of differential rent, not all surplus 
profits arising from productivity improvements are necessarily appropriated by 
landowners due to the “change in form that involves the transfer of surplus profits 
                                                                                                                                     
It is of no assistance to say that the sale of commodities produced under the worst 
conditions shows that these are required to meet the demand. If the price were higher 
than the mean market value in the case assumed [in other words, if the worst conditions 
determine the market value], the demand would be less. At a given price, a species of 
commodity can only take up a certain area of the market; this area remains the same 
through changes in price only if the higher price coincides with a smaller quantity of 
commodities and a lower price with a greater quantity. If the demand is so strong, 
however, that it does not contract when price is determined by the value of commodities 
produced in the worst conditions, then it is these that determine the market value. This 
is possible only if demand rises above the usual level, or supply falls below this. (CIII, pp. 
279-280) 
195 This is further exacerbated by the fact that: 
As soon as the lease stipulated in the contract has expired — and this is one of the 
reasons why the landowner seeks to shorten the term of the lease to a minimum, as 
capitalist production develops — the improvements made to the land fall to the 
landowner as his property, as an inseparable accident of the substance, the land. (CIII, p. 
757) 
In addition, 
The overwhelming portion of the land used for building in England that is not sold as 
freehold is leased by the landlords for ninety-nine years, or for a shorter time if possible. 
When this period has expired, the buildings fall to the landlord, together with the land 
itself. (p. 758) 
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from the capitalist farmer to the proprietor of the land” (CIII, p. 813), which 
involves class struggle between landowners and capitalist farmers. In other words, 
in the case of differential rent II, “the limits of this transformation [of surplus profit 
into ground rent] are both narrower and unstable [than in differential rent I]”. Marx 
says: 
The rent … is fixed when the farms are leased, and the subsequent surplus 
profits arising from the successive investments of capital accrue to the farmer 
as long as the tenancy contract lasts. Hence the farmers’ battle for long 
tenancies, and conversely the increase in ‘tenancies at will’, i.e. at a year’s 
notice, given the super power of the landlord. 
In sum, as Fine (1979, p. 253) concludes: 
Whilst agriculture may not resist absolutely the capitalist form of 
development it exhibits a slow pace of progress relative to industry. This is 
perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn from Marx’s theory of 
DRII, its preoccupation with obstacles to the development of capital 
accumulation rather than the static formulation of the distribution of surplus 
value in the form of rent. 
Third, landed property sets a barrier to inter-sectoral capital movement into 
agriculture (absolute rent). 196  Due to the restrictions placed upon capital 
investments into existing lands (DRII) by landed property, the development of 
agriculture is relatively slow, with a lower organic composition of capital than in 
other sectors. If there were no barrier to capital inflow, the market prices would go 
down to the level which would give capitalists only average profit. However, landed 
property does not allow free use of land, even those with worst fertility: 
Assuming … that demand requires the taking up of new land which is, say, less 
fertile than that previously cultivated, will the owner of this land lease it for 
nothing just because the market price of its product has risen high enough for 
capital investment to pay the farmer the price of production and thus yield 
him the customary profit? In no way. The capital investment must yield him a 
rent. He leases only when a lease-price can be paid. (CIII, p. 891) 
This does not mean that a landowner can charge as much rent as he wants for a new 
lease, which is then passed on to the buyers: 
                                                
196 Absolute rent is differentiated from differential rents in that in case of the former, “landed 
property has produced this rent itself [emphasis removed]” (CIII, 889). 
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It is limited by additional capital investments on the old leaseholds [emphasis 
added], by competition from foreign agricultural products (assuming their 
free import), by competition between landed proprietors and finally by the 
need of the consumers and their ability to pay. (CIII, p. 892) 
With respect to the first limit, “additional capital investments on the old leaseholds”, 
Fine (1979, pp. 262-263) shows that assuming additional capital investments 
involve an increase in OCC at the same rate as in other sectors, absolute rent cannot 
be greater than the difference between the value and (potential) price of production 
of agricultural products. Marx also makes it clear that value limits absolute rent:197 
Even though landed property can drive the price of agricultural products 
above their price of production, it does not depend on this, but rather on the 
general state of the market, how far the market price rises above the price of 
production and towards the value [emphasis added], and to what extent, 
therefore, the surplus value produced over and above the given average profit 
in agriculture is either transformed into rent or goes into the general 
equalisation of surplus value that settles the average profit. (CIII, p. 898) 
In sum, Marx’s theory of agricultural rent reveals that the capitalist form of landed 
property, especially “large-scale landed property” (p. 948) in England (at least in 
Marx’s time), obstructs the development of large-scale agriculture, keeps the price of 
agricultural products at a higher level relative to other industries and affects 
(intensive and extensive) capitalist investments into agriculture. Necessarily, its 
scope is limited to agriculture, but Marx extends his theory of ground rent by 
applying it to buildings and mines. Whilst he considers that rent of buildings and 
rent of mines are different expressions of the same ground rent,198 he is interested 
more in specifics of each industry than in imposing existing categories on new 
industries. For example, he provides four observations specific to rent of buildings: 
This rent is characterised first by the preponderant influence that location 
exerts here on the differential rent (very important, for example, in the case of 
vineyards, and building land in big towns); secondly, by the palpable and 
                                                
197 In this respect, all three rent categories are value-determined, not value-determining. 
198 “Wherever rent [emphasis added] exists, differential rent always appears and always 
follows the same laws as it does in agriculture. Wherever natural forces can be monopolised 
and give the industrialist who makes use of them a surplus profit, whether a waterfall, a 
rich mine, fishing grounds or a well-situated building site [emphasis added], the person 
indicated as the owner of these natural objects, by virtue of his title to a portion of the earth, 
seizes this surplus profit from the functioning capital in the form of rent [emphasis added]” 
(CIII, p. 908). 
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complete passivity displayed by the owner, whose activity consists simply in 
exploiting advances in social development … towards which he does not 
contribute and in which he risks nothing, unlike the industrial capitalist; 
finally, by the prevalence of a monopoly price in many cases, and particularly 
the most shameless exploitation of poverty … the tremendous power this gives 
landed property when it is combined together with industrial capital in the 
same hands enables capital practically to exclude workers engaged in a 
struggle over wages from the very earth itself as their habitat. (CIII, p. 908) 
Fine applies Marx’s rent theory to the UK coal industry (Fine, 1990), the South 
African diamond industry and the US oil industry (Fine, 1994), see also Bina (2006) 
on the oil industry. Especially, in his analysis of the UK coal industry, Fine takes up 
the question of whether a royalty is a rent. For him as well as for Marx, rent is a 
category in which “landed property is economically realised, valorised” (CIII, 756), 
and therefore the specifics of each form of landed property should be specified and 
its impact on capital accumulation studied:  
A direct response must be given to the issue of whether a royalty is a rent or 
not. The answer is both yes and no! Yes, in so far as each represents the 
revenue that accrues to the landlord in return for capital’s access to the land 
for mining or farming. But also no, in so far as those conditions of access are 
different and must be specified in each case [emphasis added]. (Fine, 1990, p. 
50) 
Similarly: 
For agriculture, it is seen to have the effect of obstructing intensive cultivation 
of the land. For coal mining we have tried to show that the existence of private 
royalties obstructed nationalisation and mechanisation of the British industry 
in the interwar period. Thus, a prerequisite for the development of a theory of 
mining and the revenues that it generates is an examination of the empirical 
form of landed property [emphasis added] that it confronts. Thus, the 
question of whether a royalty is a rent or not is a misleading one except in so 
far as it raises the questions of the access of capital to mining as opposed to 
agriculture. Both royalty and rent are derived from something else, the 
particular intervention [emphasis added] that landed property makes in 
relation to the economy and its development. (Fine, 1982b, p. 349) 
Marx anticipated that the limited purpose and scope of his rent theory is going to be 
forgotten. Whilst ground rent is historically specific because its substance, the 
capitalist form of landed property, is historically specific, “the common character of 
the different forms of rent … leads people to overlook the distinctions” (CIII, p. 772). 
The fact that ground rent is a form of surplus value often obscures an equally critical 
aspect of ground rent, that it is appropriated by landowners from the surplus profit 
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realised by the capitalist farmers, in the presence of the capitalist form of landed 
property. And for this reason, the fundamental difference between neoclassical 
theory of rent and Marx’s theory of ground rent is often neglected, and the latter is 
deployed carelessly, without specifying the property relations which it is supposed to 
represent, as we will see in the next two sections. 
5.3. The ‘Controversy’ and intellectual property rights 
Given the emphasis placed upon the narrow, but specific, scope and purpose of 
Marx’s rent theory in the previous section, it is a foregone conclusion that Marx’s 
theory of rent cannot be applied directly to an analysis of intellectual property 
rights. Nor can Marx’s three categories of rent be transplanted into the realm of 
intellectual property rights. More fundamentally, ascribing the existence of a 
systematic mechanism by which a portion of surplus profit is appropriated to a 
category, rent or not, is not of much theoretical significance unless it is accompanied 
by a historically specific analysis of the property relations in question. 
Unfortunately, in the Controversy, the discussion about rent has been limited to 
whether the price of information commodities contains rent or not in the presence 
of intellectual property rights. Whilst this point has been fiercely debated, the 
specifics of intellectual property rights have not drawn much attention, other than 
their being the legal basis of appropriating surplus profit. 
Intellectual property rights and monopoly price (the monopoly price approach)  
In the monopoly price approach, the high price of information commodities is 
considered a monopoly price. The proponents argue that software should be 
distributed free of charge because the individual value of information (commodity) 
copies is close to zero and anyone can create a copy instantly. In other words, for 
them, software, by its nature, cannot be commodified; it is only through intellectual 
property rights that a software application becomes a commodity with a much 
higher price than its social value (zero) attached to it. According to Chae (2004a, p. 
95), “‘the prices required for the normal reproduction’ of commercial software 
products of Microsoft and [other software companies] are sustained only though 
state violence [sic] such as laws, police and judiciaries”. The fact that software can 
be commodified only this way shows: 
Obviously private property and the capitalist relations of production based on 
it, and only these, are the only barrier to the unfettered development of 
information commodities and their ‘normal reproduction’. Therefore, this is 
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also a strong piece of evidence that private property and the capitalist 
relations of production have decisively become the fetter of the development 
of the material productive powers of the society. (Chae, 2004a, p. 97) 
If intellectual property rights were abolished, monopoly price would be too, and the 
price of information commodities would be determined by value — zero. Not 
surprisingly, this approach is critical of the notion of virtual multiplication. S. Kang 
(2010, p. 144) says, “the notion of intensified [multiplied] labour can be attached to 
any commodity which has monopoly price and realise monopoly profit ex post, and 
thus results in the justification [emphasis added] of monopoly price and monopoly 
profit”. This conflates different levels of abstraction. The price of a commodity can 
be monopoly price — which is determined without respect to value — regardless of 
virtual multiplication. In addition, whereas virtual multiplication is concerned with 
the determination of value, monopoly price is a more complex concept than value: 
A genuine monopoly price … [is] determined neither by the price of 
production of the commodities nor by their value, but rather by the demand of 
the purchasers and their ability to pay, consideration of which therefore 
belongs to the theory of competition, where the actual movement of market 
prices is investigated. (CIII, p. 898) 
Furthermore, virtual multiplication operates at a more abstract level than 
intellectual property rights and without reference to the presence, as well as the 
content, of intellectual property rights. Intellectual property rights need to be 
brought into the analysis in a way that is based on the process of virtual 
multiplication and reproduces it at more concrete and complex levels of abstraction. 
As we have seen in Chapter 3, the monopoly price approach draws a clear distinction 
between knowledge (labour) and commodity(-producing labour). But it is also seen 
that knowledge does not take part in the determination of the value of commodities. 
Also important is that the monopoly price approach implicitly equates the role of 
knowledge with the effect of intellectual property rights. In other words, knowledge 
allows for a monopoly price and, therefore, has an economic role, but only when it is 
protected by intellectual property rights. If knowledge were not protected by 
intellectual property rights, monopoly pricing would not be possible, and knowledge 
would not have any role in the determination of price. Likewise, if software were not 
protected by legal means, consumers would not pay for it because they would be 
able to get copies free of charge.199  However, the role of knowledge does not 
                                                
199 Software is produced and distributed in install package form that is vulnerable to illegal 
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necessarily depend on intellectual property rights. Take the example of the Coca-
Cola formula, the recipe of Coca-Cola. Only a few employees have access to it as it is 
a very important trade secret for the company. Access to this highly valuable 
knowledge is therefore heavily guarded, but not through legal means only. 
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, even if a company has acquired a codified trade 
secret of one of its competitors, it is often the case that such knowledge is not 
properly usable without an understanding of the context under which the knowledge 
is produced and used. This means that acquisition of codified knowledge such as a 
blueprint or design does not guarantee full reproduction of the original knowledge. 
Even without intellectual property rights, economic advantages arising from 
knowledge (for individual capitals) can persist for some time and so does its role in 
value production.  
The view of the monopoly price approach on the role of intellectual property rights 
has a far-reaching implication. This is precisely because intellectual property rights 
apply not only to information commodities but also to other types of commodities, 
including semiconductors, automobiles, drugs, books, music, etc. Suppose that a 
semiconductor company has produced a unique design of the CPU that minimises 
the use of electricity. From the point of view of the monopoly price approach: the 
social value of semiconductors produced by this company would be determined by 
the direct (commodity-producing) labour time and the value transferred from the 
means of production, but would have nothing to do with the unique design of the 
CPU; if CPUs (processors) were sold at the price determined by their (individual) 
value, which would be similar to, if not the same as, their social value, this company 
would suffer a loss because it would be unable to recoup the initial investment put 
into the design production; but fortunately, thanks to the protection of the design by 
                                                                                                                                     
copying, not because it is the only feasible technical method, but because software is 
protected by intellectual property rights. The presumption is that copying is easy, but illegal, 
so an efficient form of distribution, i.e. install package, could be adopted. If intellectual 
property rights had not been available, more advanced copy protection technologies would 
have been applied to software install packages, or else the architecture of computing devices 
would have evolved into a significantly closed one. Put differently, the prevalent method of 
software production and distribution is closely related to intellectual property rights. It is 
plausible to say that the open architecture of the Internet and computing devices depends on 
intellectual property rights. Considering that the open source movement, which is 
considered an alternative to information commodities, presupposes the open architecture of 
the Internet and computing devices, we may say that information commodities and the open 
source movement are two sides of the same coin. 
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intellectual property rights, the company could sell the CPUs at a monopoly price, 
higher than their social value. Here is another, a more concrete example. According 
to IHS Technology (2013), the production of an iPad Air (16GB Wi-Fi model) costs 
$274, out of which $5 is manufacturing cost and $269 is BoM (bill of materials) 
including but not limited to a Nand flash memory, a DRAM, a touch screen, etc., 
whereas its market price is $499. For companies specialised in manufacturing, 
creating an almost exact copycat of this device is not very difficult. Manufacturing 
cost may be (significantly) higher, but it accounts only for 5% of the production cost 
per unit in any case. Then, for the proponents of the monopoly price approach, the 
high price of this device ($499), about twice as high as its true social value ($269) in 
their view, would be a monopoly price which can be sustained only because of 
intellectual property rights. If Apple sold this device at $269, they would be 
suffering a huge loss, and would the company have developed the essential 
innovative technologies and designs for the iPad in the first place? 
Given the prevalence of intellectual property rights across sectors, then, 
commodities of any kind, produced based on knowledge protected by intellectual 
property rights, would be sold at a monopoly price if we take the view of the 
monopoly price approach. Consequently, the monopoly price approach to 
information commodities is the monopoly price approach to commodities in 
general. 
The implication of this conclusion is significant. Value is the category that expresses 
the fundamental social relations in capitalism, the class relations between capital 
and labour. To say value determines price is to say the same thing as the capital-
labour relations (essence) determine the economic relations (form). If the 
commodity price were typically a monopoly price, the capital-labour relation would 
not have the primacy in regulating and determining economic relations of 
capitalism. New social relations centred on intellectual property rights would 
replace the class relations as the essential social relations in capitalism, see Section 
4. S. Kang (2008a, p. 19) argues that monopoly price theory is based on, and 
consistent with, value theory, but the category of monopoly price is for exceptional 
circumstances only, as in Marx’s example of “wine which is of quite exceptional 
quality but can be produced only in a relatively small quantity” (CIII, p. 910), in 
which monopoly pricing involves value transfer from buyer to seller. Conversely, if 
monopoly price became prevalent, so would value transfer, which is determined by 
factors that have nothing to do with value. In such an economy, where value does 
not determine price, it would have no real or analytical significance except in 
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determining the portion of the monopoly price contributed by workers. 
In sum, despite the intention of the monopoly price approach to defend and 
promote value theory, its core arguments end up negating the validity of value 
theory and privileges instead the role of intellectual property rights in contemporary 
capitalism, not unlike, in some respects, CCT. 
Intellectual property rights and rent (the cost approach) 
The category of (ground) rent has drawn much interest among the cost approach 
theorists.200 According to N. Kang (2002, p. 111), it is typical for the price of 
information commodities to include extra surplus value, rent and monopoly profit. 
This means that, although the value of information commodities is seen to be higher 
than zero, its price is not necessarily determined by value. N. Kang’s view is that 
commodity price is a monopoly price when one company dominates a market for 
whatever reasons (e.g. natural monopoly, intellectual property rights, etc.). In 
addition, rent is seen to accrue “when the source of surplus profit is neither capital 
nor labour, and not shared by all capitalists” (N. Kang, 2007, p. 191). According to 
this definition, knowledge and intellectual property rights are not in themselves a 
source of rent. Suppose that an advanced production technology is produced by an 
individual capitalist. The productivity of commodity-producing labour would rise, 
and a surplus profit (or extra surplus value) would accrue to the capitalist. This 
surplus profit, however, would not be transformed into rent because it would have 
been produced by workers under the direction of capitalists. As Marshall’s 
distinction between rent and quasi rent reflects the distinction between naturally-
given factors and produced factors, for N. Kang, rent is for factors of production 
which are freely given or non-replicable. It follows that whereas the extent of 
competition determines monopoly price or otherwise, reproducibility determines 
rent or its absence: 
A surplus profit arising from a patent is a monopoly profit due to a monopoly 
being established by legal means, but it is not a [monopoly] rent because [the 
                                                
200 Similarly, many commentators have argued that productivity increases attributed to the 
monopoly of means of production or knowledge or natural conditions can be analysed on the 
basis of Marx’s theory of ground rent. For example, Harvey (2001, p. 395) says: 
All rent is based on the monopoly power of private owners of certain portions of the 
globe. Monopoly rent arises because social actors can realise an enhanced income stream 
over an extended time by virtue of their exclusive control over some directly or indirectly 
tradable item which is in some crucial respects unique and non-replicable. 
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patent] is replicable. On the contrary, [surplus profits] from Picasso’s 
drawings are rents. For they are not replicable. (N. Kang, 2007, p. 192)  
Somewhat contradictorily, however, N. Kang elsewhere argues that intellectual 
property rights are a source of rent, which suggests that replicability can be 
understood in not only technical but also legal terms. He says: 
Intellectual property rights are [a source of] a legal monopoly. Replication of 
… knowledge … costs nothing. Therefore, the value of knowledge is zero and 
its price a pure monopoly price. However, [knowledge] is inherently unique in 
a given period of time … and cannot be replicated by other capitalists. During 
this period, then, [the price of] knowledge has the characteristic of rent 
[emphasis added]. (N. Kang, 2005, p. 265)  
On this basis, N. Kang suggests that the network effect which is often associated 
with information commodities is a source of rent. For example, the use value of a 
copy of Microsoft Word is determined not only by its features but also by the 
number of users, because the more people that use the product, the easier it 
becomes for users to share documents. Suppose that Microsoft Word has the same 
use value as Apple Pages in terms of features and functionality, but due to its larger 
user base and larger network effect than Apple Pages, it is more useful than Apple 
Pages. For this reason, Microsoft Word would have a higher social value than Apple 
Pages. N. Kang argues that the excess is a differential rent, because the network 
effect (or network externality) is created by neither capital nor labour. In addition, if 
the network effect is so large as to establish a natural monopoly, whether through 
intellectual property rights or not, the price of Microsoft Word copies would be a 
monopoly price; Microsoft’s surplus profit would be transformed into a monopoly 
profit (because of the monopoly) and, then, into a monopoly rent (because of the 
network effect being non-replicable).201 From this point of view, the price of an 
information commodity consists of two parts. One part is determined by value (or 
price of production), which may or may not include surplus profit, and, in turn, may 
or may not be transformed into (differential and/or absolute) rent. The other part, 
which may be zero or higher (depending on the extent of competition), is 
determined by purchasers’ purchasing power, which may or may not be transformed 
into monopoly rent (depending on replicability). However, this way of classification 
applies to any commodity, and does not add anything new to the understanding of 
                                                
201 For similar views from a slightly different perspective, see Pasquinelli (2009) and Fuchs 
and Sevignani (2013) which discuss whether Google and Facebook are exploiting their 
customers. The presumption is that users’ activities constitute labour. See also Ross (2013). 
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information commodities. 
Whilst Rieu (2005) agrees with N. Kang in general, he argues that rent accrues only 
if property rights are granted to the factors that are the source of surplus profit. 
From this point of view, the network effect is a source of surplus profit, which may 
be transformed into a differential rent depending on whether exclusivity is given or 
not. He says, “intellectual property rights grant legal and institutional property 
rights to factors that cannot be appropriated as the productive power of capital, and 
thus make them not accessible to all capitalists” (Rieu, 2005, p. 176).202 C.-O. Lee 
(2005, p. 162) argues that the high price of information commodities can better be 
explained by absolute rent.203 
The interpretations of Marx’s theory of (ground) rent implicit in the cost approach 
and their application to information commodities have been heavily criticised by the 
proponents of the monopoly price approach. The gist of their critique is that Marx’s 
rent theory is stretched too far in a careless manner to suit the convenience of its 
wider application. As S. Kang (2009, p. 147) rightly points out, such extension of the 
scope of theory leads to Marx’s category of (ground) rent becoming “degenerated 
into economic rent of mainstream economics” in which land is no longer 
distinguished from the other factors of production, and we join this critique on the 
basis of our discussion of Marx’s theory of (ground) rent in the previous section. But 
it would be worth adding a few more points. First, for Marx, rent presupposes a class 
of landowners who have the power to block free capitalist investment into land, and 
this power enables them to appropriate surplus profit as rent. No such class is 
identified by the proponents of the cost approach. Second, related to the first point, 
                                                
202 Although there are diverse views on rent within the cost approach, not all of which can be 
reviewed here, none of them denies that rent is an important category for the analysis of the 
network effect and information commodities. For example, Jo (2008, Section 3, para. 3) 
says, “I think N. Kang’s argument that the category of differential rent does not have to be 
limited to agriculture but can be applied to what is not created by capital (and labour 
controlled by capital) is correct. Special capabilities that only a limited number of persons 
have are a prominent example. If value is determined by socially necessary labour time as 
Marx suggests, such a person would create more value (e.g. twice) even if the intensity of 
labour is the same. At the level of Volume 3 of Capital, where not only the competition 
between capitalists but also the competition between workers is considered, the excess 
appears as different wage levels, which is hard to explain. But we can call it differential rent 
[emphasis added]”. 
203 This assumes the existence of a single information commodity sector, which we criticised 
in Chapter 3. 
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it is wrong to suggest that replicability determines rent or its absence. Rent 
expresses historically specific social relations between the landowner class and the 
capitalist class, and can never be reduced to the replicability of factors of 
production. Third, whilst surplus profit is a category that is more abstract than 
(ground) rent for Marx, rent as a classificatory concept, depending on replicability, 
exists side-by-side with surplus profit. In sum, the historical specificity of Marx’s 
rent theory is lost — “euthanasia of rent theory” (Fine, 1982a, p. 99) — as in 
neoclassical economics.  
Both the cost and the monopoly price approaches are flawed in that they fail to 
incorporate the role of knowledge into value theory at abstract levels: whereas 
knowledge is equated with the means of production in the former, its role in value 
production is neglected in the latter. They short-circuit the social processes of 
virtual multiplication of labour and instead draw hasty conclusions about the value 
of information commodities. Analysis at more concrete and complex levels, 
especially in the presence of intellectual property rights, is also problematic. The 
monopoly price approach privileges the role of intellectual property rights in the 
formation of the monopoly price of information commodities. Given the prevalence 
of intellectual property rights, it implicitly follows that the commodity price is 
typically the monopoly price. This is at odds with Marx’s value theory in which value 
determines price and monopoly price is only exceptional. The cost approach 
imposes Marx’s theory of (ground) rent on intellectual property rights. Although 
rent is an economic category that expresses social relations around landed property, 
the cost approach detaches the economic form from the underlying historically 
specific relations and attaches it to other social relations without sufficiently 
analysing the latter.  
5.4. Cognitive capitalism theory, intellectual property 
rights and rent 
This section is concerned with one of the key arguments of CCT, in general, and of 
Carlo Vercellone, in particular, that the distinction between profit and rent is 
collapsing due to intellectual property rights. As we have seen in Chapter 4, CCT has 
yet to develop a theory of (cognitive) value and price, and for this reason, there is as 
yet no economic theory with which the appropriation of surplus products in 
cognitive capitalism can be assessed. CCT’s view is that capital should not be 
allowed to appropriate any surplus product. For capital does not contribute to the 
production of real wealth at all in cognitive capitalism. Then, as long as capital does 
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appropriate (a portion of) surplus products by way of intellectual property rights, 
lack of a coherent value theory is only of a secondary concern to its proponents.204 
Intellectual property rights are viewed primarily from a political point of view, as the 
main terrain of class struggle in cognitive capitalism where capital and labour stand 
as two independent classes. 
Intellectual property rights and the political appropriation of rent 
It is argued that the category of profit disappears in cognitive capitalism. According 
to Vercellone (2010, p. 97), there are two conditions of existence for profit in 
industrial capitalism. The first concerns the role of capital in the production process. 
Capitalists manage, supervise and organise the labour process, and this shows 
“correspondence between the figure of the capitalist and that of the 
entrepreneur”.205 The second condition is related to reinvesting surplus value or 
profit for expanded accumulation of capital: “Profit would play a positive role in the 
development of productive forces and in the struggle against scarcity”. It is argued 
that these two conditions are only “the transitory product of an epoch of capitalism, 
of industrial capitalism” (p. 98), fully realised “in the golden age of Fordist growth, 
during which both the logic of real subsumption of labour to capital and mass 
production found their expression”. This is different from Marx’s explanation of the 
source of profit. Whereas, for Vercellone, profit is the remuneration of capital and 
wage “the remuneration of productive labour” (p. 93), for Marx, capitalists accrue 
                                                
204 “The common has come into clearer view in recent years in large part thanks to the work 
not of economics but of lawyers and legal theorists. Debates about intellectual property make 
it impossible, in fact, not to focus on the common and its interaction with the public” (Hardt 
& Negri, 2009, p. 281). 
205 Vercellone (2010, p. 99) argues that Marx, in Volume 3 of Capital, “introduces a 
conceptual distinction between two determinations of capital, namely ownership and 
function (performing capital), and links this distinction back to that between interest as 
revenue from capital ownership and the active profit of the entrepreneur who manages 
production” to the extent that “Marx questions the terms of the opposition between profit 
and rent as well as the limits of a definition of rent reduced to ground rent only”. He 
continues: 
According to Marx, capital ownership was following a similar path to that of ground rent 
in the shift from feudalism to capitalism: it is to say that it was becoming external in 
relation to the sphere of production and, like land ownership, capital ownership was 
extracting surplus value whilst no longer exercising any function in the organisation of 
labour. (p. 100) 
Vercellone calls this interpretation of Volume 3 of Capital “theory of capital-rent” (p. 101). 
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profit not from any roles they play in the production process, but from surplus 
labour time performed by workers who must sell their labour powers and work for 
capitalists to make a living due to the monopoly of means of production by 
capitalists; capitalists add nothing to the surplus value they exploit from the 
workers. Likewise, workers earn wages not because they perform productive labour 
but because they sell their labour powers as commodities. Labour, be it productive 
or unproductive, is only the effect of the consumption of labour power in the 
production process. Vercellone’s understanding of profit and wage as the 
remuneration of factor contributions is completely at odds with Marx’s view and 
instead has more affinity with mainstream economic theory. 
Based on this false understanding of the source of profit, CCT constructs a 
contrasting view on cognitive capitalism as follows: in cognitive capitalism, the role 
of organisation, co-operation, coordination of production process is being 
appropriated by workers; capitalists are increasingly detached from the task of 
management, supervision and organisation of the labour process; consequently, 
they do not contribute to the production of final commodities to the same extent as 
in the previous stage of capitalism. As a result, it is argued that profit is losing its 
basis because where there is no contribution, there should be no remuneration. 
Appropriation of surplus products is, then, achieved by way of the expansion of the 
sphere of market “through a progressive colonisation of the common goods of 
knowledge and life by means of strengthening Intellectual Property Rights” 
(Vercellone, 2008a, Section II.2). 206  As Dyer-Witheford (2005, p. 74) puts it, 
cognitive capitalism is “the commercial appropriation of general intellect”. Whilst 
the presumption is that knowledge created by workers and non-workers should be 
freely available due to its nature of being non-rival, capitalists impose intellectual 
property rights from outside, so that they can monopolise the use of knowledge and 
thus appropriate monopoly rent on the basis of (artificially) limited use of 
knowledge. It is seen as a new enclosure movement or primitive (knowledge) 
accumulation, around which the antagonism between capital and labour is being 
reconfigured. In short, rent is seen to become the central category in cognitive 
                                                
206 Similarly, Vecrellone (2005, p. 10) says, “The solution sought by capital is now to 
establish strict intellectual property rights aiming at capturing monopoly rents”. Intellectual 
property rights are also seen to obstruct the progress of industry: “The new relations of 
ownership of knowledge obstruct the progress of knowledge through the creation of an 
artificial scarcity of resources” (Vercellone, 2007, p. 34). 
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capitalism: 
Because as the law of value-labour time is in crisis and the cooperation of 
labour appears to become increasingly autonomous from the managerial 
functions of capital, the very frontiers between rent and profit begin to 
disintegrate. (Vercellone, 2008a, para. 10) 
The current transformation of capitalism is characterised by a full-fledged 
comeback and proliferation of forms of rent parallel to a complete change in 
the relationship between wages, rent and profit. (Vercellone, 2010, p. 85) 
Capital-labour antagonism increasingly takes the form of antagonism between 
the institutions of the common as the foundations of knowledge-based 
economy and the logic of expropriation of cognitive capitalism that develops 
itself under the form of rent—a rent whereof finance is only one of the 
expressions even if it often synthesises all of them through the transformation 
of fictitious commodities into fictitious capital. (p. 92) 
Accordingly, the proponents of CCT argue that class struggle in cognitive capitalism 
increasingly takes the form of distributional struggle, where no pre-existing 
economic rules apply due to immeasurability. Cognitive capitalism is pictured as a 
stage of capitalism where capital tries to “accentuate and exercise direct [emphasis 
added] control over places or people with knowledge or potential of technical 
creativity” (Corsani et al., 2001, p. 10). The term cognitive capitalism, then, captures 
“the current issues of conflict related to the redefinition of intellectual and 
immaterial property rights and what we call new battle fences (enclosures)” 
(Moulier-Boutang, 2002, para. 1).207 
The conflict is a pure clash between capitalists and workers over the division of 
surplus products between capitalists and workers. Hardt and Negri argue that 
exploitation in the new stage of capitalism takes directly political and social forms 
due to the lack of economic forms in cognitive capitalism through which class 
relations can be expressed:208 
                                                
207 According to Monnier and Vercellone (2014, p. 62), “the term ‘capitalism’ [in cognitive 
capitalism] indicates the permanence of its fundamental laws of functioning, as the driving 
role of profit and the wage relations centrality”. 
208 For Hardt and Negri who consider not only knowledge production but also broader 
aspects of immateriality of contemporary capitalism, political compulsion can take diverse 
forms. As no systematic approach to exploitation is feasible, the political compulsion that is 
necessary for exploitation cannot be associated with order or measure. Rather, its 
effectiveness is based “on destruction (by the bomb), on judgement (by money), and on fear 
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One can no longer hope to find any natural units of measure and even when 
such units appear they are merely fleeting results that arise a posteriori from 
the common organisation of society and the continuous resolution of the 
antagonisms that run throughout it. Economics, then, which has exhausted its 
powers, has to open itself to politics; it has to yield to political practice and 
recognise that it cannot do otherwise [emphasis added].209 (Hardt & Negri, 
2004, pp. 156-157) 
In this world view, capital and labour are understood to be independent from each 
other. Here, a group of people called the working class, and another group of people 
called the capitalist class fight against each other about who takes control of 
knowledge. Now we have two super-powers, confronting each other: “There is a 
clash of Titans” (Holloway, 2002b, p. 88).210  
From a CCT point of view, at the core of the directly social and political forms of 
compulsion is intellectual property. And given that intellectual property rights 
permeate all aspects of life, rent is seen to take a variety of different forms — 
“financial, real estate, cognitive, wage, etc.” (Negri & Vercellone, 2007, para. 29).211 
                                                                                                                                     
(by communication)” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 356). 
209 At the forefront of political practice is money. Given the immeasurability of everything in 
cognitive capitalism, money no longer expresses the value of commodities, but the 
“generality” (Hardt & Negri, 2004, p. 156) of the ‘common’: 
The more that production is socialised and globalised, in fact, the more the monetary 
connections (which serve as the basis for financial instruments) are presented as indexes 
and expressions of general social production and the set of relations that bring together 
different economic actors. Only the power of money, in fact, can represent the generality 
of the values of production when they are expressions of the global multitudes. 
210  By contrast, for Marx, capital and labour are in internal relations (although the 
proponents of CCT might say it is the case only in industrial capitalism). They are not two 
independent factors of production as they appear in the neoclassical aggregate production 
function. Capital cannot be replaced by labour and vice-versa. Their inter-relation is obvious 
in the category of variable capital, in which the concept of capital contains labour as its 
constituent part. As Holloway (2002b, pp. 88-89) puts it:  
To overlook the internal nature of the relation between labour and capital thus means 
both to underestimate the containment of labour within capital (and hence overestimate 
the power of labour against capital) and to underestimate the power of labour as internal 
contradiction within capital (and hence overestimate the power of capital against 
labour). 
See also Holloway (2002a, Chapter 9). 
211 According to this view, anything which can be monopolised and generate surplus profit is 
a source of rent. Qualitative differences between elements contributing to production are 
simply abstracted away. In a slightly different context, Marx criticises this type of mental 
generalisation: 
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Vercellone (2008b; 2011, p. 35) speaks of “financial rent”, and Marazzi (2010, p. 53) 
of “financial rent … realised by redirecting liquidity towards the outside” and “social 
rent” arising from “the right to the house and the (indebted) consumption of goods 
and services”. For Chicchi (2010, p. 149), “Financialisation reveals the becoming-
rent of profit [emphasis removed]”. Negri (2010, p. 266) puts it more succinctly and 
assertively than anybody else: “The exploitation of the common is therefore financial 
rent [emphasis removed]”. Lucarelli and Fumagalli (2008) propose to draw a 
distinction between material rent and immaterial rent: 
Material rent is the income paid because of the productivity of a specific 
factor, e.g. the best land in Ricardo’s terms. Immaterial rent is defined as the 
wealth produced by the innovative skills of labour, incorporated in a different 
productive factor (land or capital) whose owner (landlords or capitalists), 
given the institutional rules or his dominant position, is allowed to 
appropriate. (p. 87)  
Moulier-Boutang’s focus is slightly different, but we may say he is interested in a 
sort of human rent: 
Exploitation has now become, basically, not that of the consumption of labour 
power, but its willingness to make itself available, its attentiveness and its 
ability to form new networks and to enter into cooperation, through the 
medium of computers linked together. It is not an exploitation of living 
labour’s capacity to transform itself into dead labour, into a product, but of its 
capacity to provide answers to non-programmed questions, the answer to 
which is tautologically given in the question. (Moulier-Boutang, 2012, p. 163) 
It is worth mentioning that the proponents of CCT approach rent from a 
Marshallian point of view as acknowledged by Negri and Vercellone (2007) and 
Vercellone (2011):212 
                                                                                                                                     
The capacity to work has been called the capital of the worker, in so far as it is the fund 
which he does not consume in an individual exchange, since he can constantly repeat the 
exchange for the duration of his life as a worker. According to this, everything would be 
capital which is a fund of repeated processes of the same subject; e.g. the substance of 
the eye is the capital of sight, etc. Such belletristic phrases, which by means of some sort 
of analogy relate everything to everything else, may even appear profound when are said 
for the first time, and the more so the more they identify the most disparate things. If 
repeated, and especially if repeated complacently, as statements of scientific value, they 
are tout bonnement foolish. Suitable only for belletristic story-tellers and empty 
chatterboxes who besmear all sciences with their liquorice-sweet rubbish. (CW28, pp. 
219-220) 
212 “This is what Marshall described as a rent, to distinguish this good as ‘free gift’ which 
results from the general progress of society from normal sources of profit” (Negri & 
Vercellone, 2007, para. 25). 
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The competitiveness of firms, in fact, depends not on internal economies, but 
increasingly on external economies, that is, the ability to capture the 
productive surplus from cognitive resources of a territory. In an 
unprecedented historical scale, this is what A. Marshall himself called rent, in 
order to distinguish this ‘free gift’ resulting from the ‘general progress of 
society’ from normal sources of profit. In addition, capital monopolises the 
benefits of free collective knowledge of the society as if it were a gift of nature 
and this part of the surplus value is comparable in all respects to the 
differential rent enjoyed by the owners of the most fertile land. (Vercellone, 
2011, p. 35) 
Similarly, the scope of rent in Vercellone (2010, p. 95) is wide enough to include 
products of labour as one of its sources and, therefore, quasi rent: 
The existence of rent is based upon monopolistic forms of property and 
positions of power that permit the creation of scarcity and the imposition of 
higher prices, justified by the cost of production [emphasis added]. Scarcity is 
induced in most cases by institutional artefacts, as shown today by the policies 
of reinforcement of Intellectual Property Rights.  
Intellectual property rights certainly constitute a barrier to capitalist investment in 
that the use of protected technologies or knowledge requires licensing of 
technologies or other forms of transfer of knowledge. However, as Marx’s analysis of 
a historically-specific capitalist form of landed property shows, theorising 
intellectual property simply as a source of surplus profit is insufficient, and this 
inadequacy is widespread in CCT. It is worth pointing out that there is an essential 
difference between intellectual property and landed property for our later 
discussions. Whilst landed property, in the context of agriculture in England (in 
Marx’s time), is a pure barrier to capital investment and movement,213 intellectual 
property rights have contradictory impacts on capital accumulation. On the one 
hand, it encourages innovation by preventing competitors from imitating or 
catching up for a limited period time. On the other hand, for the same reason, the 
progress of an industry can be obstructed especially if the key technologies are 
                                                
213 By contrast, in case of coal mining, large-scale landed property accelerated capital 
investment: 
In Britain the pattern of landownership was not fragmented, ownership was highly 
concentrated and much the same was true of royalty ownership. Rather than small 
landowners obstructing mining through the charges that would be made for the small 
quantities of coal that they owned, it was more a case of large landowners encouraging a 
number of mineowners to extract as much coal as possible and this explains the 
occurrence of fixed rents to be paid irrespective of the quantity of coal re-moved but 
against which royalties were set. (Fine, 1982b, p. 340) 
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patented and the intellectual property owners refuse licensing.214 
Significantly, intellectual property rights are not an invention of contemporary 
capitalism. Its modern origins date back as early as 1474 when the patent statute of 
Venice was issued. The United States and France enacted their patent laws in 1790 
and 1791, respectively.215 In other words, some forms of intellectual property rights 
have always been part of the capitalist mode of production.216 
Externalities and basic income 
As we have seen in Chapter 4 and in the previous section, CCT is a theory of use 
value. Implicit in such a theory, and in the CCT literature, is that for a given product 
or phenomenon, contributing factors can be theoretically identified although 
identifying all factors in practice is almost impossible because externalities are 
prevalent in capitalism, as we have seen in Chapter 2. 
CCT re-appropriates the concept of externalities to analytically capture the nature of 
cognitive labour, the ‘common’, and the biopolitical production in light of its being 
                                                
214 Boldrin and Levine (2009, p. 994) give four examples: 
• Boulton and Watt’s steam engine patent most likely delayed the industrial revolution by a 
couple of decades. 
• Selten’s automobile patent set back automobile innovation in the United States by roughly 
the same amount of time. 
• The Wright Brothers airplane patent forced innovative work on airplane technology out of 
the United States to France. 
• The patent system of England and France forced the chemical industry to move to 
Germany and Switzerland, where chemical patents did not exist or were much weaker. 
See also Boldrin and Levine (2008, Chapter 1) and Jaffe and Lerner (2004). 
215 For a brief history of patents, see Guellec and Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2007, Chapter 
2) and Sherman and Bently (1999). 
216 In this respect, it is somewhat surprising that Marx does not provide any analysis of 
patenting although he was well aware of the existence of the patent system and its economic 
implications. He even read the specification of Watt’s steam-engine patent: 
The greatness of Watt's genius showed itself in the specification of the patent that he 
took out in April 1784. In that specification his steam-engine is described, not as an 
invention for a specific purpose, but as an agent universally applicable in industry. (CI, p. 
499) 
He also mentions patents in a sarcastic remark: “MacCulloch took out a patent on the ‘wages 
of past labour’ long before Senior patented the ‘wages of abstinence’” (p. 757). 
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immeasurable and excessive (Hardt & Negri, 2004, p. 146). First of all, it is argued 
that externalities arise from the weakening distinction between labour time and 
non-labour time: 
There is no longer a factory wall that divides the one from the other, and 
‘externalities’ are no longer external to the site of production that valorises 
them. Workers produce throughout the metropolis, in its every crack and 
crevice. In fact, production of the common is becoming nothing but the life of 
the city itself. (Hardt & Negri, 2009, p. 251) 
Second, more broadly, it is not only in the production process and but also in the life 
process as a whole where (cognitive) value is created. 
Economists register the common in mystified form through the notion of 
‘externalities’ … More generally and fundamentally, positive externalities refer 
to social wealth created outside the direct productive process, the value of 
which can be captured only in part by capital. The social knowledges, 
relationships, and forms of communication that result from immaterial 
production generally fit into this category. (Hardt & Negri, 2004, p. 147) 
Third, given the hegemony of cognitive labour in cognitive capitalism, externalities 
are considered prevalent, posing the challenge of capturing or internalising them. 
In cognitive capitalism external effects — what we have defined as 
externalities — cease to be marginal and tied to simple partial phenomena of 
indivisibility of public goods. If the core of the value to be extracted is based 
on intelligent, inventive and innovative labour, and if the latter mobilises the 
cooperation of brains in networks, then capturing positive externalities 
becomes the number one problem of value. (Moulier-Boutang, 2012, p. 55) 
Significantly, Marx was well aware of the existence of externalities, especially those 
arising from co-operation and scientific discoveries: 
Being independent of each other, the workers are isolated. They enter into 
relations with the capitalist, but not with each other. Their co-operation only 
begins with the labour process, but by then they have ceased to belong to 
themselves. On entering the labour process they are incorporated into capital. 
As co-operators, as members of a working organism, they merely form a 
particular mode of existence of capital. Hence the productive power developed 
by the worker socially is the productive power of capital. The socially 
productive power of labour develops as a free gift [emphasis added] to capital 
whenever the workers are placed under certain conditions, and it is capital 
which places them under these conditions. Because this power costs capital 
nothing, while on the other hand it is not developed by the worker until his 
labour itself belongs to capital, it appears as a power which capital possesses 
by its nature — a productive power inherent in capital. (CI, p. 451) 
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This is certainly a positive externality of co-operation, but Marx’s emphasis is on the 
illusion that it appears as the productive power of capital. For externality, a concept 
of use value, is not his primary concern. In fact, externalities, as is the case with 
everything else in capitalism, have a dual nature. First, the productivity of the social 
combined labour exceeds the sum total of the productivities of individual labours, 
and therefore more use values are created than the sum total that would have been 
created by isolated workers. Second, in terms of value production, however, given 
that co-operation and collective work are a norm in the capitalist production 
process, it does not affect the magnitude of value created for a given period of time. 
On the other hand, an increase in the productivity of social labour (across the 
economy) drives down the value of labour power, and therefore relative surplus 
value rises. In addition, that capitalists appropriate this free gift does not violate any 
principle of commodity exchange; as Marx mentions in the quote above, “it is capital 
which places [workers] under these conditions [of co-operation]” in the first place. 
As a theory of use value, CCT only considers the first, use value aspect of 
externalities. For its proponents, externalities play a crucial role in use value 
production, so there should be some corresponding remuneration. Given the nature 
of co-operation, collaboration and cognition being inherently immeasurable and 
communal, it is impossible and meaningless to be concerned with individual 
contributions. The collective contributions, currently being appropriated by 
capitalists as rent, then, should be re-appropriated by workers, both employed and 
unemployed.217 Hence, they advocate basic income, arguing that CCT “complements 
and reinforces … ethical conceptions, giving to BPI [basic primary income] new 
basis resulting from the rise of the cognitive nature of labour and from the 
recognition of the social character of the creation of wealth” (Monnier & Vercellone, 
2014, p. 61). In other words: 
BPI, as social wages, would at least partially correspond to the collective 
remuneration of this always-collective dimension, of a productive activity of 
value that extends over the whole of social times and is translated, in often 
unprecedented forms, by the lengthening of effective labour time and an 
increase in absolute surplus value. (Monnier & Vercellone, 2014, pp. 66-67) 
                                                
217 “In our approach, unemployment and precocity are, in effect, produced by the structural 
logic that waged labour depends on in a monetary economy of production … they are the 
expression of a monetary limit that makes employment the required condition for accessing 
money” (Monnier & Vercellone, 2014, p. 64). 
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Similarly, according to Moulier-Boutang (2012, p. 158), “The guaranteed social 
income (GSI) is not a remuneration for an individual’s contribution to an 
input/output function of production”, but it “remunerates a productive activity of 
pollination and makes it possible to take intangibles into account”. For Lucarelli and 
Fumagalli (2008), basic income not only “represent[s] the compensation for the 
social productivity” (p. 83) but also “reduce[s] the instability inherent in CC 
[cognitive capitalism]” (p. 85) by ensuring a fairer income distribution. From a class 
struggle point of view, “the struggles around rent (in particular for a basic income) 
are first and foremost a means—a means for the construction of a political subject” 
(Negri, 2010, p. 268). 
Attempting to provide a theoretical basis for basic income, CCT unduly ties the 
justification of basic income to the validity of CCT. If we indeed live in cognitive 
capitalism where positive externalities of co-operation, collaboration, 
communication and knowledge are being appropriated as rent, CCT provides a clear 
case that this portion of total output, which all of us have produced together, should 
be re-appropriated as basic income. However, if Marx’s value theory is still valid 
because either cognitive capitalism is yet to come or CCT is wrong and misleading, 
basic income needs other theoretical justifications than externalities because there is 
no place of externalities as such in Marx’s value theory. In this respect, CCT is a 
double-edged sword to basic income. It provides a theoretical framework. But it 
implies that basic income can be theoretically justified only within, and because of, 
the framework.218 This is not to deny the cause of basic income, but only to point out 
that a theory of use value such as CCT can provide basic income with only a shaky 
foundation. 
5.5. Concluding remarks 
With Marx’s theory of ground rent being an application of, and rooted in, his value 
theory, misinterpretations of his value theory necessarily lead to misinterpretations 
of rent theory as well. This is most prominent in CCT. Having rejected the validity of 
labour as the sole substance of value, each immeasurable life activity is suggested as 
a particular source of cognitive value or the source of a particular value. It follows 
that if a (unique) activity’s output can be monopolised, it becomes a particular 
source of rent, constituting a theory of particular rent. However, different effects of 
                                                
218 For an attempt to justify basic income on the basis of the cost approach, see Ahn (2012). 
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(intellectual) property rights on different activities are simply ignored, and rent, a 
horizontal category, is applied from without to analytically capture the allegedly 
salient fact in contemporary capitalism that a portion of output is appropriated by 
way of legal means. By doing so, CCT abstracts from the very particularity which it 
claims to cherish. Although there is a multiplicity of rent theories, they are 
particular in name only. Our view is different. There is no such thing as general 
theory of intellectual property rights, let alone general theory of rent. This is because 
the effects of intellectual property rights are different in different industries, and, 
therefore, one concept – rent – cannot express different economic and social 
relations in different industries, which is the topic the next chapter is concerned 
with. 
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6. Summary of the thesis and directions for future 
research 
6.1. Summary of the thesis 
Previous chapters were concerned mainly with critically engaging with existing 
accounts of knowledge in contemporary capitalism. The main points covered in 
these chapters can be summarised as follows. First, knowledge-based growth models 
of NGT, especially Romer’s 1990 model, privilege some aspects of knowledge whilst 
endogenising it on the basis of a neoclassical framing. Many restrictions are placed 
upon knowledge, in general, and its utilisation and diffusion, in particular, to 
generate exponential knowledge growth, leading to some implausible consequences: 
knowledge, once produced, is protected by intellectual property rights permanently; 
knowledge necessarily leads to the establishment of a permanent monopoly; a firm 
can produce either knowledge or final goods, but not both; with monopoly profit 
arising from knowledge being fully appropriated as remuneration for human capital, 
knowledge, although protected by intellectual property rights, is not the source of 
surplus profit; the allocation of resources between the intermediate and final goods 
sectors and the knowledge sector emerges as the major challenge the economy as a 
whole faces, etc. After all, instead of reconstructing economic growth on the basis of 
knowledge, NGT only seeks to identify conditions under which the aggregate 
knowledge stock grows exponentially. 
Second, for the monopoly price approach in the Controversy, in the presence of 
intellectual property rights, knowledge plays no role in the determination of value, 
but a critical role in the determination of price. Intellectual property rights imposed 
upon knowledge, which should otherwise be freely available, allow for monopoly 
pricing. Given that knowledge is protected by intellectual property rights in most 
other industries, although to varying degrees, it is implicit in the monopoly price 
approach that monopoly pricing is preponderant in the economy; if the price of 
information commodities is a monopoly price in general, so are the prices of other 
commodities. It follows, although not explicitly acknowledged by its proponents, 
that value is seen not to determine price in contemporary capitalism. Analytical 
primacy is therefore accorded to intellectual property rights, not to capital-labour 
relations. 
Third, as is the case with the monopoly price approach, cognitive capitalism theory 
argues that (industrial-)value no longer determines price in contemporary 
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capitalism, especially in knowledge-intensive sectors. This is taken as expressing 
fundamental changes that contemporary capitalism is allegedly undergoing, that is, 
the emergence of cognitive capitalism, in which workers increasingly appropriate 
the role of knowledge production and cognitive labour becomes the hegemonic form 
of labour. Coupled with the flawed understanding of value theory that the separation 
between conception and execution is the prerequisite for value production, this is 
seen to undermine the validity of Marx’s value theory. Instead, it is argued that in 
cognitive capitalism, surplus products are appropriated through directly political, 
social, and legal means, especially intellectual property rights. 
Fourth, externalities play an important role in CCT, a theory of use value, with 
unpaid life activities, through co-operation, collaboration and communication, being 
seen to contribute significantly to production. According to CCT, surplus products 
are being appropriated by capital as rent, the central category in CCT, by way of 
intellectual property rights, which can potentially be re-appropriated by members of 
society as basic income; and rent and intellectual property rights are the major 
terrain of class struggle in cognitive capitalism. Interestingly, externalities are 
essential to NGT, also a theory of use value. In NGT, long-term sustained economic 
growth depends on exponential growth of knowledge, requiring that the productivity 
of knowledge-producing labour be proportional to the current knowledge stock; new 
knowledge improves not only the productivity of commodity-producing labour but 
also the productivity of knowledge-producing labour. In this respect, CCT has an 
affinity with neoclassical economics despite its purported commitment to Marx’s 
method. Furthermore, for the major proponents of CCT, profit is the remuneration 
for capital (not a form of surplus value) as in neoclassical economics, and rent arises 
from monopoly of anything as long as it is a source of surplus profit (not an 
economic form in which a historically specific property relation is realised and 
expressed). 
Fifth, for the cost approach, there is no distinction between knowledge and 
commodities; knowledge is considered more or less as means of production, which 
transfers value to the final products in a piecemeal fashion. When knowledge and, 
more generally, externalities, are sources of surplus profit by being monopolised 
through intellectual property rights or otherwise, surplus profit is seen to be 
transformed into rent depending on replicability or the presence of property rights. 
As is the case with CCT, rent is seen as being a special case of surplus profit, 
detached from Marx’s analysis of the historically specific capitalist form of landed 
property. 
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In light of these flawed theories of knowledge in contemporary capitalism, an 
alternative approach — the virtual multiplication approach — was put forward in 
Chapter 3. It was argued and shown that the role of knowledge can be incorporated 
into value theory in a consistent and coherent manner. The starting point is to draw 
a clear structural distinction between knowledge and commodities; knowledge is not 
a commodity and therefore it does not have value. Knowledge, however, affects the 
determination of the productivity and complexity of (collective) commodity-
producing labour within and across sectors, respectively, and therefore takes part in 
the determination of the value of commodities (produced on the basis of the 
knowledge). As a corollary, an individual capital realises surplus profit if the level of 
its use of knowledge is higher than the sectoral average and/or if it operates in a 
knowledge-intensive sector. These social processes of virtual multiplication of 
labour, determining the value-creating capacity of commodity-producing labour, is a 
relatively abstract formulation of the role of knowledge in contemporary capitalism. 
Whilst it is shown that knowledge is compatible with value theory, the 
multiplication approach, contrary to CCT, does not analyse historically specific 
configurations of knowledge production in contemporary capitalism. Nor does it 
attempt to provide a definitive answer to the nature of the price of (information) 
commodities, contrary to the monopoly price and cost approaches. Further, 
although knowledge is seen as fundamentally distinct from commodities as in NGT, 
this distinction is not projected to the economy as a whole, with a separate 
knowledge sector being ascribed the role of economic growth as opposed to 
equilibrium. 
6.2. Extension of the virtual multiplication approach 
In this respect, on the one hand, the virtual multiplication approach is a defence of 
value theory against the claim of CCT that it is no longer valid in contemporary 
capitalism. On the other hand, it provides an abstract logical foundation upon which 
more concrete and complex, and constructive, theories of knowledge can be built in 
accordance with Marx’s method of moving from the abstract to the concrete. In 
developing such a theory, the following principles should be applied. First, it should 
be a value theory of knowledge, not a use value theory. This is not to deny the 
importance of the dimension of use value, given that use value is the precondition 
for value. However, in capitalism, production is, above all, for capital accumulation 
(surplus value production), with use value production and its growth only being the 
by-product of value production. The roles of knowledge in value production and 
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their consequences for capital accumulation have to be clarified before the relations 
between knowledge and use value production can be satisfactorily studied. Second, 
as the analysis incorporates more concrete and complex elements, so should the 
distinction between knowledge and commodities be developed and reproduced at 
more concrete and complex levels. For example, whilst intellectual property rights 
allow for, and facilitate, the commodification of knowledge, it should not be seen as 
blurring the distinction between knowledge and commodities in any way, but as a 
historical and concrete form of the distinction. Third, related to the previous point, 
intellectual property rights should be brought into the analysis at relatively concrete 
and complex levels, where the distribution of surplus profit and the capitalisation of 
intellectual property are discussed. Fourth, however, this should not be taken as 
limiting the role of intellectual property rights to appropriating (part of) surplus 
profit arising from knowledge. The effects of intellectual property rights on capital 
accumulation across the circuits of capital should be identified and analysed, 
especially to show how they both accelerate and decelerate capital accumulation, 
without collapsing different levels of abstraction. Fifth, there can be no general 
theory of intellectual property rights, because they have different roles and effects in 
different industries. For example, copyright is essential in the recorded music 
industry and patents in the pharmaceutical industry to the extent that the existence 
of these industries relies on intellectual property rights, although patents play at 
best a minor role in the aircraft industry, especially with respect to competition 
within the industry. It is, then, crucial for an analysis of intellectual property rights 
in an industry to examine how intellectual property rights and competition interact 
with each other. 
It is a strong point of the virtual multiplication approach that it allows for 
combining, or linking, logical analyses with historical ones. In other words, the 
unfolding of the abstract and simple distinction between knowledge and 
commodities can be analysed from both logical and historical perspectives. For the 
latter, the distinction can take different forms in different times and places: in terms 
of degree of separation (e.g. learning by doing vs. education); in terms of level of 
collectivity (e.g. individual skills vs. knowledge materialised in fixed capital); within 
a firm (e.g. between R&D department and manufacturing department); across firms 
within an industry (e.g. between fabless semiconductor firms and semiconductor 
manufacturers); and even across industries (e.g. management consulting as a 
knowledge sector). 
More specifically, for Marx, large-scale industry is an outcome of the systematic 
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separation of knowledge from individual workers, with production being 
increasingly organised around fixed capital embodying science.219 At the same time, 
in Marx’s view, scientific discoveries, in his time, lay outside the domain of capital, 
separated from direct labour, so that capital only appropriates science to raise 
productivity and the degree of control in the production process (CW34, p. 33).220 
After all, the real subsumption of labour under capital was made possible by the 
incorporation of scientific discoveries and massive natural forces into the direct 
production process. This historical development is reflected in his distinction 
between universal labour and communal labour (CIII, p. 199) as mentioned in 
Chapter 3. With the former being performed outside not only the direct production 
process but also the capital-labour relation, “invention becomes a business, and the 
application of science to immediate production itself becomes a factor determining 
and soliciting science” (CW29, p. 90).  
This historical configuration of the division between knowledge production and 
commodity production prevalent at Marx’s time gave way to a new form in the late 
1800s and early 1900s. According to Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (2005), whilst 
intellectual property rights, more specifically, the patents system, gave rise to the 
emergence of invention as a business, creative inventors gradually lost their 
independence from large firms. 221  Knowledge production became increasingly 
subsumed under the control of capital during this period, especially with the rise of 
in-house R&D laboratories in large firms: 
As technology became more complex and science-based during the late 
nineteenth century, creative individuals with the requisite skills and 
knowledge may have required more capital to pursue careers at invention 
than local partners (or other traditional sources of funding) could readily 
                                                
219 In his analysis of the chapters on machinery in the 1861-63 manuscript, Smith (2009, p. 
118) says: 
Marx … refers explicitly to the increasing importance of scientific-technological 
knowledge, insisting that there is a structural tendency for science to be subsumed under 
the capital form. As far as these central ideas are concerned, there is nothing new about 
‘new growth theory’. 
220 “It is the analysis and application of mechanical and chemical laws—originating directly 
from science—that enables the machine to perform the same labour as was previously 
performed by the worker. However, the development of machinery takes this course only 
when large-scale industry has already attained a high level of development and all the 
sciences have been forced into the service of capital” (CW29, pp. 89-90). 
221 See also Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (1999). 
165 
provide. The marked decrease by the early twentieth century in the number of 
productive inventors who managed their careers without forming long-term 
attachments with firms, together with the sharp decline in patenting rates in 
the regions where independent inventors had mainly been concentrated, 
suggests that the need to mobilise substantial amounts of capital may indeed 
have operated as a barrier to success in, or even to entry into, inventive 
activity by this period. (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 2005, p. 26) 
For Mirowski (2011), these changes resulted in the establishment of the “captains of 
erudition regime” of American science organisation, which dates back to the 1890s 
and is characterised by the emergence of in-house R&D labs. Against the accounts of 
the history of science in which science has always been essentially commercially-
oriented, he suggests that the organisation and funding of science in the United 
States have undergone transitions from the “captains of erudition regime” through 
the “cold war regime” to the “globalised privatisation regime”, see Mirowski (2011, 
pp. 94-95) for a summary of the characteristics of each regime. More specifically, in 
his account, R&D has gone through fundamental changes over the last 100 years: 
from privately-funded in-house R&D in corporate R&D labs, through semi-public 
funded R&D in semi-autonomous R&D labs, to outsourced and offshored R&D.222 In 
the latter case, R&D and, more generally, knowledge are not only commercially-
oriented but also commodified: 
[D]ependable R&D is a distinct fungible commodity in a well-developed 
market, one so competitive that it can lower the costs relative to doing it 
internal to each firm … [N]o matter how ‘commercialised’ science may or may 
not have been in the previous American science regimes, until recently it was 
this state of affairs that was uniformly absent.223 (p. 122) 
Against this historical background, Arora et al. (2001) explore factors determining 
the extent of the commodification of technology or “the division of innovative 
                                                
222 For Jessop (2007, p. 122): 
Novel features of the current period are the growing application of knowledge to the 
production of knowledge in developing the technical and social forces of production; the 
increased importance of knowledge as a fictitious commodity in shaping the social 
relations of production; and the increased importance of intellectual property as a 
revenue category that modifies the overall distribution of social wealth. 
223 Mirowski (2011, p. 7) explains the transition to the globalised privatisation regime as an 
outcome of neoliberalism: “I argue that much of the modern commercialisation of science 
and commodification of the university has followed a script promulgated by neoliberal 
thinkers”. Whilst he rightly points out the correspondence between material changes and 
ideological expressions, there is a danger that analytical primacy is placed upon the latter. 
See Fine (2012b) for a critique of such a view. 
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labour” (Arora et al., 2001, p. 6).224 The presumption is that the expansion of 
markets for technology is desired in general 225  as firms can benefit from 
specialisation; markets for technology “promote the diffusion and efficient use of 
existing technology and can enhance the rate of technological advance” (p. 8), for 
which intellectual property rights provide an essential institutional framework. It is, 
however, also shown that constraining factors including, but not limited to, context 
dependence, tacitness of knowledge, transaction costs and uncertainty obstruct the 
deepening of R&D outsourcing and commodification. Although these factors are 
seen to harmoniously interact with each other to produce an outcome — the analysis 
is necessarily static — with an emphasis placed upon the institutional factors, their 
analysis precludes a deterministic approach, highlighting the transformative effects 
of technological development and their interplay with intellectual property rights 
and industry-specific competitive conditions in determining the size of the industry-
specific markets for technology.226 
This brings us back to the point that there is no general value theory of intellectual 
property rights and knowledge as their significance on industry structure and 
competition varies across industries.227 In the next section, we will briefly review 
                                                
224 See also Arora and Gambardella (2010). 
225 According to Arora et al. (2001, p. 31), in 1996, “the size of the market for technology in 
North America is [estimated to be] approximately $25 billion; while in Europe and Japan it 
is approximately $6.6 and $8.3 billion, respectively”. Robbins (2009), using the Internal 
Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income (SOI) data, shows that in 2002, the total royalty 
income of all manufacturing industries is $72.7 billion (p. 158). Based on the same data set, 
it is also shown that the average growth rate of royalty income between 1994 and 2004 is 11 
percent (p. 140). 
226 “The rise of markets for technology during the past decade is not an inexorable trend but 
historically contingent. Thus, while markets for technology flourished in nineteenth-century 
America, by the 1930s, the dominant model for privately conducted R&D had become the 
large corporation with an R&D laboratory, and with only limited trade in technology. In the 
last two decades of the twentieth century, technology trades have grown markedly. The 
question is whether in the twenty-first century the two modes will coexist on a more 
balanced basis, or whether there will be a new phase, with R&D integrated almost exclusively 
in large corporations once again … Undoubtedly, the transformation of some of the basic 
institutions of the economic system will profoundly shape how markets for technology 
evolve. As we look ahead, we hope that a little understanding of the past will prove valuable 
in dealing with the important transformations that the future will bring” (Arora et al., 2001, 
p. 287). 
227 This by no means suggests that horizontal critical approaches to intellectual property 
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three cases in which intellectual property rights play important roles but in different 
ways. The aim is both to provide a sketch of a positive and more concrete theory of 
knowledge in contemporary capitalism based on value theory and to point to future 
directions of research. 
6.3. Future directions: (constructive) value theories of 
knowledge  
Digital music and the transformation of the recorded music industry 
The recorded music industry has been undergoing fundamental transformations 
since the invention of the MP3 format by Fraunhofer Institute in 1990. Music 
listeners started copying songs from audio CDs to their computers and portable 
music players and, with the wide adoption of the Internet, increasingly shared them 
amongst one another on an unprecedented scale. Napster, a global P2P file sharing 
network, was founded in 1999 and used by millions for (illegal) sharing of ‘ripped’ 
MP3 files until it was ordered to shut down after only two years of operation due to 
copyright infringement. In 2003, Apple launched the iTunes Music Store which, 
alongside more effective and ruthless copyright enforcement regimes in major 
markets, further accelerated the transition of the recorded music industry from 
physical to digital.228 Another important recent trend in the recorded music industry 
is the rapid growth of music subscription services, although in varying degrees 
across territories. In 2014, global subscription streaming revenues increased by 
39.0%, whereas digital permanent downloads revenues decreased by 8.0% whilst 
still remaining the largest source of digital income (52%) (IFPI, 2015, p. 7). 
There is, however, continuity between physical and digital music. It is not only that 
                                                                                                                                     
rights, especially those focusing on the use of intellectual property rights in commodifying 
the cultural and traditional in the context of globalisation (Drahos, 1996; Drahos & 
Barithwaite, 2002; May, 2006 and 2007; May & Sell, 2006), should be discarded. 
228 In 2014, this ongoing transition reached an important milestone; the industry’s global 
digital revenues (from permanent downloads, streaming service subscriptions, etc.) were the 
same as the physical revenues (from CDs, vinyl LPs, etc.) and will certainly surpass the latter 
in 2015 (IFPI, 2015, p. 6). Between 2007 and 2014, the digital revenues grew at an 
annualised rate of 6.4% globally, whereas the recorded music market as a whole continued to 
shrink, albeit at a diminishing rate (the market contracted by 0.4% in 2014). Inflation-
adjusted recorded music revenues in 2014 were only 30% of those in 2007 (Boluk, 2015, Part 
I, para. 1). Simply put, digital has been failing to offset declining physical sales. 
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physical music still accounts for the half of the recorded music revenues, but record 
labels continue to function as powerful intermediaries between artists and music 
listeners. Although value chain dynamics in the recorded music industry have been 
evolving rapidly, broadly speaking, the traditional artist-label-retailer structure still 
remains. It is therefore important to briefly review how physical music is produced 
and distributed before analysing the results of the interplay between digital 
technologies and intellectual property rights in the recorded music industry.  
Typically, the production of a new album starts with an artist signing a recording 
contract with a record label. The artist, then, produces a master recording of new 
music (recording costs are usually born by the artist), based on which the record 
label’s production department mass produces music CDs. These physical products 
are supplied to retailers mostly through (major) distributors.229 Put differently, the 
record label is an industrial capital (employing workers to produce physical 
products) and the retailer a commercial capital (adding no value to commodities but 
only realising already produced values). The major difference from other types of 
commodities is that knowledge, i.e. master recording, is produced almost entirely 
outside the industrial capital, that is, artists are self-employed knowledge workers. 
In other words, the distinction between knowledge and commodities appears as the 
social division of labour between artists (composing and recording) and record 
labels (manufacturing and distribution). 
Although record labels also play important roles in marketing, promotion and 
supply chain management, whether a new album is successful or not essentially 
depends on the quality of music and cultural meanings attached to it. Therefore, it is 
not only that music is required to produce recorded music commodities, but the 
quantity sold is affected heavily by (the quality of) music. For this reason, royalties 
are paid to artists for each record sold, around 10% of the wholesale price (Passman, 
2014, p. 76).230 Artist royalties, however, cannot be considered as rent although they 
arise from the monopoly of intellectual property, i.e. the copyright in the sound 
recording. First, the copyright in a new album is transferred to the record label when 
a recording contract is signed. It is as if the record label outsources the production 
                                                
229 Major record labels (Universal Music Group, Warner Music Group and Sony Music 
Entertainment) are also recorded music distributors. 
230 The wholesale price of an album is typically 70% of the retail price. 
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of a new recording (R&D) to the artist.231 Second, the core competency of a record 
label lies in its capability of introducing successful new albums and artists on a 
regular basis, not in physical music commodity production. The A&R (Artists & 
Repertoire) department232 of a record label is proactively involved in finding new 
artists, nurturing them and maintaining and managing existing artists. In this 
respect, record labels are an important part of music-making (or knowledge 
production) and not a passive collector of rent: 
The Company [Warner Music Group]’s Recorded Music business primarily 
consists of the discovery and development of artists [emphasis added] and 
the related marketing, distribution and licensing of recorded music produced 
by such artists. (Warner Music Group Corp., 2015, p. 5) 
Following the launch of the iTunes Store and its uniform pricing ($0.99 per song), 
individual (digital) songs became the dominant form of recorded music 
commodities. Whilst this was inevitable given the preponderance of ‘piracy’ at that 
time, this undoubtedly contributed to the rapid decline of recorded music revenues 
as listeners’ behaviour changed from buying a whole album to buying one or two 
‘hit’ songs from the album. On the other hand, this change encouraged wider 
adoption of legal digital music among music listeners and expedited the transition of 
the recorded music industry from physical to digital. The impact of the transition to 
digital on the industry is often discussed from the perspective of supply chain and 
governance (Graham, Burnes, Lewis, & Langer, 2004) with digital technologies 
considered to weaken the role and power of intermediaries such as record labels and 
to facilitate the formation of direct commercial relationships between producers and 
consumers.233 However, a more fundamental impact has been on the relationships 
                                                
231  Some popular artists own the copyrights to their recordings and have control of 
distribution. In addition, regardless of the transfer of the copyright to the sound recording to 
the label, the copyright to the musical work remains with the composers and lyricists.  
232 “A&R executives … are among the most important industry people. They are responsible 
for finding and signing talent, as well as finding songs, matching producers and artists, and 
generally overseeing projects” (Passman, 2014, p. 130). 
233 “In 2013, Macklemore became the first unsigned artist in nearly 20 years to have a 
number-one single in the United States, ‘Thrift Shop’. The track was a grassroots success 
story born on social music sites such as SoundCloud and Hype Machine, rather than in state 
of the art studios and ad agency lofts. And if ‘Thrift Shop’ didn’t scare music labels, 
Macklemore quickly gave them a second reason to be. Three months later, he proved he was 
no ‘one hit wonder’ with another chart topper: ‘Can’t Hold Us’. A third track, ‘Same Love’ hit 
#11 shortly thereafter” (Boluk, 2015, Part II, para. 37). 
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between record labels and retailers; the latter transformed from commercial capitals 
to industrial capitals. For digital distribution, record labels no longer manufacture 
recorded music commodities, but provide the sound recordings (i.e. knowledge) to 
retailers in digital form. Once a song has been purchased, the retailer produces a 
digital copy of the sound recording and delivers it to the customer through the 
Internet. From a retailer point of view, then, a record label is no longer a supplier of 
music commodities, but more or less a group of rights holders wielding significant 
bargaining power through collective licensing.234 Not surprisingly, record labels 
gradually changed the nature of their core business to become recording copyright 
pools, often obstructing innovations on the retailer side.  
With the switch cost between permanent digital music downloads services being 
almost zero, retailers increasingly attempted to differentiate their service offerings. 
For example, in 2011, Amazon launched ‘Amazon cloud player’, a digital locker 
service, which allows users to keep their music collections in the cloud. In 2012, 
Apple introduced ‘Mastered for iTunes’ to optimise the sound quality of master 
recordings for digital distribution. Major digital music retailers also abandoned 
DRM (digital rights management) one by one, to enhance user experiences, 
especially sharing of music across devices. All of these innovations required re-
negotiation of licensing terms with the record labels as their focus had shifted from 
selling physical products to exploiting and seeking new business opportunities and 
securing new revenue streams. Being intellectual property owners vis-à-vis retailers, 
record labels increasingly placed severe restrictions on the use of their intellectual 
properties and, by doing so, constrained retailers’ investments into innovations.235 
The emphasis has been more on securing stable revenue streams to the record labels 
than on expediting the adoption of digital music at the expense of the retailers’ own 
profitability although the retailers preferred the latter. 
This trend has accelerated with the rapid growth of the subscription streaming 
model.236 Music streaming service subscribers neither buy nor own individual songs 
                                                
234 However, for each digital song or album sold, retailers still technically pay the record 
label the wholesale price, about 70% of the retail price, not royalty. 
235 These restrictions cover wide areas, from bundling of products and pricing (e.g. buy one 
get one free) to technical implementations (e.g. how many re-downloads of a purchased song 
are allowed). 
236 Spotify, a subscription streaming service, has been leading the transition of digital music 
from permanent downloads to subscription streaming since its launch in 2008. 
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and albums, but instead get access to the full catalogue with tens of millions of songs 
for a monthly subscription fee. For a subscription streaming service, then, 
individual songs and albums are no longer commodities. Rather, the commodity 
which subscription streaming music services produce and sell is the streaming 
service as a whole, consisting of access to the music catalogue and other service 
features necessary for users to discover and consume digital music such as search, 
recommendations and curated playlists.237 As in the permanent downloads and 
ownership model, about 70% of subscription revenues are distributed to record 
labels and publishers. This portion is, in turn, distributed among record labels and 
artists (through record labels) according to market share calculated based on 
number of streams served. For example, if a record label accounts for 5% of monthly 
total plays, 5% of the label/publisher portion of the monthly revenue is distributed 
to the record label.238  
This new revenue share scheme has set in motion the following tendencies. First, 
whilst record labels (and artists) compete against each other, vis-à-vis subscription 
streaming service providers, they form a united front. They are interested in 
increasing the (collective) share of the label/publisher portion and there is nothing 
to gain from differentiating individual licensing terms.239 It is in this context that 
streaming service providers are often criticised for paying artists much less than one 
cent per play and, by doing so, exploiting them.240 Second, with the (business) 
                                                
237 Not surprisingly, for a subscription music streaming service, obtaining licences from as 
many record labels as possible is a key to the success. For example, it is considered as one of 
the advantages of Apple Music over Spotify that Taylor Swift made her hit album ‘1989’ and 
her back catalogue available for Apple Music after Apple agreed to pay artists royalties 
during free-trial periods as Swift suggested (She removed her back catalogue including ‘1989’ 
in 2014 from Spotify and she is still withholding this album from Spotify at time of writing). 
For more on this topic, see Swift (2015) — her open letter to Apple — and Duboff (2015). 
238 For more on royalty distribution, see Spotify Ltd. (n.d., Royalties: in detail). 
239 This is similar to Marx’s view that capitalists are united as a class whilst competing 
fiercely against each other. “The capitalists, no matter how little love is lost among them in 
their mutual competition, are nevertheless united by a real freemasonry vis-à-vis the 
working class as a whole” (CIII, p. 300). 
240 For a response, see Spotify Ltd. (n.d., Wait, I thought Spotify paid per stream?): 
We [Spotify] personally view ‘per stream’ metrics as a highly flawed indication of our 
value to artists for several reasons. For one, our growing user population might listen to 
more music in a given month than the month before (resulting in a lower effective ‘per 
stream’), while generating far more aggregate royalties for artists. As with any 
subscription service, our primary goal is to attract and retain as many paying subscribers 
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success of record labels (and artists) being tied more closely to the success of 
subscription streaming services, record labels have increasingly intervened in the 
operations of streaming services. For example, record labels have been pressuring 
Spotify to abandon the ad-supported free subscription tier since the revenue stream 
generated from the free-tier is much lower than that for the premium subscription 
(Knopper, 2015; Boluk, 2015). This reflects a clash of interests. Streaming service 
providers’ priority is to build up the subscriber base, free or premium (paid-for), on 
which they can expand their business by offering other products and services.241 On 
the other hand, for record labels, the focus is on developing and exploiting business 
opportunities, intensively and extensively, and maximising the value of their 
intellectual property rights. In short, from a record label point of view, music is a 
“portfolio business” (IFPI, 2015, p. 7). Music can and should be sold, packaged, used 
as marketing tool, and consumed in as many different and commercially viable ways 
as possible since a record label’s success hinges on securing diversified revenue 
streams: 
The strength of the industry today is seen in the wide-ranging portfolio of 
diverse businesses operating in the market. The consumer is now being 
offered an incredible array of music experiences and artists have more 
opportunities to reach the widest possible audience - Francis Keeling, Global 
Head of Digital Business, Universal Music Group. (p. 9) 
Third, with catalogue outselling current releases (The Nielsen Company, 2015) due 
in part to easier content discovery in digital music,242 the importance of A&R is 
questioned. According to Dave Goldberg, “Catalogue provides 50% of the revenue 
and 200% of the profits of recorded music … In addition, streaming revenues tend 
to be more heavily weighted to catalogue. Pandora and Spotify are probably 65% 
catalogue” (Kafka, 2015, para. 12). Hence, “catalogue replenishment [should be] the 
only goal of the new release business … New releases will be tested on consumers 
before added money is spent to ensure that it isn’t wasted” (para. 17).  
In conclusion, digital technologies, in the presence of intellectual property rights, 
have been fundamentally transforming the recorded music industry and the roles of 
                                                                                                                                     
as we possibly can, and to pass along greater and greater royalties to the creators of the 
music in our service.  
241 Major streaming service providers also sell ‘merchandise’ such as t-shirts, concert tickets 
and autographed vinyl records. 
242 An album or a song released more than 18 months ago is categorised as ‘catalogue’. 
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the record labels in particular. As rights holders, record labels attempt to maximise 
the value of their intellectual properties under ever-changing business 
environments, but this cannot be seen simply as passive rent-seeking behaviour. 
Although they do sometimes obstruct innovations, they are putting a lot of effort 
into developing (and exploiting) new business opportunities, shaping and driving 
the development of the industry. Royalty alone is not sufficient to analyse and 
capture the key dynamics in the recorded music industry and, if used in isolation, 
obscures the multifaceted and complex relationships between artists, record labels 
and retailers. 
ARM: Chipless semiconductor company 
A more positive case for intellectual property rights is found in the semiconductor 
industry. During the 1980s and 1990s, the minimum level of capital to maintain 
manufacturing facilities increased rapidly due to ever-intensifying competition on a 
global scale. As a result of this, the traditional model in which vertically-integrated 
companies both design and manufacture semiconductors lost its dominance. 
Specialisation gained momentum, decoupling design (fabless firms) from 
manufacturing (foundries) (Macher, Mowery, & Hodges, 1999; Macher, Mowery, & 
Di Minin, 2008; Brown & Linden, 2008). In addition, there was a further division of 
innovative labour, with the fabless model splitting into fabless companies 
outsourcing chip manufacturing to foundries and chipless companies specialised 
purely in design and licensing intellectual property instead of selling chips (Arora et 
al., 2001, pp. 76-88). It was not only that the distinction between knowledge and 
commodities took the form of the division between fabless firms and foundries in 
the semiconductor industry, but specialisation within chip design further deepened. 
From a technological point of view, this was “a response to the growing complexity 
of chip design” (p. 77), made possible and driven by “the development of 
computerised design tools” and “the standardisation of manufacturing technologies” 
(Langlois, 2013, p. 158). 
ARM is one of the most well-known and successful chipless companies.243 By the 
end of 2014, ARM had licensed its technologies to 389 semiconductor firms (1,198 
licences). Out of 33 billion chips containing a processor produced in 2014, 12 billion 
made use of ARM technologies (a 37% market share). One of the core competencies 
                                                
243 See Bedford (2012) for a brief history of ARM. 
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of ARM is its design of low-power high-performance chips for handheld devices; 
ARM’s market share in the mobile device segment, including smartphones, tablets 
and laptops, was 86% in 2014, up from 59% in 2010, with 2 billion smartphones 
containing at least one chip based on ARM technologies (ARM Holdings plc, 2014 
and 2015).244 
Apparently this chipless licensing model depends greatly on intellectual property 
rights.245 Chip designs are delivered in soft macros (circuit descriptions written in a 
hardware description language) and/or hard macros (physical and graphical 
descriptions specific to a foundry) which, like software source code, can be used an 
unlimited number of times for the production of chips (Greenbaum, 2011). Then, 
without intellectual property rights, from a downstream customer point of view, 
there would be less incentive to enter a multi-year licensing contract, paying royalty 
for each chip produced. On the other hand, a chipless company would try to increase 
the licensing fee portion on the total deal value, raising the minimum capital 
requirements for new capitals to enter the semiconductor industry. Consequently, 
the notion of sharing risks and growing the industry together would dissipate, there 
would be fewer licensing deals and vertical integration would gradually replace 
specialisation. 
The chipless licensing model is generally considered to be mutually beneficial to 
both chipless companies and downstream licensees. With downstream industries, 
ranging from computers to consumer electronics and telecommunications, rapidly 
developing in market size, diversity and performance, there has always been the 
need for better-performing processors. Especially with the introduction of System-
on-Chip (SoC), integrating all the necessary components (e.g. CPU and GPU) 
required to power a computer or smartphone into a single chip, semiconductor 
companies have focused their efforts more on optimising the design of SoC for the 
                                                
244 Vance (2014, para. 5) says, “In fact, you can argue that ARM-based products are now the 
most-used consumer products in the world, outflanking even Coca-Cola and McDonald’s by 
some measures”. 
245  “While licensing and cross licensing of semiconductor patents by semiconductor 
manufacturers may be mainly in response to the complex nature of the product, patents are 
also being used increasingly as a means for defining the property rights on inventions to 
facilitate the trade of these property rights. The creation and enforcement of intellectual 
property, while far from sufficient for a division of innovative labour, is clearly a 
precondition” (Arora et al., 2001, p. 89). 
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downstream customers’ target devices, relying more on ARM and other chipless 
companies such as Imagination Technologies for the basic and fundamental R&D 
(e.g. processor architecture), which otherwise would cost each semiconductor 
company between $50 million to $150 million a year, according to ARM’s 
estimate.246 Basically, chipless companies, especially ARM who owns the intellectual 
properties around the RISC-based ARM architecture based on which ARM 
processors are designed,247 are industry R&D centres248 which are funded by the 
payments of up-front licence fees and per-chip royalties by the semiconductor 
industry as a whole.249 With its success tied to that of downstream customers, ARM 
has been introducing new processor designs which can meet market needs and get 
buy-ins from leading licensees on a regular basis. It is known to work with up to 
                                                
246 “ARM designs technology that once would have been developed by the R&D teams inside 
each company in the semiconductor industry. ARM has demonstrated that it is cheaper to 
license technology than to continue in-house development. The design of an ARM processor 
requires a large amount of R&D investment and expertise. We estimate that every 
semiconductor company would need to spend between $50 million and $150 million every 
year to reproduce what ARM does. This represents an additional $20 billion of annual cost 
for the industry. By designing once and licensing many times, ARM spreads the R&D costs 
over the whole industry and thereby helps make digital electronics cheaper” (ARM Holdings 
plc., 2010, p. 2). 
247 ARM licenses both processors based on the ARM architecture and the ARM architecture 
itself. The latter is licensed by major semiconductor companies such as Qualcomm and 
Apple who design their own processors based on the ARM architecture. For an overview of 
the licensing options ARM provides, see Shimpi (2013). 
248 ARM’s R&D expenditures grew from £139.7 million in 2010 to £224.2 million in 2014. 
During this period ARM’s revenues increased from £406.6 million to £795.2 million and the 
R&D intensity (R&D expenditures / total revenues) was 28.2%. See ARM (2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014, 2015). 
249 Competition among semiconductor companies is, then, centred on SoC design whilst the 
performance of processors continually improves thanks to the industry-wide processor 
architecture R&D performed by ARM and other chipless companies. Interestingly, whilst the 
sectoral knowledge level in terms of computing power has been growing rapidly, doubling 
every two years according to the so-called Moore’s law, this has not entailed as much growth 
in productivity (output per hour of work). Whilst the computing power of a chip is 
determined by transistor density, it is a chip, not a transistor, which is a semiconductor 
commodity. In other words, knowledge production in the semiconductor industry takes the 
form of product quality improvement, not of productivity increase as such. Whilst for Marx, 
an increase in social productivity is beneficial to capitalists by way of increasing relative 
surplus value, for this reason, knowledge production in the semiconductor industry has little 
impact on the rate of exploitation. 
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three semiconductor companies to cover major market segments when it designs a 
new processor. 
In sum, intellectual property rights in the semiconductor industry accelerate capital 
accumulation and the formation of new capitals by enabling specialisation in chip 
design. Whilst ARM and other chipless companies earn royalty payments as record 
labels in the music industry, the nature of intellectual property which is 
economically realised in royalty and its roles in industry dynamics in the 
semiconductor industry are considerably different from those in the recorded music 
industry. 
Apple: outsourcing of manufacturing 
As is the case with the fabless companies in the semiconductor industry, since the 
1980s, there has been a trend of outsourcing of manufacturing that was previously 
performed in-house across industries, for example, the computer, consumer 
electronics and fashion industries. Especially, many multinational companies 
increasingly outsource manufacturing to countries that provide greater access to 
supply chain and/or cheaper labour. 
Outsourcing of manufacturing, or contract manufacturing (Lüthje, 2002), is of 
interest in two respects. First, it presupposes the existence of specialised companies 
in both knowledge production (design) and commodity production (manufacturing), 
respectively. As we have seen in the case of chipless companies, this requires 
intellectual property rights because, otherwise, contract manufacturing companies 
would easily create and sell copycats. Second, when a company outsources 
manufacturing entirely, no direct labour is performed by the workers employed by 
the company. Outsourcing and information commodities are, then, similar to each 
other in the sense that they do not require direct labour in the production process, 
although for different reasons. After all, information commodities are not an 
exceptional case. They should not be taken as a marginal exception which can be 
ignored (as in neoclassical economics) or as the epitome of a new mode of 
production (as in cognitive capitalism theory). Instead, it should be understood as 
an example of the production process configuration in which next to no living labour 
is involved. 
Under a manufacturing service contract, by definition, direct labour for assembly, 
testing and etc. is performed by the workers employed by the contract 
manufacturing company, which basically provides a manufacturing service, 
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essentially an agreed-upon labour time by average worker, to the customer. Such 
manufacturing service, in which labour is usually simple and repetitive, is 
fundamentally distinct from the commodities which the customer produces, by way 
of outsourcing, and sells. For example, Foxconn employees, who assemble and test 
Apple’s iPads, produce contract manufacturing services, not iPads. Like mobile 
apps and digital music for which online purchase and download (content delivery) 
are completely automated, Apple’s iPad production process (from Apple’s point of 
view) should be understood as an automated process connecting suppliers, contract 
manufacturing companies (e.g. Foxconn) and delivery companies, whilst also co-
ordinating between them. Although no Apple employee performs direct labour in 
the production process, Foxconn employees contribute to the value of an iPad 
because their product — contract manufacturing service — is consumed during this 
automated production process, thereby transferring value to iPads in a piecemeal 
fashion. 
This does not mean that the value of an iPad is reduced to the total costs of parts, 
components, manufacturing service, delivery service, etc., which is around $274 at 
time of writing (iPad Air 16GB Wi-Fi model). Apple is well known to have a higher 
level of knowledge, in terms of design, engineering, features and functionality of 
both software and hardware, than its competitors and the average level of 
knowledge in the tablet industry as a whole may be higher than the economy-wide 
social average. 
Therefore, if all direct labours were performed by Apple employees in the US, their 
labour would be virtually multiplied to a significant degree. As Table 1 shows, the 
contract manufacturing cost per iPad is estimated to be only $5, which accounts for 
1% of the retail price and 1.8% of the total costs (costs of goods sold) per device 
excluding delivery. Suppose that wages account for 60% of the total manufacturing 
costs ($3), the average Chinese wage is half the average US wage ($6) and the rate of 
exploitation is 100%. Then, the manufacturing cost per device would go up to $8 (= 
$2 + $6), a new value of $12 (= $6 + $6), instead of $6 (= $3 + $3), would be added 
and $2 would be transferred during the production process. The costs of goods sold 
per iPad (excluding delivery) would then go up from $274 to $277 (= $269 + $2 + 
$6). In other words, by way of outsourcing manufacturing to Foxconn, Apple can 
increase surplus profit per iPad by up to $3 (0.6% of the retail price and about 1.5% 
of estimated surplus profit). Ignoring delivery costs, the individual value (or price of 
production) of an iPad would be $283 (= $269 + $2 + $6 + $6) with Apple’s surplus 
profit being $216, which may or may not include monopoly profit. 
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Preliminary iPad Air Cost 
Estimates Wi-Fi + Cellular Wi-Fi 
Components / Hardware Elements 16GB 32GB 64GB 128GB 16GB 32GB 64GB 128GB 
(Retail pricing) $629 $729 $829 $929 $499 $599 $699 $799 
Implied Margin 51% 56% 60% 61% 45% 53% 58% 59% 
Total BOM Cost $304 $313 $315 $355 $269 $278 $290 $320 
Manufacturing Cost $6 $6 $6 $6 $5 $5 $5 $5 
BOM + Manufacturing $310 $319 $321 $361 $274 $283 $295 $325 
Nand Flash (Memory) $9.20 $18.00 $30.00 $60.00 $9.20 $18.00 $30.00 $60.00 
DRAM (Memory) $10.50 $10.50 $10.50 $10.50 $10.50 $10.50 $10.50 $10.50 
Touch Screen (Display) $90.00 $90.00 $90.00 $90.00 $90.00 $90.00 $90.00 $90.00 
Processor (64bit A7 + M7) $18.00 $18.00 $18.00 $18.00 $18.00 $18.00 $18.00 $18.00 
Cameras (5MP + 1.2MP) $9.00 $9.00 $9.00 $9.00 $9.00 $9.00 $9.00 $9.00 
Wireless Section - BB/RF/PA $32.00 $32.00 $32.00 $32.00     
User Interface & Sensors $10.00 $10.00 $10.00 $10.00 $10.00 $10.00 $10.00 $10.00 
WLAN / BT / FM / GPS (dual-band) $5.00 $5.00 $5.00 $5.00 $5.00 $5.00 $5.00 $5.00 
Power Management $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 $7.25 
Battery (32.9Wh Pack) $19.00 $19.00 $19.00 $19.00 $19.00 $19.00 $19.00 $19.00 
Mechanical / Electro-Mechanical $45.00 $45.00 $45.00 $45.00 $42.00 $42.00 $42.00 $42.00 
Box Contents $6.00 $6.00 $6.00 $6.00 $6.00 $6.00 $6.00 $6.00 
 
Table 1. Preliminary iPad Air2 cost estimates. Source: IHS Technology (2013) 
And suppose once more for illustrative purposes, that iPad-producing labour 
(performed by Apple employees) is virtually multiplied by the factor of 10 and 
therefore a new value of $120, instead of $12, is created during the production 
process. Then, whereas the individual value of an iPad is $283, its social value 
would be $391 (= $269 + $2 + $120).250  
The social value of an iPad would not deviate much in spite of Apple outsourcing 
manufacturing to Foxconn. And given the small manufacturing cost portion of the 
total costs, individual value and surplus profit would not change much either.251 
                                                
250 Ignoring the transformation of values into prices of production, out of $216, Apple’s 
surplus profit per iPad, $108 (= $499 - $391) would be monopoly profit. 
251 Given that an additional surplus profit of $3 is not that large, it is hard to justify 
outsourcing entirely on this basis. Certainly there are other reasons why outsourcing (to 
China) is more favourable. For example, see Duhigg and Bradsher (2012). However, see also 
Cohen and Zysman (1987, p. 7) for the risks involved in outsourcing: 
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More generally, in the presence of intellectual property rights, a capital with 
advanced technologies (e.g. Apple) has a choice of either directly employing 
commodity-producing workers or outsourcing manufacturing altogether. In the case 
of direct employment of workers, the capital can realise surplus profit arising from 
the process of virtual multiplication of commodity-producing labour, in addition to 
(normal) surplus value, with the latter much smaller than the former. 
In the case of outsourcing, the capital with advanced technologies realises surplus 
profit only (the difference between social value and individual value, with contract 
manufacturing costs being a part of the latter) since it does not exploit workers 
directly. Instead the capital purchases contract manufacturing services — means of 
production — from a contract manufacturing company (e.g. Foxconn), which 
realises (normal) surplus value since it employs and exploits workers who perform 
simple and repetitive labour, producing contract manufacturing services. 
In outsourcing, then, intellectual property is economically realised through neither a 
licence fee nor a royalty. Instead, the rights holder realises surplus profit by way of 
purchasing contract manufacturing services on the condition that the rights holder’s 
intellectual properties are used exclusively for manufacturing of the rights holder’s 
products as stipulated in the service contracts. However, the economic benefit 
derived from outsourcing (and intellectual property rights) is no less significant; an 
intellectual property rights holder can focus on, and invest more in, R&D instead of 
maintaining huge manufacturing facilities and employing commodity-producing 
workers.  
Based on the analysis of the three cases, we can conclude that intellectual property 
rights are economically realised in different ways in different industries, of which 
royalties and licence fees are just one. In the recorded music industry, royalties are a 
norm, but record labels and artists increasingly ask for advances (pre-payments of 
royalties), which are recouped over time. For chipless companies, striking a right 
balance between royalty and licence fee is crucial to ensure that their revenues grow 
in tandem with the growth of the industry as a whole whilst reducing risks by 
accepting lump-sum cash payments from each new customer. 
                                                                                                                                     
At the heart of our argument is a contention that … tight linkages tie a broad core of 
service jobs to manufacturing — but on a much larger scale. Shift out of manufacturing 
and it is more likely that you will find that you have shifted out of such services as 
product and process engineering, than into those services. This is true of a large number 
of high-level service activities, the very services that are supposed to drive the argument 
for development by sectoral succession — out of industry and up into services. 
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6.4. Concluding remarks 
This chapter and the thesis as a whole cover only a small part of the (variegated) 
presence of knowledge in capitalism across different levels of abstraction, different 
industries and different spheres of the economy.  
Ideally, each chapter of the three volumes of Capital should be examined with the 
view to make explicit, and properly situate, the role of knowledge specific to the 
scope and level of abstraction concerned, complemented by theories of intellectual 
property rights drawing from industry-specific studies in a similar depth and style to 
Marx’s theory of agricultural ground rent. At the logical level, ultimately the concept 
of productive powers (or forces) could be reconstructed as the most concrete, 
complex and collective form of knowledge encompassing science, technology, modes 
of co-operation and even relations of production (Cohen, 1978; Suchting, 1982; 
Sayer, 1987; Hunt, 1998). However, more importantly, knowledge has always been 
associated with change and historical narrative in theories, discourses and policy 
discussions and, therefore, wedding a logical analysis with a historical one is 
absolutely necessary. For example, the surge of startups in the software, Internet, 
electronics and biotechnology industries since the 1990s cannot be explained 
without referring to financialisation or the unprecedented expansion of interest 
bearing capital, not least venture capital and private equity firms. In addition, 
knowledge, once turned into intellectual property, can accrue a stable stream of 
income and be capitalised (fictitious capital). Patent pooling is used to maximise the 
commercial value of patents and there are even securities backed by intellectual 
properties. In 1997, the famous singer David Bowie raised $55 million by selling 
‘Bowie Bonds’ backed by his recorded music (Celebrity bond, n.d.). The growing 
divergence between market value and book value is often attributed to ‘intangibles’ 
which must be fuelled in part by the easier access to the capital market. Knowledge 
has always been important and economically valuable, but the extent of 
commodification and capitalisation of knowledge in contemporary capitalism is 
probably unprecedented as the continuing growth of markets for technology 
suggests.  
All these cannot be satisfactorily explained solely on the basis of value theory but 
value theory certainly provides a coherent and flexible theoretical framework which, 
in combination with historical materials and contingencies, can provide powerful 
analyses, precisely because all these concrete and complex developments are 
underpinned fundamentally by the value relation, that is, the commodity forms of 
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exploitative social relations. Hopefully, by way of critiques and constructive 
theorisations of knowledge, this thesis takes a small step in the right direction.  
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